I.Facts and Summary of the Petitions
A.Factual Background of Original Cases
The Chiayi City Council (hereinafter “Petitioner No. 1”) lodged a petition for constitutional interpretation on May 13, 2021 (the date on which this Court received the petition, and the same shall apply hereinafter), claiming that the following MOHW Letter is in contravention of the institutional protection of the local self-government system and the principle of separation of powers between the central and local governments provided in the Constitution, and hence constitutes an infringement upon local self-government and the City Council’s legislative power, leading to a dispute in the application of the Constitution: MOHW Letter Wei-Shou-Shih-1091304823E of December 31, 2020, which nullified Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the Chiayi City Self-Government Ordinance for Food Safety Management (hereinafter “Self-Government Ordinance No. 1”) promulgated by Petitioner No. 1 on October 16, 2016.
On February 8, 2021, the Taipei City Council (hereinafter “Petitioner No. 2”) lodged a petition for constitutional interpretation and unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations, arguing that the following Executive Yuan Letter infringes upon its power of local self-government: Executive Yuan Letter Tai-Shih-An-1090203692B of December 31, 2020, which nullified Article 9-1 of the Taipei City Self-Government Ordinance for Food Safety (hereinafter “Self-Government Ordinance No. 2”) promulgated by Petitioner No. 2 on December 13, 2016 and declined to approve Article 17-1 of Self-Government Ordinance No. 2 passed by Petitioner No. 2 on November 4, 2020.
On March 24, 2021, the Tainan City Council (hereinafter “Petitioner No. 3”) lodged petitions for constitutional review and unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations, claiming that the following two Executive Yuan Letters had led to divided opinions and a dispute between the Executive Yuan and Petitioner No. 3 over their exercise of powers under the Constitution, and the controversy as to whether the Executive Yuan’s application of statutes and regulations is in conflict with the Constitution: Executive Yuan Letter Tai-Shih-An-1090203692A of December 31, 2020, which nullified Article 11-1 of the Tainan City Self-Government Ordinance for Food Safety Management（hereinafter “Self-Government Ordinance No. 3”), promulgated on September 4, 2017, invalid on and after January 1, 2021; and Executive Yuan Letter Tai-Shih-An-1090044498 of January 8, 2021, which replied in writing to the Tainan City Government that the revised Articles 11-1 and 17-1 of Self-Government Ordinance No. 3 adopted on December 1, 2020, had not been validated.
On October 12, 2021, the Taichung City Council (hereinafter “Petitioner No. 4”) lodged a petition for constitutional review and unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations, claiming that the following Executive Yuan Letter arguably infringes upon its power of local self-government: Executive Yuan Letter Tai-Shih-An-1090203692B of December 31, 2020, which nullified Articles 6-1 and 13-1 of the Taichung City Self-Government Ordinance for Governing Food Safety and Sanitation (hereinafter “Self-Government Ordinance No. 4”) promulgated on September 25, 2017.
On March 15, 2022, the Taoyuan City Council (hereinafter “Petitioner No. 5”) lodged a petition for constitutional interpretation and unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations, claiming that the following Executive Yuan Letter is in contravention of the institutional protection of the local self-government system and the principle of separation of powers between the central and local governments provided in the Constitution, arguably infringing upon its power of local self-government: Executive Yuan Letter Tai-Shih-An-1090203692C of December 31, 2020, which nullified Article 12 of the Taoyuan City Self-Government Ordinance for Food Safety Management (hereinafter “Self-Government Ordinance No. 5”) promulgated on November 5, 2019, and declined to validate the revised Articles 12 and 22 (the penalty provision of Article 12) of the same Ordinance adopted on October 30, 2020.
B.Summary of the Petitioners’ Statements
1.Petitioner No. 1
Petitioner No. 1 argued that: MOHW Letter of December 31, 2020, which nullified Article 6, Paragraph 2 of Self-Government Ordinance No. 1 invalid on and after January 1, 2021, constitutes an infringement upon the autonomous right of local counties/cities in self-government matters and the legislative power therein, and is in contravention of the institutional protection of the local self-government system and the principle of separation of powers between the central and local governments provided in the Constitution. Food safety issues concern people's daily lives, making it a self-government matter that local governments may regulate with local legislation. While Article 15, Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act only stipulates that MRL standards for the veterinary drug (beta-agonists) in food may be established by the central competent authority, the said MRL standards shall be merely considered the minimum standard. Article 6, Paragraph 2 of Self-Government Ordinance No. 1 at issue does not contravene the principle of proportionality, since it does not prohibit the sale of all pork products, but only ractopamine-fed pork; furthermore, as the sale of ractopamine-fed pork had never been allowed before, continuing the prohibition of its sale has less restrictive impact on city residents’ freedom of business, and at the same time protects their right to health. In addition, whether to prohibit the sale of ractopamine-fed pork at the local level vis-à-vis whether to allow the import of ractopamine-fed pork touches upon matters of distinct natures. Last, despite the mandate to conduct risk assessments based on the citizen’s dietary habits as per Article 15, Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act, the MOHW’s mere reference to international trade policy proved that the MOHW failed to act in line with the minimum protection requirement or the purpose of constitutional protection of the right to health.
2.Petitioner No. 2
a.In Regard to the Petition for Constitutional Interpretation
Petitioner No. 2 argued that: Article 9-1 and Article 17-1 (the latter being passed in November 2020) of Self-Government Ordinance No. 2 govern the local self-government matters that fall into the categories of matters related to “consumer protection in the special municipality” and “health administration in the special municipality” as stipulated in Article 18, Subparagraph 7, Item 4 and Article 18, Subparagraph 9, Item 1 of the Local Government Act, respectively. Thereby, the Executive Yuan’s Letter that rendered invalid and declined to validate the said provisions of Self-Government Ordinance No. 2 is in contravention of the institutional protection of the local self-government system, as provided in Article 118 of the Constitution. In addition, as Article 9-1 of Self-Government Ordinance No. 2 had been submitted to the Executive Yuan and completed the registration process, the Executive Yuan violates the estoppel principle by notifying in writing and rendering invalid the same provision at a subsequent time. With reference to J.Y. Interpretation No. 738 and academic opinions, the residue limit for Ractopamine in pork as stipulated in Article 3 of the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods shall only be considered the minimum standard. To protect the city residents’ right to health, the local government may adopt a stricter, zero-tolerance standard, which is in line with the protection of the right to health under Article 22 of the Constitution and the Gesetzesvorbehalt principle and proportionality principle under Article 23 of the Constitution. The MRL standards for Ractopamine in imported pork as stipulated in Article 3 of the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods contravene the essence of and go beyond the scope of authorization granted by Article 15, Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Food Safety Act. The said standards further contradict Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Food Safety Act, which specifies the legal requirements for the competent authority to follow in governing food safety as well as the mandate to establish a risk assessment and advisory system. The said standards also go in conflict with the principle of equality under Article 7 and the protection of the right to health under Article 22 of the Constitution. Lastly, the following provisions—Article 26, Paragraph 4, Article 30, Paragraph 1, and Article 32, Paragraph 3 of the Local Government Act as well as Article 1, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3, Item 2 and Article 1, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 3, Item 2 of Uniform Procedures for Validating or Registering Local Self-Government Ordinances and Regulations Submitted to the Executive Yuan which rendered local self-government ordinances, which are passed by the legislative body of the local government, hierarchically lower than laws and regulations of the central government, in fact add restrictions that are not prescribed by the Constitution and allow the central government to issue regulations as per statutory authorization so as to limit the legislative autonomy on local self-government matters. As such, this has violated the core realm of local self-government and contravenes the institutional protection of the local self-government system provided in the Constitution.
b.In Regard to the Petition for Unifying Interpretation of Statutes and Regulations
Petitioner No. 2 claimed that: The Executive Yuan erred in applying the law when determining Article 9-1 of Self-Government Ordinance No. 2 in contravention with Article 15, Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act and rendering it invalid. Therefore, a unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations is warranted.
3.Petitioner No. 3
a.In Regard to the Petition for Constitutional Interpretation
Petitioner No. 3 argued that: The Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods (authorized by Article 15, Paragraph 2 of the Food Safety Act), on whose Article 3 the Executive Yuan based its decision to nullify and decline to validate the provisions of Self-Government Ordinance No. 3 passed by Petitioner No. 3, is not enacted as “law” as per Article 107, Subparagraph 11 of the Constitution. Moreover, Article 118 of the Constitution grants special municipalities the power of local self-government to adopt ordinances for matters in regard to “consumer protection in the special municipality” under Article 18, Subparagraph 7, Item 4 as well as “health administration in the special municipality” under Article 18, Subparagraph 9, Item 1 of the Local Government Act. Therefore, the Executive Yuan, although citing Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 18 of the Constitution as the basis, infringes upon special municipalities’ authority to regulate such matters and hence the core realm of local self-government. The provisions of Self-Government Ordinance No. 3 at issue aim for protecting the health of local consumers, and hence are more in line with the requirements of the right to health under Article 22 of the Constitution. The procedure of “notifying in writing and rendering invalid” as stipulated in Article 30, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Local Government Act, and the procedure of “replying not to [validate]” as authorized by the Uniform Procedures for Validating or Registering Local Self-government Ordinances and Regulations Submitted to the Executive Yuan, altogether add restrictions that are not prescribed by the Constitution and thus infringe upon the core of local self-government. These procedures further fail to provide legislative bodies of local governments with opportunities to state their opinions ex ante or appeal for remedies ex post, and thus contravening the equitable principle of law—ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy).
b.In Regard to the Petition for Unifying Interpretation of Statutes and Regulations
Petitioner No. 3 argued that: Petitioner No. 3 of the Food Safety Act, the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods, and the Local Government Act, when exercising its authority, is in disagreement with the Executive Yuan such statutes or regulations when nullifying and declining to validate the said provisions in its Letters. This petition for a unifying interpretation is thereby submitted.
4.Petitioner No. 4
a.In Regard to the Petition for Constitutional Interpretation
Petitioner No. 4 argued that: In accordance with Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 18, Paragraph 2 and Article 110, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Constitution, Article 9 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution, and Article 18, Subparagraph 7, Item 4 and Subparagraph 9, Item 1 of the Local Government Act, along with the meanings and purposes of J.Y. Interpretation No. 550, matters related to consumer protection and health administration in special municipalities both fall within the scope of local self-government. In addition, the Food Safety Act and related MRL standards stipulated by the central government shall be deemed merely as minimum standards. Local self-governing bodies may exercise their authority to local self-government and adopt stricter standards adaptive to local conditions. Therefore, the Executive Yuan Letter of December 31, 2020, which nullified Article 6-1 and Article 13-1 (the penalty provision) of Self-Government Ordinance No. 4 at issue, infringes upon the Petitioner’s power of local self-government.
b.In Regard to the Petition for Unifying Interpretation of Statutes and Regulations
Petitioner No. 4 argued that: The Executive Yuan and the Petitioner hold different views over whether Self-Government Ordinance No. 4 at issue is in conflict with Article 15, Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act and Article 3 of the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods. Hence a unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations shall be warranted.
5.Petitioner No. 5
a.In Regard to the Petition for Constitutional Interpretation
Petitioner No. 5 argued that: Since matters of public health are within the scope of local self-government, local governments have the authority to adopt stricter standards adaptive to local conditions. The Executive Yuan Letter that rendered invalid and declined to validate the related provisions of Self-Government Ordinance No. 5 at issue contravenes the institutional protection of the local self-government system and the principle of separation of powers between the central and local governments provided in the Constitution. Therefore, the said Letter infringes upon the Petitioner’s power of local self-government.
b.In Regard to the Petition for Unifying Interpretation of Statutes and Regulations
Petitioner No. 5 argued that: The Executive Yuan and the Petitioner hold different views over whether the zero-tolerance standard for ractopamine set in Self-Government Ordinance No. 5 at issue is in conflict with Article 15, Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act and Article 3 of the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods. Therefore, a uniform interpretation of statutes and regulations shall be warranted.
II.Grounds for Petition Admissibility and the Proceedings
A.Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4
On May 13, 2021, Petitioner No. 1 lodged a petition to this Court for constitutional interpretation regarding the provisions in Self-Government Ordinance No. 1, which had been adopted by the Petitioner and been nullified by the MOHW Letter (as shown in attached tables 1 and 2). As per the proviso of Article 90, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA, Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the then effective CIPA shall apply. As such, this Court considered the petition as satisfying the requirements of Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the CIPA as well as Article 30, Paragraph 5 of the Local Government Act and the relevant criteria set by J.Y. Interpretation No. 527, and accordingly granted review on December 23, 2021. In addition, on February 8, March 24, and October 12 of the same year, Petitioners Nos. 2 to 4, respectively, lodged petitions for constitutional interpretation regarding the provisions at issue in Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 2 to 4, which had been adopted separately by the Petitioners and been nullified respectively by the Executive Yuan Letters. On December 23, 30, and 23 of the same year, this Court, respectively, considered the petitions as satisfying the above-mentioned requirements and so decided to admit the petitions for review. Given that the nature of these disputes is identical to that of Petitioner No.1, this Court decided to consolidate the said petitions into a joint case and render a single decision.
As for the petitions for constitutional interpretation lodged by Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 against the Executive Yuan and the MOHW, which had declined to validate Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, the ground for admitting the petition is to adjudicate disputes over authorities. Article 30 of the Local Government Act does not explicitly enumerate the refusal of competent authorities of the central government to validate self-government ordinances as a ground for petitions to the Judicial Yuan for constitutional interpretation (see Article 2, Subparagraph 4 and Article 26, Paragraph 4 of the same Act). Nevertheless, a self-government ordinance would not take effect if the competent authority of the central government declines to give validation, and this has a legal effect no different from that of rendering the ordinance invalid in writing after its entry into force. Accordingly, when legislative bodies of local governments disagree with the reasons with which a competent authority of the central government declines to validate their ordinances and thus see the rejection to be an encroachment of their power of local self-government under the Constitution, the nature of the case should be regarded as a dispute in the application of the Constitution between the central and local governments over the exercise of their respective powers. This constitutes a dispute over authorities between government agencies as stipulated in Article 5, Paragraph 1, the middle section of Subparagraph 1 of the CIPA. The review is granted accordingly.
As for the petitions of Petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 for unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations, since the issues therein mostly fall into the category of constitutional interpretation rather than that of disagreement about the interpretation of statutes and regulations, the petitions do not meet the requirements of unifying interpretation set forth in Article 7, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the CIPA, and hence shall be dismissed.
B.Petitioner No. 5
Following the oral arguments held by this Court on February 22, 2022, Petitioner No. 5 lodged a petition for constitutional interpretation and unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations on March 15, 2022 regarding the provisions in Self-Government Ordinance No. 5, which had been adopted by Petitioner No. 5 but nullified or declined to validate by the Executive Yuan Letter (as shown in attached tables 1 and 2). It is noted that Petitioner No. 5 filed the petition after the CCPA came into force, and hence the admissibility of this petition shall be decided in accordance with the CCPA.
As per Article 83, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the CCPA, in a dispute arising from the case of self-government ordinances and regulations being nullified or not being validated by the supervisory authority as is notified in writing, when the local self-governing body has exhausted all ordinary judicial remedies and considers that the unfavorable final court decision infringes upon its powers of local self-government laid down in the Constitution, it may file a petition to the Constitutional Court for a judgment declaring the relevant final court decision unconstitutional. Accordingly, after [the CCPA came into force on] January 4, 2022, when a local self-governing body lodges a petition to this Court with regard to self-government ordinances, the requirements set forth in Article 83, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the CCPA shall be met, and Article 30, Paragraph 5 of the Local Government Act and other relevant provisions shall henceforth cease to apply.
It is noted that Petitioner No. 5 has not initiated any administrative litigations or exhausted all ordinary judicial remedies. The subject matter of the petition is therefore not an unfavorable final court decision, but a dispute between government agencies. Hence, the petition filed by Petitioner No. 5 fails to meet the admissibility requirements set forth in Article 83, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the CCPA.
Secondly, Petitioner No. 5 also argued that its petition satisfies the requirements set forth in Article 30, Paragraph 5 of the Local Government Act and by J.Y. Interpretation No. 527, and that the said provisions of Local Government Act and J.Y. Interpretation qualify “other legislation provid[ing] for petitions to the Judicial Yuan for interpretation” as stipulated in Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA, which provide grounds for filing a petition for constitutional interpretation.
In light of the linguistic meanings and legislative purposes of Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the CCPA, while other legislation provides a ground for submitting petitions to the Judicial Yuan for interpretation (such as Article 30, Paragraph 5, Article 43, Paragraph 5, and Article 75, Paragraph 8 of the Local Government Act, as well as Article 30, Paragraph 3 of the Referendum Act), after the CCPA came into force, such petitions shall not be admitted by this Court unless they meet the requirements of respective litigation categories set forth in the CCPA. This does not, however, prevent this Court from admitting petitions involving categories or procedures not explicitly stipulated in the CCPA out of procedural autonomy of this Court (such as petitions for supplementary opinions to expound without overruling previous Judicial Yuan Interpretations or Decisions).
However, Article 92, Paragraph 2 of the CCPA provides that “[f]or petitions . . . under Article 83, Paragraph 1, the peremptory period of six months will run from the effective date of this Act if the service of the relevant final court decision is made prior to the [effective date] of this Act. The proviso to Article 90, Paragraph 1 and Article 91 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the adjudication of such petitions.” Accordingly, a local self-governing body receiving an unfavorable final court decision while the CIPA was in force may still lodge a petition for a constitutional court judgment declaring the statutes or regulations applied in such a decision unconstitutional during the transition period of six months after the effective date of the CCPA. In addition, during the time when the CIPA was still in force, a legislative body of a local government might have been able to—in accordance with the Local Government Act and the meanings and purposes of J.Y. Interpretation No. 527—lodge a petition for constitutional interpretation against a Letter nullifying self-government ordinance, without first seeking administrative remedies and with no peremptory time limit. In fact, during the period when the CIPA was in force, even if local self-governing bodies or their legislative or executive branches were to initiate an administrative litigation, the administrative courts would have dismissed such litigation. Consequently, without allowing relevant transition periods in the CCPA for cases similar to that of Petitioner No. 5, the CCPA fails to provide adequate protection for local self-governing bodies or their legislative or executive branches to file constitutional litigations as a right to judicial remedy. Therefore, with reference to Article 92 of the CCPA and its legislative purposes, if local self-governing bodies or their legislative or executive branches lodge a petition to this Court within six months after the CCPA came into force and satisfy the admissibility requirements set forth in the CIPA, the Local Government Act, and the relevant J.Y. Interpretations, admission to such petitions shall still be granted.
In summary, this Court shall grant admission to the petition for constitutional interpretation lodged by Petitioner No. 5. As for the petition for constitutional interpretation with regard to the Executive Yuan Letter that nullified or declined to validate the Self-Government Ordinance at issue, this Court decided to consolidate all the petitions of Petitioners Nos. 1 and 5 into a joint case and render a single decision given the similarity of the subject matters and sameness of the issues. In regard to the petition for unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations, given that the issues therein mostly fall into the category of constitutional interpretation rather than that of disagreements about the interpretation of statutes and regulations, and that the [CIPA] category of petitions made by government agencies is no longer available in the provisions of Chapter VIII of the CCPA regarding unifying interpretation of statutes and regulations, local self-governing bodies or their legislative or executive branches do not thenceforth have standing to file a petition for unifying interpretation. Therefore, the petition for unifying interpretation lodged by Petitioner No. 5 is not in the prescribed form set forth in Article 15, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 7 of the CCPA, and shall hence be dismissed.
C.The Procedure of Oral Argument Sessions
At 9:30 a.m. on February 22, 2022, this Court held oral arguments and summoned Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4, authorities concerned (the Executive Yuan and the MOHW), and expert scholars to appear in court and state their opinions. Petitioner No. 5 did not participate in the oral arguments, since it lodged petitions after the closing of the oral arguments sessions.
The statements made by Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 in the oral argument sessions are summarized as follows: Regarding the management policy on ractopamine-fed pork import, the MRL standards stipulated by the MOHW were not in line with the purpose of constitutional protection of the right to health, since the MOHW failed to provide rigorous and persuasive risk assessments and did not base its determination on the citizen’s dietary habits as required by Article 15, Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act. The authorities concerned of the central government did not allow the use of ractopamine on domestically-produced pork, and long adopted a policy that primary and secondary schools, the National Sports Training Center, and the military shall supply domestically-produced pork in principle. Such policies are at odds with the said MRL standards and the policy of allowing import of ractopamine-fed pork, and this differential treatment has violated the principle of equality. Food safety management is not an exclusive authority of the central government. Rather, food safety management is also matters of local health administration and consumer protection. Therefore, in accordance with the Constitution and the Local Government Act, local self-governing bodies may formulate and enforce their respective self-government ordinances and regulations. The said standards established by the central government shall be considered the minimum standard, and hence local self-governing bodies may stipulate a (more stringent) “not detected” standard in their self-government ordinances. While foreign trade matters are exclusive authorities of the central government as per Article 107, Subparagraph 11 of the Constitution, the issues of import and local sales involve different levels of consideration, and [the prohibition of local sales] does not necessarily constitute barriers to trade, and whether local sales are allowed has nothing to do with foreign trade matters. The remaining statements can be found in the written submission for oral arguments.
The statements made by the authorities concerned (the Executive Yuan and the MOHW) in the oral argument sessions are summarized as follows: Articles 108 to 110 of the Constitution stipulate the legislative and administrative matters that are allocated respectively to the powers of the central and local governments. The opening sentence of Article 111 of the Constitution further provides that any non-enumerated matters shall be allocated to the jurisdiction of the central and/or local governments based on the nature of subject matters. Even though this principle of balance of powers remains abstract, J.Y. Interpretation No. 738 has pointed out that it should be interpreted in a direction that can best adapt to local conditions. Article 15, Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Food Safety Act authorize the competent authority of the central government (the MOHW) to establish MRL standards for veterinary drugs residue, and such authorization does not violate Articles 108 and 111 of the Constitution. As pork and pork products circulate nationwide, no particular local conditions need to be taken into consideration. Further, the zero-tolerance standards set in the self-government ordinances contradict the principle of proportionality. In addition, Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 1 to 4 do not provide the same rules for the same matters (such as not imposing the exact zero-tolerance requirements for meats other than pork). This constitutes differential treatment and hence violates the principle of equality. Furthermore, the import, transportation, and sale of foreign pork indeed fall within the scope of foreign trade policies set forth in Article 107, Subparagraph 11 of the Constitution. Allowing the local governments to establish their own standards may in effect supersede the exclusive authorities of the central government, and further constitute unlawful barriers to trade and violate relevant international law obligations. The remaining claims can be found in the written submission for oral argument.
Upon careful consideration of the petition briefs and the statements made by each parties in the oral argument sessions, we hereby make this judgment based on the following reasons:
III.Review of the Admitted Petitions
A.The Constitutional Principle of Delineation of Powers between the Central and Local Governments
1.Framework Provisions of the Constitution
Regarding local self-government and the delineation of powers between the central and local governments, Chapter 10 of the Constitution and Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution explicitly list the matters in which the central government, provinces, and counties respectively shall have the power of legislation and enforcement. Neither the Constitution nor the Additional Articles of the Constitution explicitly provides provisions that accord direct protection regarding the self-government matters of special municipalities; instead, Article 118 of the Constitution authorizes the Legislative Yuan to prescribe such provisions by law. As a matter of interpretation, the authorities to self-government of special municipalities may be more than, equal to, or less than those of provinces and counties, which are explicitly protected by the Constitution, thus giving legislators of the central government a certain degree of discretion in this regard. However, in terms of the constitutional practice concerning local self-government in our country, the legislators of the central government have set the level of autonomy for special municipalities equivalent to that of provinces before the later were “frozen” (virtualized), but above that of counties/cities (see Article 3, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Local Government Act). As for the self-government matters of special municipalities covered by and protected under the Constitution, they are virtually identical to that of counties/cities (see Articles 18 and 19 of the Local Government Act). Accordingly, for the disputes over the separation of powers on food safety standard setting in this case, special municipalities and counties/cities shall enjoy the same powers and authorities and be subject to the same restrictions, therefore no distinction is merited.
In light of the meanings and purposes of Chapter 10 of the Constitution, and Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution, for disputes over the separation of powers between the central and local governments, when there are relevant provisions explicitly provided in the Constitution or the Additional Articles of the Constitution, such provisions shall apply. For instance, Article 107 of the Constitution enumerates matters that the central government shall have the exclusive power of legislation and administration. Article 108 of the Constitution also provides for matters that the central government shall have the power of legislation, while allowing the central government to enforce on its own or delegate the power of enforcement to local governments. The provision regarding the self-government of provinces in Article 109 of the Constitution has been frozen and ceased to apply in accordance with Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution. Article 110 of the Constitution then specifies the self-government matters that counties shall have the power of legislation and administration. Consequently, in a case that involves the dispute over the separation of powers between the central and local governments, we shall first examine whether there are relevant provisions explicitly provided in the Constitution or the Additional Articles of the Constitution that may serve as a basis for interpretation in specifying the delineation of powers between the central and local governments. Only when there are no explicit provisions and when it is not possible to determine by interpretation whether the matter is within the power of the central or local governments considering its nature, shall the dispute be settled by the Legislative Yuan by way of political means, according to Article 111 of the Constitution (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 769).
2.The Nature of Disputes and Constitutional Provisions Involved in this Case
As for the dispute of MRL standards for ractopamine residue in imported meat products in this case, Article 15, Paragraph 2 of the Food Safety Act states: “The standards governing the permissible tolerance of pesticide or veterinary drugs residue . . . mentioned in Subparagraph 5 . . . of the preceding paragraph shall be prescribed by the competent authority [of the central government] through consultation with the relevant authorities.” Paragraph 4 of the same Article states that “Beta-agonists shall not to be detected via tests in domestic and foreign meat products and other meat-related products[ unless otherwise permitted in accordance with a] tolerance [standard set by the competent authority of the central government based on a risk assessment taking into consideration of] the citizens’ diet[ary] habits.” These provisions explicitly authorize and allow the MOHW, the competent authority of the central government, not to adopt a zero-tolerance standard, but instead to prescribe an MRL standard. With this authorization, the MOHW, following the COA, Executive Yuan Notice Nung-Fang-1011473960 of September 7, 2012, amended and promulgated Article 3 of the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods on September 11, 2012, which established the MRL standard for ractopamine residue in beef. Following the COA Notice Nung-Fang-1091472241 of September 7, 2020, the MOHW further amended and promulgated Article 3 of the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods (entry into force on January 1, 2021) on September 17, 2020 and its Appendix for the MRL standards for ractopamine residue in pork (see footnote 6 in the Appendix to Article 3 of the Standards).
In contrast to the MRL standards for ractopamine residue in beef and pork adopted by the MOHW, Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 1 to 4 adopted by Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 at issue explicitly stipulate that any beta-agonists (including ractopamine) shall not be detected via tests in pork and pork products. Moreover, Self-Government Ordinance No. 5 adopted by Petitioner No. 5 explicitly provides that beta-agonists (including ractopamine) shall not be detected via tests in meat, such as beef, chicken, and pork, and meat products. Accordingly, by way of Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 1 to 5 at issue, Petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 each adopted stricter zero-tolerance standards for ractopamine residue in certain meat products that differ from the above-mentioned central government laws and regulations. They then claimed that the provisions of these self-government ordinances fall within the scope of local self-government and the legislative power therein, which are protected by the Constitution. This led to the petitioners’ dispute over the authorities with the central government.
This disputes of MRL standards for ractopamine residue in imported meat products concerns issues of the separation of legislative powers between the central and local governments, rather than the separation of their enforcement powers. More specifically, for public health matters stipulated in Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 18 of the Constitution, the central government shall have the power of legislation and enforcement, but it may delegate the power of enforcement to the provincial and county governments. By definition, the central government has the power of legislation in governing food safety standards. However, Article 110, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Constitution also stipulates that counties shall have the power of legislation and enforcement in public health matters of counties. Therefore, it raises the question whether local governments may claim that they have the power of legislation based on this provision and then set relevant standards in their self-government ordinances, which differ from those set in laws and regulations of the central government and exclude the application of these laws and regulations in their jurisdictions.
In addition to the Constitutional provisions mentioned above, the establishment and implementation of safety standards for (imported and domestically produced) food also concern the manufacturing, trading, transporting and importing/exporting of foods. Therefore, when deciding this dispute, we shall also take into account the following Constitutional provisions: Article 107, Subparagraph 11 and Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 3 and 10 of the Constitution, which respectively refer to matters of “international trade policy,” “commerce,” and “agriculture and [animal husbandry] enterprises covering two or more provinces” (all of the above are within the competence of the legislative body of the central government), as well as Article 110, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 1 and 5 of the Constitution, which respectively referring to matters of “[county] industries” and “[county] fishery [and] animal husbandry” (both are within the competence of county legislative bodies).
In light of the above Constitutional provisions, except for international trade policy matters whose legislative power belongs exclusively to the central government, the legislative power of the matters of (public) health, agriculture, fishery and animal husbandry matters appear to be shared among central and county/city governments. Therefore, these provisions do not provide a decisive ground for jumping into a conclusion that the legislative power over the establishment of food safety standards shall be exclusively enjoyed by the central government, or be shared by the central and local governments, while both having their own core realm of legislative power protected by the Constitution. Yet there indeed are explicit provisions on the allocation of powers in the Constitution, the dispute in this case does not amount to the non-enumerated matters stipulated in Article 111 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the plain texts of above provisions cannot provide a crystal clear answer either. Therefore, to delineate the said legislative powers between central and local governments, further interpretation based on both the systematic examination as well as the normative purposes of the Constitution is needed.
3.The Legislative Power of a Local Self-Governing Body in Self-Government Matters Shall Be Bound by the Constitution and Central Government Laws and Regulations in a Unitary State System
In regard to the system of vertical separation of powers of governments, our Constitution adopts a unitary state system rather than a federal state system. The Constitution explicitly enumerates matters that the central government shall have the exclusive power of legislation in Articles 107 and 108; at the same time, however, it does not explicitly enumerate matters that local governments shall have exclusive power of legislation or enforcement. Other powers of the government, such as judicial power, examination power, and control power, likewise belong exclusively to the central government. Moreover, self-government matters of the county stipulated in Article 110, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution can all find corresponding provisions or provisions with similar nature in Articles 107 and 108 of the Constitution, so there are simply no county self-government matters completely or absolutely immune from the legislative power of the central government. In other words, the provisions of Articles 107 to 110 of the Constitution regarding matters and scopes of central government, province, and county legislative powers are not mutually exclusive or completely separate. Rather, the normative structure is one similar to concentric circles, in which each county self-government matter (the small circle) is housed within its corresponding municipality self-government matter (the middle circle), further covered by the legislative power of the central government (the large circle). As for the self-government matters of special municipalities, Article 118 of the Constitution authorizes the central government to decide through legislation, and as such there are no core matters of local self-government directly protected by the Constitution.
In a unitary state system under the Constitution, local governments do not have the legislative power, by way of passing self-government ordinances, over matters that fall within the realm of the central government’s exclusive legislative power. Local governments, at most, shall not go beyond issuing relevant self-government ordinances or rules on the enforcement of the said matters pursuant to the authorization of laws of the central government, provided that local ordinances or rules are not in conflict with laws of the central government in any other way. By contrast, even for local self-government matters protected by the Constitution, local governments shall be bound by and shall not contradict the Constitution and laws of the central government. This is the very meanings and purposes of Article 125 of the Constitution, which states that “[county] rules and regulations that are in conflict with national laws, or with provincial rules and regulations, shall be null and void.” The similar can be found in Article 108, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which states that “[w]ith respect to the various items enumerated in the preceding paragraph, the provinces may enact separate rules and regulations, provided these are not in conflict with national laws.” As a matter of interpretation, the legislation of special municipalities on self-government matters shall likewise be subject to the constraints no less than those imposed upon the said county legislation. This means special municipalities may not contradict the Constitution and laws of the central government, and the principle of preemption of central statutes shall apply. In this regard, the foregoing has been made clear by J.Y. Interpretation No. 738, which states that “. . . the related self-governing regulations and ordinances promulgated by the respective local governing bodies may be applicable only if they do not contradict the Constitution and the laws” (see the Reasoning of the Interpretation, Paragraph 2). Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the Local Government Act, which reads: “Self-government ordinances [shall become invalid] if contradictory to the Constitution, laws, regulations promulgated in accordance with law, or self-government ordinances of the superior self-governing bodies[,]” is enacted by the central government exactly to ensure the above-mentioned unitary state system.
4.The Scope and Limits for the Local Government to Exercise its Self-Government Legislative Power Adaptive to Local Conditions
Aside from the legislative matters explicitly and exclusively allocated by the Constitution to the central government (see Articles 107 and 108 of the Constitution), each county shall enjoy self-government legislative and enforcement power for Article 110 matters where they “concern the [county]” in nature (see Article 111 of the Constitution) considering that the spirit of local self-government is to adapt to local conditions. The aforesaid also applies to special municipalities for matters “concerning the special municipality” in nature. Notwithstanding these self-government matters governed through a local organic act or an act of a regulatory nature, the central government may still have power to regulate the same by laws and enjoy a reasonable degree of legislative discretion (such as the Local Government Act or the Act Governing Local Tax Regulations). However, in order to uphold the purposes of the constitutional protection of local self-government, such central government laws should leave enough room for local legislative or enforcement discretion in self-government matters. Meanwhile, when exercising their self-government legislative and enforcement power, local governments shall attend to the scope and limits therein.
Any local self-governing body, be it a county/city or a special municipality, has its own jurisdiction, which defines the realm and boundary that the local self-government legislative and enforcement power shall and can reach. Hence, for matters that “concern the county” or “concern the special municipality” in nature, the realm and boundary of the local self-governing body’s enforcement power naturally shall correspond to its jurisdiction. Except as otherwise provided by law, it is self-evident that the executive authority of local self-governing bodies shall not, in principle, exercise its enforcement power across counties/cities or special municipalities. In principle, when the legislation of a local self-governing body aims to regulate individuals, matters, or objects that fall within its respective local jurisdiction, it should be deemed as acting within the scope of local self-government legislative power; whereas individuals, matters, or objects that fall outside the respective local jurisdiction should not be subject to the local self-government legislative power.
As for whether the legislation of a local self-governing body merely regulates individuals, matters, or objects within its respective local jurisdiction or exceeds the said boundary, the determination shall be based on the linguistic meaning of the provisions of the self-government ordinances as well as the regulatory effects and practical ramifications. While a self-government ordinance, on its textual face, regulates merely individuals, matters, or objects within the respective local jurisdiction, if its regulatory effects or application have a direct, close, and substantive impact on individuals, matters, or objects outside its jurisdiction, the regulatory subjects of the self-government ordinance, in effect, shall be considered exceeding the jurisdiction of the county/city or special municipality. Accordingly, such regulatory subjects shall be regarded as matters across local jurisdictions or even national matters in nature, and hence shall not be delegated entirely to local self-governing bodies for legislation and enforcement. Even if they may be jointly undertaken (enforced) by the respective counties as per Article 110, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, the legislative power therein shall be allocated exclusively to the central government (see the meanings and purposes of Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 9 and 10 of the Constitution). Having said that, considering the differences between localities, the central government may delegate the enforcement of these matters to local governments.
B.Local Governments Shall Not Stipulate Self-Government Ordinances in Contravention with Statutory Standards Set by the Central Government because the Establishment of MRL Standards for Ractopamine Residue in Meat Products are Legislative Matters of the Central Government
1.The Establishment of the MRL Standards at Issue Is a National Matter in Nature and Accordingly Falls within the Competence of the Legislative Body of the Central Government
For domestic and foreign meat products and meat-related products sold nationwide, if each local government is allowed to have its own MRL standards, it would inevitably cause direct, close, and substantive impact on the extraterritorial buyers and sellers, as well as on the sale and delivery of such products outside each jurisdiction. For instance, food products containing beef or pork sold on the train travelling across different counties and cities would face varying legal treatments or uncertainties regarding the legality of the sale of such products, rendering the general public bewildered. Accordingly, the establishment of food safety and sanitation standards shall be considered a national matter in nature, hence it falls under Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 3 and 18 of the Constitution, which respectively define the matters of “commerce” and “public health” that the central government shall have the power of legislation.
On the premise of the Constitutional provisions mentioned above, Article 15, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 5 of the Food Safety Act has it that “Foods or food additives with any one of the following circumstances shall not be manufactured, stored, sold, imported, exported, presented as a gift or publicly displayed: . . . 5. [T]hose with pesticide or veterinary drugs residue exceeding the permissible tolerance.” Regarding the standards governing the permissible tolerance (MRL standards) referred to in Subparagraph 5, they “shall be prescribed by the competent authority [of the central government] through consultation with the relevant authorities,” as Subparagraph 2 of the same Article explicitly stipulates. The Act does not authorize local governments to establish different standards on their own. Furthermore, other Articles on food raw materials and ingredients also fall within the competence of the central legislative body so as to uphold the meanings and purposes of the above constitutional provisions. Such Articles include Article 15-1 on “items and restrictions for the raw materials[ and ingredients]” permissible for food use, Article 18, Paragraph 1 on “product names, specification, use and limitation of food additives,” and Article 21, Paragraph 2 on “genetically modified food raw materials.” In conclusion, the MOHW’s decrees on MRL standards for ractopamine residue in imported beef and pork have been explicitly authorized by the Food Safety Act, and at the same time in line with the meanings and purposes of Article 108 of the Constitution, which stipulates that such matters fall within the competence of the legislative body of the central government.
2.The Self-Government Ordinances at Issue Are in Conflict with Central Government Laws and the Constitution
While, on its face, the related provisions of Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 1 to 5 may seem to regulate merely individuals, matters, or objects within their respective local jurisdictions, the regulatory effects or application apparently have direct, close, and substantive impacts on individuals, matters, or objects outside their jurisdictions. The regulatory effects or application of the said self-government ordinances therefore exceed the jurisdictions of the respective local self-governing bodies, as they impose restrictions on matters across local jurisdictions or even on matters of national nature. In conclusion, Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 1 to 5 at issue clearly exceed the scope and limits of local self-government legislative power, therefore contravening the said central government laws, including the above-mentioned Article 15, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 5, Paragraph 2, and Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act, and violating the essences of Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 3 and 18 of the Constitution.
3.In Light of the Differences between J.Y. Interpretation No. 738 and this Case, the Two Cases Shall be Distinguished, so the Conclusion of the Former Cannot be Applied Analogically Here
The Petitioners cited J.Y. Interpretation No. 738 as a basis to argue that the matters their Self-Government Ordinances at issue regulate fall within the competence of the legislative bodies of local governments. While the above Interpretation concludes that, for the restriction on distance concerning electronic gaming arcades in the respective jurisdictions of local self-governing bodies, they may adopt stricter requirements than those under the central government laws, the Interpretation at the same time pointed out that Article 11 of the Electronic Game Arcade Business Regulation Act enacted by the central government expressly gives local competent authorities the power to issue, void, or revoke the business rating certificate for electronic game arcade business, and to conduct relevant registration matters. Thus, local governments may promulgate self-government ordinances adaptive to local conditions to regulate self-government matters stipulated by law, to the extent that they do not encroach upon laws and regulations of the central government (see the Reasoning of J.Y. Interpretation No. 738, Paragraph 3). However, the MRL standards in this case, which are set by the Petitioners’ respective self-government ordinances and stricter than their central counterparts, are promulgated without the authorization of and in conflict with laws and regulations of the central government. Moreover, their regulatory effects apparently go beyond the residents within the jurisdictions of the Petitioners and constitute intervention in the rights and obligations of residents outside the respective jurisdictions. This underlines the differences between the said Interpretation and this case, and hence the conclusion of the former shall not be applied analogically here.
4.Summary
To sum up, to uphold the purposes of Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 3 and 18 of the Constitution, which respectively define the matters of “commerce” and “public health,” the legislators explicitly designate the above-mentioned food safety and sanitation matters as ones falling within the competence of the legislative body of the central government. In particular, with regard to the MRL standards for ractopamine residue in meat products, Article 15, Paragraph 4 of the Food Safety Act, and the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods prescribed under the authorization of the Paragraph, are manifestly set by the legislators to be applicable nationwide. Therefore, self-government ordinances shall be bound by these rules, and shall not stipulate otherwise. Even if local governments may issue rules concerning technical details on the above-mentioned matters as a basis of enforcement, such rules shall not contravene the said central government laws.
Accordingly, the zero-tolerance standards set in the Petitioners’ self-government ordinances are promulgated without the authorization of laws of the central government, and in clear conflict with the Food Safety Act and relevant central regulations authorized therein. As per Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the Local Government Act, authorities in charge of the supervision of local self-governing bodies shall have the power to nullify or decline to validate self-government ordinances.
As for whether the MRL standards set by the central government provide sufficient protection to people’s right to health, or whether there is scientific evidence showing that different local standards can better protect such right, they touch upon questions of expertise in risk assessment and shall be answered by the competent authority of the central government based on scientific evidence in accordance with statutory procedures. Moreover, it suffices to say here that the dispute over the appropriateness of the said MRL standards differs by nature from that over the separation of powers between the central and local governments, hence falls outside the scope of this judgment.
In addition, the Petitioners claim that the authorities of the central government fail to provide equal treatment by allowing the import of meat products with ractopamine while banning the use of ractopamine in domestically-produced ones. The Petitioners further claim that it obviously constitutes differential treatment for the central government to require pork used in school lunches provided by primary and secondary schools, and meals provided in the National Sports Training Center and the military to be domestically-produced. As such, both measures violate the principle of equality. However, for the former claim, it is a question of national industrial policy choices; furthermore, it is domestic livestock enterprises rather than local self-governing bodies that are subject to differential treatment. As for the latter, allowing the import of a product does not equal to the mandatory use of it. It is the importer and retailer of pork (with and without ractopamine) rather than local self-governing bodies and their agencies that are subject to the relatively unfavorable differential treatment caused by the above procurement policies. Accordingly, it should be pointed out that the Petitioners’ claims are neither relevant to the dispute over the separation of powers between the central and local governments, nor involving the issue of the violation of the principle of equality and consequent infringement upon the right to local self-government.
The Zero-tolerance MRL Standards for Imported Meat Products Set in the Petitioners’ Self-government Ordinances Contravene the meanings and purposes of Article 148 of the Constitution on the Free Movement of Goods within the Country
Article 107, Subparagraph 11 of the Constitution explicitly stipulates that the power of legislation and enforcement for matters of foreign trade policies is exclusively conferred on the central government. In compliance with the relevant provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreements (WTO Agreements), [including] the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which this country formally accedes to and is bound by, the central government allows the import of beef and pork with ractopamine residue successively, but at the same time continues to prohibit the use of the said veterinary drug domestically. Therefore, the Petitioners’ Self-government Ordinances clearly target imported meat products as their regulatory objects (Self-Government Ordinances Nos. 1 to 4 impose restrictions on the import of pork and pork products [with ractopamine residue], and Self-Government Ordinance No. 5 prohibits beef, chicken, and pork, and their meat products [with ractopamine residue]), and are aimed at banning the goods that are legally allowed to import by the central government. While such regulations do not directly contradict Article 107, Subparagraph 11 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the legislative power of international trade policy matters belongs exclusively to the central government, they constitute domestic market barriers that may indirectly affect the implementation of this country’s foreign trade policies as well as the compliance of relevant international trade agreements, potentially leading to violation of international law obligations. While violating international law externally does not necessarily constitute a violation of the Constitution internally, this Court shall take such effects into consideration and strive to seek for harmonization between international and domestic laws when weighing and deciding whether the legislative power over the food safety standards at issue shall be exclusively enjoyed by the central government, or be shared by the central and local governments.
Article 148 of the Constitution explicitly stipulates that “[w]ithin the territory of the Republic of China, all goods shall be permitted to move freely from place to place”. While this provision is set in Chapter XIII—Fundamental National Policies of the Constitution—it does not entirely lack legal effects. Instead, the effects of this provision shall be determined in light of its regulatory content and nature. To ensure the realization of the aim set under this provision, when exercising its public authority, the state (including central and local governments) shall not go against this aim as the bottom line; and it may certainly adopt necessary measures to remove de jure and de facto obstacles that impede or obstruct the free movement of goods within the country. Moreover, this provision refers to the entire country as its scope of application, which clearly has the meanings and purposes to ensure the free movement of goods across local jurisdictions.
In accordance with the meanings and purposes of Article 148 of the Constitution, all lawful goods shall be permitted to circulate freely, except for those subject to restrictions or prohibitions by law, so as to prevent the formation of domestic market barriers that go against the normative objectives of this Article. In this case, the meat products containing ractopamine are both food products and [lawful] goods, and as they are legally permitted by the central government for import, they shall also be protected under Article 148 of the Constitution. It is noted that Petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 all enacted self-government ordinances prohibiting the sale of meat products containing ractopamine and setting out penalties for violations. Petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 further prohibit the export, import, manufacturing, processing, preparation, packaging, transportation, storage, gifting, and public display of ractopamine-fed pork, thereby completely prohibiting the commercial activities of ractopamine-fed pork importers, such as the sale and delivery in their respective local jurisdictions. Even if the importers do not register for business operation within the jurisdictions of the respective Petitioners, they are subject to such regulation. Furthermore, the above-mentioned self-government ordinances also deny consumer autonomy in their respective jurisdictions in deciding whether to consume meat products containing ractopamine, as well as relevant businesses’ freedom to use such products or not. In practice, the regulatory effects of such ordinances essentially amount to proclaiming meat products containing ractopamine as unlawful goods within their jurisdictions. Such prohibitions would even apply to meat products containing ractopamine being transported from A county/city to B county/city and result in penalties merely because they pass through the jurisdiction of Petitioner No.3 or No.4. The restrictions and penalties imposed by the Petitioners’ respective self-government ordinances clearly have regulatory objectives and effects that exceed the scope of their jurisdictions and therefore are inconsistent with the spirit of local self-government that is to adapt to local conditions.
By citing health protection as the basis, the Petitioners’ respective self-government ordinances established stricter MRL standards for ractopamine in meat products than those adopted by the central government, therefore prohibiting the sale and delivery of meat products containing ractopamine in their respective jurisdictions. Consequently, these ordinances also contravene the meanings and purposes of Article 148 of the Constitution that ensures the free circulation of goods within the country.
IV.Conclusion of this Judgment
In summary, the MRL standards for beta-agonists residue (including ractopamine) in imported meat and its products concern all the citizens’ freedoms and rights in relation to health and goods transactions. Further, to ensure the free circulation of domestic goods, the establishment of the said MRL standards shall be a national matter in nature. Therefore, according to Article 108, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 18, and Article 148 of the Constitution, this matter falls within the competence of the legislative body of the central government.
Special municipalities and counties/cities, in implementing the aforementioned legislative matters of the central government, may enact self-government ordinances and regulations, provided that they are not in conflict with laws of central government. However, if such ordinances and regulations conflict with laws of the central government, the competent authorities in charge of the supervision of local self-governing bodies shall have the power to nullify or decline to validate such ordinances and regulations based on relevant provisions of the Local Government Act.
The decisions made by the MOHW and Executive Yuan that nullified or declined to validate the self-government ordinances amended by Petitioner No. 1 and Petitioners Nos. 2 to 5, respectively (as shown in attached tables 1 and 2), do not exceed the scope of authority granted by the Constitution to the central government to supervise local self-governments and therefore are constitutional.
The rest of the petitions from Petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 are dismissed.