Article 31, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 11 of the Police Personnel Management Act provides: “A police officer shall be dismissed by the appointing authority, or the agency or school authorized thereby, under any of the following circumstances: … (11) Where, after offsetting rewards and demerits in the same performance evaluation year, the cumulative record has reached two major demerits.” This provision does not conflict with Articles 7 and 18 of the Constitution, which guarantee the people’s right to equality and the right to hold public office, nor with Article 77 of the Constitution, which entrusts the Judicial Yuan with the authority over disciplinary actions of public officials.

        The remainder of the petition is dismissed.

        I. Summary of Petitioners’ Statements

        The Petitioner, a firefighter of the Kaohsiung City Government Fire Department (rank: Police Officer, Grade 4), accumulated two major demerits after offsetting rewards and demerits during the 2014 performance evaluation year (from January 1 to July 16, 2014). Pursuant to Article 31, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 11 of the Police Personnel Management Act, as amended and promulgated on July 11 of 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the provision at issue”), and Paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Kaohsiung City Government issued an order (No. 10304482600, September 4, 2014) dismissing the Petitioner from office, with suspension from duty prior to the finalization of the dismissal. The Petitioner sought review from the Civil Service Protection and Training Commission, which rejected his request. The Petitioner then filed an administrative lawsuit, which the Kaohsiung High Administrative Court 104-Su-162 (2015) dismissed as groundless. On appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court 106 pan-76 (2017) rendered a final judgment, hereinafter referred to as “the final judgment”), dismissing the appeal as groundless.The Petitioner contended that the provision at issue, as applied in the final judgment, resulted in unreasonable differential treatment due to legislative omissions: once police and firefighting personnel accumulate two major demerits within a single performance evaluation year, they must be dismissed immediately, unlike ordinary civil servants who, under Article 12, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Civil Service Performance Evaluation Act, may still offset demerits with merits before the year-end evaluation. The Petitioner further argued that the provision does not limit the underlying causes of rewards and demerits to events occurring within the same performance evaluation year, thereby raising concerns of violating Articles 7 and 18 of the Constitution, which guarantee the right to equality and the right to hold public office. In addition, the Petitioner claimed that the 2003 amendment to Articles 25, Paragraph 1, First Sentence; 72, Paragraph 1; 77, Paragraph 1; 78, Paragraph 1; and 84 of the Civil Service Protection Act created different remedies by distinguishing between “rights matters” and “management matters,” in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the right to judicial remedy. Moreover, as the provision at issue in essence constitutes a disciplinary action, is nevertheless enforced by an administrative agency, thereby inconsistent with Article 77 of the Constitution, which requires that disciplinary power be exercised by the Judicial Yuan. The Petitioner thus petitioned this Court for a constitutional interpretation, for supplementary interpretations of J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 243, 298, 323, and 785, and asked this Court to overturn J.Y. Interpretation No. 583.

        II. Grounds for Granting Review and the Court’s Proceedings

        1. The Provision at Issue

        According to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (hereinafter the “CCPA”), cases that were already pending but not concluded prior to the enforcement of the amended Act shall, unless otherwise provided by the Act, be governed by the provisions as amended. However, the admissibility of such cases shall be determined in accordance with the provisions prior to amendment.Where a person claims that his/her constitutionally guaranteed rights have been unlawfully infringed and has, in accordance with statutory procedures, instituted litigation, if there is doubt as to whether the law or order applied in the final judgment contravenes the Constitution, such person may petition for a constitutional interpretation. This is explicitly provided in Article 90, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA and Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (formerly the Constitutional Court Justices Adjudication Act, hereinafter the “CCJA”).The CCPA came into force on January 4, 2022. Since this petition was filed on August 9, 2017, its admissibility shall be determined under the CCJA. Upon review, the petition regarding the provision at issue conforms to Article 90, Paragraph 1, Proviso of the CCPA and Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the CCJA, and shall therefore be admitted.

        2. Other Claims

        (1) Additionally, the Petitioner requested supplementary interpretations of J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 243, 298, 323, and 785, and asked this Court to overturn J.Y. Interpretation No. 583. However, upon review, the final judgment of the underlying case did not apply J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 298, 323, or 583. Moreover, with respect to civil servants who object to unlawful administrative dispositions, inappropriate management measures, or matters concerning their working conditions, they may seek remedies through administrative litigation depending on the nature of the measures. This has already been addressed by J.Y. Interpretation No. 785. Therefore, it is not  necessary at all for this Court to render any further interpretations on this issue. At the same time, this part of the petition does not conform to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Justices Adjudication Act (CCJA), and pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the same Article, shall not be entertained.

        (2) The Petitioner further argued that the 2003 amendment to the Civil Service Protection Act—specifically, Article 25, Paragraph 1, First Sentence; 72, Paragraph 1; 77, Paragraph 1; 78, Paragraph 1; and 84 of the Act—established different remedial procedures by distinguishing between “rights matters” and “management matters,” thereby allegedly violating the constitutional guarantee of the right to judicial remedy. However, Articles 25, Paragraph 1, First Sentence and 72, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Service Protection Act merely provide that civil servants, against improper or unlawful administrative dispositions rendered by their employing agency or personnel authority, may seek administrative complaint, and upon dissatisfaction with the complaint’s decision, may further seek judicial remedies through the courts. In the present case, the Petitioner had already filed for administrative complaint for review in accordance with the foregoing provisions, and upon rejection, sought judicial remedy. Therefore, the Petitioner’s right to file for review and to bring administrative litigation has not been unlawfully infringed by the above provisions, and thus the requirements for petitioning for constitutional interpretation are not met. As to Articles 77, Paragraph 1; 78, Paragraph 1; and 84 of the same Act, J.Y. Interpretation No. 785 has already addressed the Petitioner’s concerns, holding that these provisions do not contravene the constitutional guarantee of the right to judicial remedy under Article 16 of the Constitution. Accordingly, there is no need for further interpretation. In other words, this part of the petition also does not conform to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the CCJA, and pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the same Article, shall not be entertained.

        III. Legal Grounds for the Holdings

        1. Summary of Oral Arguments by the Petitioner and the Relevant Government Agencies

        This Court held an oral argument hearing at 3:00 p.m. on March 29, 2022, and notified the Petitioner as well as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Civil Service (hereinafter the “relevant agencies”) to appear and present their opinions. The gist of their statements is summarized as follows:

        (1)	Petitioner’s Arguments

        The Petitioner argued that the provision at issue does not restrict the underlying causes of rewards and demerits to events occurring within the same performance evaluation year, thereby preventing the Petitioner’s administrative performance from being fairly evaluated. This may even result in being removal from public office and loss of salary, thus violating the constitutional guarantees under Articles 7, the right to equality, and Article 18, the right to hold public office. Furthermore, dismissal is the most severe measure depriving a civil servant of his/her status, which is not reasonably within the scope of disciplinary actions that may be unilaterally imposed by administrative agencies. Accordingly, the provision at issue also contravenes Article 77 of the Constitution, which entrusts the Judicial Yuan with direct authority over disciplinary actions of public officials.

        (2)	Relevant Agencies’ Arguments

        (i) The Ministry of the Interior: The Ministry contended that the provision at issue, which provides for dismissal based on mid-year performance evaluation, takes into account the differences in duties and responsibilities between police/firefighting personnel and ordinary civil servants. Its purpose is to allow immediate actions in order to maintain leadership, command authority, and team discipline, thus serving an important public interest. The differential treatment has a legitimate and reasonable substantive connection with its purpose. Moreover, the state should be afforded broad discretion in determining whether an individual is fit to serve as a public official. Since the provision addresses practical needs of administrative authority, it should be reviewed under a lenient standard. Therefore, the provision does not violate the constitutional guarantees of the right to equality and the right to hold public office. The Ministry of the Interior further argued that the provision concerns administrative sanctions, whereas the disciplinary power vested in the Judicial Yuan under Article 77 of the Constitution refers specifically to judicial disciplinary actions, not to administrative sanctions. Given the unique nature of police and firefighting duties, the regulation on dismissal through mid-year performance evaluation does not violate Article 77 of the Constitution.

        (ii)The Ministry of Civil Service: The Ministry argued that the legislative formation of the provision at issue was based on special considerations and backgrounds. Although it creates differential treatment between police/firefighting personnel and ordinary civil servants in terms of the right to hold public office through examinations, such differentiation is justified by the differences in the nature of their duties. Since police officers serve as state law enforcement personnel, exert significant influence on the public interest, their personnel management follows a system of strict rewards and severe penalties, with particular emphasis on discipline and the timeliness of sanctions. The provision at issue is connected with the foregoing objectives. Moreover, individuals subject to dismissal may still re-enter public service by passing the national civil service examinations or according to other relevant civil service regulations. Hence, the provision cannot be regarded as in violation of the constitutional guarantees of the right to equality or the right to hold public office. The Ministry also argued that although the Judicial Yuan holds the authority to discipline civil servants, this does not preclude administrative authorities from exercising their power to impose rewards and sanctions, including dismissal. Even when an administrative superior issues a dismissal order, the affected civil servant may still seek judicial remedy through proper procedures. Therefore, the disciplinary authority of the Judicial Yuan and its position as the highest disciplinary body are not undermined. Accordingly, the provision at issue does not violate Article 77 of the Constitution or infringe upon the rights of the dismissed personnel.

        2. The Provision at Issue Does Not Contravene the Constitutional Guarantee of Equality and the Right to Hold Public Office under Articles 7 and 18

        (1)	Principle of Review【18】

        The right to equality guaranteed by Article 7 of the Constitution does not absolutely prohibit all forms of differential treatments. Based on constitutional values and legislative purposes, the legislature and relevant authorities may, in light of the differing nature of the matters regulated, establish reasonable differential treatments. Whether a legal norm satisfies the requirements of the principle of equality depends on whether the legislative purpose underlying the differential treatment is constitutionally legitimate, and whether the classification adopted bears a sufficient degree of relation to the achievement of that purpose. Article 18 of the Constitution guarantees the people the right to hold public office, including the right to serve as central or local civil servants. However, civil servants are of various types, and their duties differ in nature. Referring to Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution, the state is required to enact laws governing the appointment, selection, rank, remuneration, protection, retirement, and survivor benefits of civil servants, thereby regulating their rights and obligations. In principle, the legislature enjoys discretion in forming such laws and may adopt different rules based on the distinct nature of various categories of civil servants. Nevertheless, since the right to hold public office constitutes part of the broadly defined right of political participation, involving the people’s participation in the formation of the national will and the execution of public affairs, and closely relates to the public order, any differential treatment imposed on this right—particularly where it concerns dismissal from public office—shall generally be subject to intermediate scrutiny. The legislative objective must serve an important public interest, and there must be a substantial nexus between the differential treatment adopted and the achievement of that objective. Only then may it be deemed consistent with the constitutional guarantees of the right to equality and the right to hold public office.

        (2) The Provision at Issue Also Applies to Firefighting Personnel

        The provision at issue explicitly provides: “A police officer shall be dismissed by the appointing authority, or the agency or school authorized thereby, under any of the following circumstances: … (11) Where, after offsetting rewards and demerits in the same performance evaluation year, the cumulative record has reached two major demerits.” This subparagraph was added by the amendment promulgated on May 6, 1997. In the amendment of December 11, 2002, only the opening clause of Paragraph 1 was revised by changing the dismissing authority from the “competent authority” to the “appointing authority or its authorized agency or school,” while the rest of the provision remained unchanged. In the amendment of July 11, 2007, only the title of the Act was revised, without revising the essence of substantive content of the provision.【21】The management of personnel serving in firefighting agencies who hold police officer ranks is governed by the Police Personnel Act and other relevant regulations. Specifically, Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the Organic Act of the National Fire Agency of the Ministry of the Interior and Article 39-1 of the Police Personnel Act both expressly provide that personnel matters of firefighting officers designated as police officers shall be handled pursuant to the Police Personnel Act. Since the Petitioner in the present case is a firefighter classified as a police officer, the provision at issue is also applicable to the Petitioner.

        (3) Difference Between the Provision at Issue and the Civil Service Performance Evaluation Act

        The provision at issue differs from the Civil Service Performance Evaluation Act. Article 12, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of that Act provides: “Rewards and demerits in ordinary performance evaluations may offset each other. Where there is no offset and the cumulative record reaches two major demerits, the year-end evaluation shall be graded D.” Article 7, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 4 further provides: “The year-end performance evaluation shall be graded as follows: … Subparagraph 4, Grade D: dismissal.” In other words, when police officers have accumulated two major demerits, they are subject to immediate dismissal. By contrast, for ordinary civil servants, the accumulation of two major demerits does not automatically lead to dismissal; only if, at the year-end performance evaluation, the accumulation of two major demerits remains, may they be rated as Grade D and thereby dismissed. As a result, with respect to whether dismissal follows immediately upon the accumulation of two major demerits, a differential treatment indeed exists between the two categories.

        (4) The Objective of the Provision at Issue Is to Pursue an Important Public Interest

        Admittedly, police are tasked with maintaining public order, protecting social security, preventing harm, and promoting the welfare of the people. Under the Police Act, they exercise the following powers: “(1) issuing police orders; (2) imposing penalties for violations; (3) assisting in the investigation of crimes; (4) executing searches, seizures, detentions, and arrests; (5) enforcing administrative measures; (6) using police equipment; (7) matters relating to police functions such as security, public morality, traffic, health, firefighting, disaster relief, business and construction, urban order, household registration, and foreign affairs; (8) other duties prescribed by law” (see Articles 2 and 9 of the Police Act). It is evident that the methods, processes, and results of police duties are closely related to the safety of the people’s lives, physical safety, liberty, property, as well as the maintenance of social order. The provision at issue was added by the amendment promulgated on May 6, 1997. Its content is similar to Article 32 of the draft amendment to the same Act submitted by the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan in 1989 (which was not passed). The legislative rationale of that draft explained: “As for incompetent police officers who consistently perform poorly in ordinary evaluations, repeatedly incur minor demerits, and show no improvement despite counseling, once their accumulated record reaches the equivalent of two major demerits, under the Civil Service Performance Evaluation Act, they could only be dismissed after being graded D at the year-end evaluation. However, since the police are an armed unit carrying weapons on duty, failure to promptly take decisive action could easily lead to accidents, seriously undermining leadership and discipline. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct special evaluations for immediate dismissal. Conversely, for outstanding police officers who are diligent, dedicated, and risk their lives in maintaining public security, once their accumulated rewards reach the equivalent of two major merits, they should also be promptly given special evaluations to provide encouragement, thus achieving the timely effect of rewarding the good and eliminating the unfit.” (See The Legislative Yuan Gazette 86(23): 18, 32–33; see also the Directorate-General of Personnel Administration, Executive Yuan Letter 1080047924 of November 22, 2019). It is therefore clear that the provision at issue was designed to promptly remove police officers who have reached the statutory threshold for dismissal due to disciplinary violations, in order to prevent threats or harms to the people’s lives, physical safety, liberty, property, and social order, thereby actively safeguarding the people’s security and maintaining social order. Its purpose is thus to pursue an important public interest.

        (5) Substantial Connection Between the Differential Treatment and Its Objective

        Police officers typically perform their duties directly in the presence of the public and are authorized by law to adopt various coercive measures (see Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Police Duties Enforcement Act). Thus, the manner, process, and outcomes of their performance often directly affect the safety of the people’s lives, property, and liberty, as well as the maintenance of social order. Once police officers exhibit misconduct, such as passively neglecting their duties, failing to perform duties according to law, abusing authority through unlawful means, or demonstrating lax discipline in the course of duty, people’s lives, physical safety, liberty, and property, as well as social order, may face imminent threats. By contrast, ordinary civil servants generally exercise public authority within the administrative hierarchy, and their actions are typically subject to internal direction, supervision, and multiple levels of review before being externally executed. This clearly differs from the manner in which police officers perform their duties. Accordingly, higher standards of discipline are required of police officers than of ordinary civil servants, and tolerance for their misconduct must also be lower. Considering the unique nature of police duties, the provision at issue requires immediate dismissal of police officers who, within a single performance evaluation year, accumulate two major demerits after offsetting rewards and demerits. This measure bears a substantial connection with achieving the important public interest pursued by the provision.

        (6) Conclusion

        For the reasoning aforementioned, although the provision at issue differs from the Civil Service Performance Evaluation Act, its purpose is to pursue an important public interest, and the differential treatment it adopts bears a substantial connection with the achievement of that legislative objective. Therefore, the provision at issue does not contravene the constitutional guarantees of the right to equality and the right to hold public office.

        3. The Provision at Issue Does Not Violate the Constitutional Guarantee of the Right to Hold Public Office under Article 18

        The petitioner further contends that the offsetting of rewards and demerits should be limited to facts arising within the same year is unconstitutional. It is alleged, since the disputed provision allows offsetting based on rewards and demerits confirmed within the same performance evaluation year, to contravene Article 18 of the Constitution concerning the right to hold public office. Article 18 guarantees the people the right to hold public office, meaning the right to assume certain positions and engage in public service in accordance with law. The state is therefore obliged to establish corresponding systems, including mechanisms for the removal of unqualified civil servants and police officers. The provision at issue requires that, where a police officer accumulates two major demerits within the same performance evaluation year after offsetting rewards and demerits, the officer shall be dismissed, thereby ensuring such removal. The phrase “within the same performance evaluation year” refers to rewards and demerits determined and issued within that same year, rather than requiring that the underlying facts giving rise to such rewards or demerits must have occurred in that year (see the Ministry of Civil Service Letter Tai-Wei-Deng-17207 of September 9, 1969). This interpretation follows legal reasoning, as the conferral of a reward or imposition of a demerit requires that the competent authority first become aware of the underlying facts and then issue a legal decision. Such decisions do not automatically arise from the occurrence of the underlying facts themselves. Therefore, allowing rewards and demerits issued in the same evaluation year to offset each other—regardless of the year in which the underlying facts occurred—does not infringe upon the constitutional right to hold public office. If offsetting were limited only to rewards and demerits based on facts occurring within the same evaluation year, commendable conduct from a prior year could not be offset against punishable conduct occurring in a subsequent year, which may not benefit the police officers themselves. Furthermore, if an authority were to arbitrarily manipulate the timing of issuing demerits—for example, by intentionally delaying the issuance of a punishment decision until the year following the occurrence of the underlying facts, such actions would still be constrained by the principles of good faith and protection of legitimate expectations under administrative law. It therefore cannot be determined that the constitutional right to hold public office of police officers would be harmed accordingly.

        In sum, since the provision at issue requires dismissal when two major demerits are accumulated after offsetting rewards and demerits determined “within the same performance evaluation year,” rather than based on the “underlying facts occurring within the same year,” it does not violate the constitutional guarantee of the right to hold public office.

        4. The Provision at Issue Does Not Contravene Article 77 of the Constitution

        This Court has already held that, in Constitutional Court Judgment 111-Hsien-Pan-9 of 2022, the administrative authority to dismiss civil servants under Articles 6, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 4, 7, and 8 of the Civil Service Performance Evaluation Act does not contravene Article 77 of the Constitution. For similar reasons, this Court now holds that the provision at issue does not contravene Article 77 of the Constitution.

        (1)	The Exercise of the Power of Dismissal by Administrative Authorities Comports with the Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers

        Without the authority over civil service personnel, there can be no administration. Personnel authority is an indispensable core element of executive power. The appointment of civil servants marks the starting point of such authority, nevertheless dismissal marks its end; both are essential to personnel authority. Based on the principles of administrative unity and political accountability, agency heads must possess certain powers of direction and supervision over their subordinates in order to accomplish tasks and achieve administrative objectives. In particular, for civil servants subject to qualification requirements, if the employing authority had no means to lawfully remove incompetent officials who underperform or commit misconduct, administrative efficiency would inevitably be impaired, and the realization of administrative goals obstructed. Compared with the power of appointment, the power of dismissal more effectively ensures supervisory control, and thus constitutes an essential and inherent core power of the executive under the Constitution.

        The rewards and punishments resulting from routine performance evaluations of civil servants are mechanisms that employing agencies must establish and implement to ensure proper supervision, guidance, and the removal of unsuitable personnel. Since routine performance evaluations are based on the daily performance of civil servants, their supervisors and agency heads are typically the most knowledgeable about the operational needs of the agency and the work, conduct, knowledge, abilities, and performance of each civil servant. Therefore, regarding the same performance evaluation year, where the cumulative total of disciplinary actions after offsetting rewards and punishments reaches the threshold for dismissal due to two major offenses, the administrative department should be the most appropriate competent authority in terms of both organizational structure and procedure, and is more suitable for making the initial judgment. Compared to administrative agencies, courts possess legal expertise, but they may not be as familiar with the implementation of various administrative tasks as administrative agencies. Additionally, the primary function of courts is to provide external post-hoc remedies, limited to reviews of legality of the conducts, while unable to review the appropriateness or purposefulness of the conducts. Therefore, considering organizational structure, procedural aspects, or professional competence, administrative agencies should be better positioned to be the primary authorities exercising dismissal authority. Courts are neither capable nor suitable to completely replace administrative agencies and their officials in making the initial decision on whether to dismiss an official. 

        (2)	The Exercise of the Power of Administrative Sanctions to Dismiss Does Not Contravene Article 77 of the Constitution

        The systems of administrative sanctions and judicial disciplinary measures both originated during the period of political tutelage under the Constitution of the Republic of China and have from the outset been separate regimes, continuing in parallel even after the Constitution came into force. Whether based on the original intent of the Constitution or the legal context at the time, it cannot be directly concluded that Article 77 of the Constitution implies a principle of “unified disciplinary action” and prohibits the head of an administrative agency from exercising administrative disciplinary authority with the effect of dismissal.

Subsequently, Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution amended the wording of Article 83 from “appointment”(任用) to “appointment and dismissal”(任免). The intent and effect of this amendment was solely to transfer the authority over civil service appointment, dismissal, and performance evaluation from the Examination Yuan to the Executive Yuan, thereby adjusting the distribution of powers between those two branches. It was not related to the Control Yuan’s power of impeachment nor the Judicial Yuan’s authority over civil service disciplinary measures. Rather, it made it absolute that both appointment and dismissal of civil servants inherently fall within the scope of executive power. Therefore, the “discipline of civil servants”stipulated in Article 77 of the Constitution should not be interpreted to include administrative sanctions, nor does it require that courts serve as the first-instance authority in imposing civil service disciplinary measures or sanctions.

        Since the two systems of administrative sanctions and judicial disciplinary measures coexisted in parallel at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, and since the Judicial Yuan’s interpretations have consistently recognized that both may result in dismissal or similar effects, administrative sanctions imposed on civil servants (including dismissal) are, in principle, subject to relief through administrative litigation under Article 77 of the Constitution. Although civil servants were once constrained by the theory and practice of “special power relations” and thus unable to seek remedies through appeals or administrative litigation against unfavorable measures, this obstacle was removed after Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 785. That interpretation made clear that civil servants may now seek relief through appropriate administrative litigation against various unlawful measures affecting their rights and interests, including dismissals imposed as administrative sanctions. Accordingly, there is no interpretive need to construe dismissals pursuant to the provision at issue as substantive disciplinary measures that only judicial disciplinary bodies may impose.

        In light of the constitutional design, subsequent amendments, and consistent Judicial Yuan interpretations, the provision at issue does not contravene Article 77 of the Constitution.

        IV. Conclusion

        In sum, the provision at issue does not contravene Articles 7 and Article 18 of the Constitution, which guarantee thr right to equality and the right of the people to hold public office, nor does it contravene the intent of Article 77 of the Constitution, which vests the Judicial Yuan with authority over civil service disciplinary measures. The remainder of the Petitioner ‘s claims shall not be entertained.

        V. Additional Hereby Specify

        Although the provision at issue does not contravene the above-mentioned constitutional provisions, the statutory ground for dismissal it establishes that a police officer shall be dismissed if, after offsetting rewards and demerits within the same performance evaluation year, the accumulation reaches two major demerits—has certain operational implications. Because the provision does not establish an interim settlement period for offsetting rewards and demerits within the evaluation year, the system of rewards and demerits in ordinary performance evaluations functions in a dynamic and immediate manner. Once the accumulation reaches two major demerits after offsetting, the competent authority must impose dismissal. In practice, this means that the final sanction which causes the total to reach two major demerits serves as the closing point for calculating the rewards and demerits, thereby satisfying the statutory ground for dismissal. In other words, when the final sanction that results in the accumulation of two major demerits is imposed, the calculation of rewards and demerits is deemed complete, and the statutory threshold for dismissal is met—even if some time remains before the end of the evaluation year. Under the current regime, the evaluated officer can no longer offset those two major demerits through subsequent commendations. In extreme and exceptional circumstances, there remains the possibility of abuse or manipulation in the application of this rule—for instance, if an authority imposes a sanction first while delaying recognition of a commendation, or imposes several sanctions in quick succession, thereby preventing the officer from earning commendations through subsequent performance improvements.

        To avoid unreasonable outcomes in such extreme cases, the relevant authorities should consider adopting appropriate measures. These may include: requiring supervisory or personnel officials to promptly investigate, confirm, and process rewards and sanctions once the underlying facts are discovered; reminding officers in a timely manner when their accumulation of demerits approaches two major demerits, so as to encourage improvement; processing commendations that should be granted but have not yet been formalized before imposing dismissal once the threshold of two major demerits is reached; and allowing dismissal only where no commendatory facts remain to be recognized. Such safeguards should be instituted by regulation.