The provision of Article 13 of the State Compensation Act that "this Act is applicable where a public functionary with the duty of trial or prosecution who, in the performance of his duty, infringes upon the freedom or right of a person, and is convicted and sentenced by an irrevocable judgment for his crime committed in connection with his duty while taking part in the trial or prosecution of a case" is a special law directed at the characteristics of such duty without having gone beyond the scope of legislative discretion, and is therefore not in contradiction to the Constitution.

       The legislation of the State Compensation Act is based on Article 24 of the Constitution, which provides: "Any public functionary who, in violation of the law, infringes upon the freedom or right of any person shall, in addition to being subject to disciplinary measures in accordance with the law, be held liable under criminal and civil laws. The injured person may, in accordance with the law, claim compensation from the State for damages sustained." When making this law, the legislature is free to use its discretion to set forth reasonable requirements for people*s applications for state compensation. With respect to the liability for damages arising out of or in connection with tortious acts of public functionaries in general, the State Compensation Act provides in Article 2, Paragraph 2, the first sentence: "Where a public functionary who, in performing his duty to enforce the public power, has wrongfully infringed upon the freedom or right of any person as a result of his intentional or negligent act, the State shall be liable for damages sustained by the person." Specifically, the liability for damages arising out of or in connection with tortious acts committed by public functionaries with the duty of trial or prosecution is set forth in Article 13 of the same Act, which provides: "This Act is applicable where a public functionary with the duty of trial or prosecution who, in the performance of his duty, infringes upon the freedom or right of a person, and is convicted and sentenced by an irrevocable judgment for his crime committed in connection with his duty while taking part in the trial or prosecution of a case." 

       Under the current judiciary system, when a public functionary in charge of a trial or prosecution performs his duty, he is vested with the power to render judgment on the questions of facts and law by moral conviction and the opinion in which he firmly believes based on the evidence and other information obtained during a trial or investigation. It is thus inevitable that public functionaries with the duty of trial or prosecution at different levels will disagree with each other’s moral conviction or opinions. Such variance, if any, may be put right by the mechanism already existing within the framework of the judiciary system. In criminal cases, damages are compensable under the system of compensation for wrongful imprisonment. To ensure judicial independence and that no external interference will be applied in prosecution so that fairness and justice may be upheld, any such inevitable variance within reasonable degree must be tolerated and should not be taken by any party as a ground to support his argument that his freedom or right has been wrongfully infringed upon, based on which to claim state compensation. Only in this way will all public functionaries with the duty of trial or prosecution be able to take an impartial position in their efforts to make objective and equitable decisions in adjudication and prosecution without having to be overly cautious, and will the lawful rights of the people be thus protected. In the case where such a public functionary is convicted and sentenced by an irrevocable judgment because of the crime he has committed in connection with his duty while taking part in a trial or prosecution, then the fact that he has wrongfully encroached upon the freedom or right of a person has become rather obvious and is not just a matter of the difference in moral conviction or opinions. When this happens, the State must certainly be held liable for damages in order to conform to the spirit contemplated in the constitutional provision quoted above. 

       It must be noted that the principle of equality embodied in the Constitution does not forbid reasonable variation in statutory provisions regulating the State*s liability for compensation based on dissimilarity in the functions of different organs of the State. In cognizance of this concept, we hold that Article 13 of the State Compensation Act, as a special law directed at the characteristics of the duty of trial and prosecution, is necessary in order to ensure judicial independence, that no external interference will be applied in prosecution, and that said Article has not gone beyond the scope of the legislative discretion and is therefore not in contradiction to Articles 7, 16, 23, and 24 of the Constitution.  

*Translated by Raymond T. Chu.