It must be pointed out at the outset that the regulation at issue here as applied by the court in its final judgment is Clause 4 of the Instructions on the Application for and Issuance of Certificates of Self-Tilling Ability issued by the Ministry of Interior and amended on June 22, 1990, and that, while said Instructions were made inoperative on January 28, 2000, and finally repealed on February 18, 2000, we find it appropriate to take up this case under the Law of Procedure for Interpretation by the Grand Justices, Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2, as it gives practical advantage in the protection of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner.
That the transfer of private farmland may be made only to a transferee with the ability to farm the land by himself/herself and that a lessor who desires to reclaim leasehold farmland for the purpose of farming by himself must possess the self-tilling ability are clearly prescribed by the Land Law, Article 30 (deleted on January 26, 2000) and the Statute for the Reduction of Farmland Rent to 37.5 Percent, Article 19, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1. To bring into operation such statutes and the Statute for Agricultural Development as well, the Ministry of Interior, based on the power granted to it as the relevant authority, issued on January 26, 1976, the Instructions on the Application for and Issuance of Certificate of Self-Tilling Ability (rendered inoperative on January 28, 2000, and then repealed on February 18, 2000). Clause 4 of the Instructions amended on June 22, 1990, which makes private and public corporate bodies, natural persons under 16 or over 70 years of age, persons in occupations other than farming, and resident students (except for students of evening schools) ineligible to apply for the certificate of self-tilling ability, thereby increasing difficulties for a transferee of farmland and a lessor of farmland who desires to reclaim the land to prove their self-tilling ability and jeopardizing the right of those who are in reality capable of self-tilling to accept the transfer of farmland or to reclaim their farmland and imposing on lessors a restriction on their property right that is not prescribed by law, causes more than mere inconvenience and minor consequence to the people as secondary regulations concerning detail and technical matters in connection with the enforcement of law would do and is thus inconsistent with the principle of reservation of law as contemplated by Article 23 of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 15 thereof in protecting the property right of the people. Accordingly, the abovementioned clause of the Instructions must be rendered inoperative.
Furthermore, Clause 3, Subparagraph 4, of said Instructions as amended on November 25, 1986, provided: “An applicant whose domicile is not in the same or adjacent hsiang (township, city or district) as the location of the farmland transferred to him/her shall not be deemed to be able to till by himself/herself and shall not be issued a certificate therefor, unless the distance of the traffic route is not more than fifteen kilometers.” This provision was subsequently amended on June 22, 1990, and renumbered Clause 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2, which reads: “A certificate may be issued only if the applicant’s domicile and the farmland transferred to him/her are located in the same county or city or adjacent hsiang (township, city or district) within the boundaries of different counties or cities.” As said provision fails to take into consideration factors such as the mechanization of agriculture and motorization of transportation means, it constitutes jeopardy to the right of those who are in reality capable of self-tilling to accept transfer of farmland or reclaim their farmland and is inconsistent with the purpose of Article 15 and Article 23 of the Constitution. Thus, the relevant part of the text in our Interpretation No. 347 must be modified. Apropos, the provision of the Statute for the Reduction of Farmland Rent to 37.5 Percent, Article 19, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1, is not contrary to the provision of Article 15 of the Constitution for the protection of property rights as we have so held in our Interpretation No. 580.
*Translated by Raymond T. Chu.