Note: 
This summary constitutes no part of the Judgment but is prepared by the Department of Clerks for the Constitutional Court only for the readers’ reference.
Original paragraph numbers that the summarized texts correspond to are put into lenticular brackets after each paragraph. 
In case of any conflict of meaning between the Traditional Chinese version and the translated English version, the Traditional Chinese version shall prevail.

Headnotes

    As the punishment stipulated in Article 4, Paragraph 1, First Sentence of the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act is either a death sentence or life imprisonment, the defendants are still subjected to disproportionately severe punishment even after applying Article 59 of the Criminal Code for mitigating factors in their respective cases. Consequently, the provision restricts the defendant's personal freedom in a way that violates the principle of proportionality in sentencing (the principle that the punishment should fit the crime) and the principle of proportionality, rendering the provision partly unconstitutional. 

    The decision in J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 is thus altered within the scope of this Judgment. 

Background Note

    Article 4, Paragraph 1, First Sentence of the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act stipulates that "[o]ffenders of manufacturing, transporting, or selling Category one narcotics are subject to a death sentence or life imprisonment." 

    Petitioners I to III are judges from Taiwan High Court Tainan Branch Court, Taiwan High Court, and Taiwan Changhua District Court, who were hearing Category One narcotics cases (heroin). Petitioners IV to VIII are defendants of Category One narcotics cases. They are either first-time offenders, subordinates of the primary offender, or involved in relatively petty drug dealings (in terms of the amount of drugs or the monetary amount concerned). 

    The petitioners argued that Article 4, Paragraph 1, First Sentence of the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act (hereinafter "NHPA") prescribes the death penalty or life imprisonment for dealing Category One narcotics, without distinguishing the severity and mitigating factors of individual cases. The petitioners argued that the disputed provision violates the principle of proportionality in sentencing. The disputed provision's severity was once addressed in J.Y. Interpretation No.476 in 1999, in which the TCC ruled proportionate and constitutional. The petitioners also argued that J.Y Interpretation No. 476 should be revised. The petitioners filed for constitutional reviews respectively, and their cases were consolidated.

Summary of the Judgment 

Holding

1. Article 4, Paragraph 1, First Sentence of the NHPA stipulated that "[o]ffenders of manufacturing, transporting, or selling Category one narcotics are subject to a death sentence or life imprisonment." The legislators drafted the provision with life imprisonment as the minimum statutory penalty to prevent hazards brought by narcotics. Although the legislators had their policy considerations, for cases with petty circumstances and clearly forgivable situations—in terms of the pattern of selling, amount and price of the narcotics involved, and whether there were no other crimes committed—the punishment could be disproportionate to the culpability even if the sentences were reduced under Article 59 of the Criminal Code. Within this scope, the disputed provision has imposed a constraint on the people's personal freedom (protected by Article 8 of the Constitution), in a manner which does not conform to the constitutional principle of proportionality in sentencing, thus violating the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution. The competent authority should amend the provision in accordance with this Judgment within a two-year grace period from the day of this Judgment. 
2. From the date of announcement of this Judgment until the provision is amended, courts hearing Category One narcotics cases with the abovementioned petty circumstances, besides applying Article 59 of the Criminal Code, may further halve the sentences in accordance to this Judgment.
3. In addition, considering that the circumstances and harms of Category One narcotic-selling cases differ drastically, applying the disputed provision and sentencing them all to punishments no less than life imprisonment could be overly rigid. The competent authority should review the statutory penalty of the disputed provision and add options other than life imprisonment and the death penalty, or stipulate respective penalties toward cases that involve different amounts and frequencies of selling Category One narcotics.
4. The rest of Petitioner VIII's complaint should be dismissed. 

Reasoning (the parts that repeat with the Holding are omitted)

1. The punishment that the State imposes on the wrongdoers should be fitting to their crimes. If one's punishment exceeds the amount that one should have borne for one's crime, it constitutes a violation of the principle of proportionality in sentencing (the principle that the punishment should fit the crime), consequently violating the principle of proportionality under Article 23 and the protection of personal freedom under Article 8 of the Constitution. (Please refer to J.Y. Interpretation No.775)
2. The disputed provision punishes the selling of Category One narcotics with a statutory penalty of no less than life imprisonment. This stipulation must have been for the reason that Category One narcotics are most dreadful in terms of their abuse and dependence potentials and their hazard towards society. It must have also been for the reason that the action of selling narcotics lies in the root of drug supply, and was deemed of grave hazard and thus needed to be heavily punished. From this sense, this provision does not only serve to prevent drug buyers from being harmed but further emphasizes the protection of all citizen's health, the social order, and national security. The provision can be considered to involve especially important public interest, thus falling under the legislature's policy consideration.【27-28】
3. However, Category One narcotics-selling cases vary drastically in terms of the extremely diverse circumstances. From the perspective of the selling process, the patterns could vary in terms of the organizations, the scale, the amount, the prices, the frequency, and the persons involved (users dealing with each other, people who simply deliver narcotics for the dealers…etc.). The activities of selling narcotics present a spectrum of circumstances of the crime that clearly differ in their severity and the degree of harm toward society. The disputed provision stipulated that the minimum statutory penalty for selling Category One narcotics is life imprisonment based on its legislative purpose of preventing drug hazards. Yet the provision did not provide a sentencing model levelled with cases of different degrees of severity, nor did it provide a mitigating mechanism for minor violations. For cases with petty circumstances or clearly forgivable situations, applying the disputed provision could be excessive and not conform to the principle of proportionality in sentencing even if their sentences were reduced under Article 59 of the Criminal Code. Within this scope, the restriction (the disputed provision) posed toward personal freedom violates the principle of proportionality in sentencing and the principle of proportionality. The decision in J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 should be altered within this scope. The competent authority should amend the provision in accordance with this Judgment within a two-year grace period from the day of this Judgment.【31】
   
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4. The NHPA did set up different statutory penalties for possessing and transferring based on the amount involved. It should be worth referencing when it comes to the punishment for selling Category One narcotics.【38】
   
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