Petitioner Chen Guo-Zhong (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner One) was convicted in 2009 for violating the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as the Narcotics Case) by the Banqiao District Court in Taiwan. Both the prosecutor and Petitioner One appealed to the Taiwan High Court. The High Court, in its 2010 Criminal Judgment No. 2192, reversed the original judgment and, in accordance with the amended Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act in effect as of May 20, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the 2009 Narcotics Act), convicted Petitioner One of trafficking first-class and second-class drugs under Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 4. The Supreme Court, in its 2011 Criminal Judgment No. 1633, dismissed Petitioner One’s appeal on procedural grounds, making the High Court's judgment final (hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment One). Petitioner One argued that the substantive reasoning based on the Supreme Court’s Criminal Precedent No. 123 of R.O.C, Year 25 (hereinafter referred to as Disputed Precedent One), which states that the crime of drug trafficking is complete as long as drugs are purchased or sold for profit, without the need for subsequent resale, contradicts the Constitution. Therefore, Petitioner One requested a review from this Court.
Petitioner Wu Yu-Ming (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner Two) was convicted in 2010 in a narcotics case by both the Miaoli District Court and the Taichung Branch of the Taiwan High Court. The Supreme Court reversed the original judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The Taichung Branch of the Taiwan High Court, in its 2011 Retrial Criminal Judgment No. 56, foundd Petitioner Two guilty of trafficking first-class drugs under Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 2009 Narcotics Act. The Supreme Court, in its 2012 Criminal Judgment No. 3686, dismissed Petitioner Two’s appeal on procedural grounds, making the High Court’s retrial judgment final (hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment Two). Petitioner Two argued that the substantive reasoning based on the Supreme Court’s Criminal Precedent No. 2500 of R.O.C.Year 67 (hereinafter referred to as Disputed Precedent Two), which states that the crime of drug trafficking is complete as long as drugs are purchased or sold for profit, without the need for subsequent resale, contradicts the Constitution. Therefore, Petitioner Two requested an interpretation from this Court.
Petitioner Zheng An-Jia (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner Three) was convicted in 2010 in a narcotics case by both the Taipei District Court and the Taiwan High Court in its 2010 Criminal Judgment No. 67. He was convicted of trafficking first-class drugs under Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 2009 Narcotics Act. The Supreme Court, in its 2011 Criminal Judgment No. 1106, dismissed Petitioner Three’s appeal on procedural grounds, making the High Court's judgment final (hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment Three). Petitioner Three argued that the substantive reasoning based on Disputed Precedent One in Final Judgment Three raised constitutional issues, and thus requested a review from this Court.
Petitioner Xie Chang-Sheng (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner Four) was convicted in 2010 in a narcotics case by both the Taoyuan District Court and the Taiwan High Court in its 2011 Criminal Judgment No. 3579. He was convicted of trafficking second-class, third-class, and fourth-class drugs under Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article 4 of the 2009 Narcotics Act. The Supreme Court, in its 2012 Criminal Judgment No. 3439, dismissed Petitioner Four’s appeal on procedural grounds, making the High Court’s judgment final (hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment Four). Petitioner Four argued that the substantive reliance on Disputed Precedent One in Final Judgment Four raised constitutional issues, and thus requested a review from this Court.
Petitioner Chen Zhi-Ming (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner Five) was convicted in 2005 in a narcotics case by both the Pingtung District Court and the Kaohsiung Branch of the Taiwan High Court in its 2008 Criminal Judgment No. 1104. He was convicted of trafficking first-class drugs under Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 2003 Narcotics Act. The Supreme Court, in its 2010 Criminal Judgment No. 292, dismissed Petitioner Five’s appeal on procedural grounds, making the High Court’s judgment final (hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment Five). Petitioner Five argued that the substantive reasoning based on Disputed Precedent Two in Final Judgment Five raised constitutional doubts, and thus requested a review from this Court.
Petitioner Chen Jun-Ting (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner Six) was convicted in 2005 in a narcotics case by both the Banqiao District Court and the Taiwan High Court. The Supreme Court reversed the original judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The Taiwan High Court, in its second judgment, convicted Petitioner Six of trafficking first-class drugs under Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 2003 Narcotics Act. The Supreme Court, in its 2008 Criminal Judgment No. 1377, dismissed Petitioner Six’s appeal on grounds of meritlessness making the High Court’s judgment final (hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment Six). Petitioner Six argued that the substantive reliance on Disputed Precedent Two in Final Judgment Six raised constitutional doubts, and thus requested an interpretation from this Court.
Petitioner Wang Zong-Yan (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner Seven) was convicted in 2008 in a narcotics case by both the Kaohsiung District Court and the Kaohsiung Branch of the Taiwan High Court. The Supreme Court reversed the original judgment regarding the possession of first-class drugs with intent to sell and remanded the case for a new trial. The Kaohsiung Branch of the Taiwan High Court, in its 2009 Retrial Criminal Judgment No. 121, found Petitioner Seven guilty of trafficking first-class drugs under Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 2003 Narcotics Act. The Supreme Court, in its 2010 Criminal Judgment No. 2400, dismissed Petitioner Seven’s appeal on procedural grounds, making the High Court’s retrial judgment final (hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment Seven). Petitioner Seven argued that the substantive reasoning based on Disputed Precedent One in Final Judgment Seven raised constitutional issues, and thus requested a review from this Court.
If a final judgment relies on a precedent that is alleged by the people to be unconstitutional, it should be reviewed as if it were an ordinance, as repeatedly interpreted by this Court (see J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 154, 271, 374, 569, and 582). To begin, Final Judgments Two, Five, and Six applied Disputed Precedent Two; Final Judgments One, Three, Four, and Seven, though not explicitly citing Disputed Precedent One, were substantively based on its legal reasoning (see J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 582, 622, 675, 698, 703, and 771). In addition, it is revealed that while Disputed Precedents One and Two were deemed outdated by the Supreme Court in its 2012 Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Criminal Division Meetings that were held, respectively, on August 7, August 21, and November 6, 2012, where it was decided that they would no longer be applied the seven aforementioned final judgments were all rendered before these meetings and were based on either Disputed Precedent One or Two, thereby convicting the petitioners of the completed crime of drug trafficking under Article 4 of the 2003 or 2009Narcotics Acts. Therefore, the petitions meet the criteria stipulated in Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act and should be granted certiorari.
Furthermore, since the seven aforementioned petitions involve the same issues related to Disputed Precedents One and Two, they are combined for review and addressed in this interpretation, with the reasoning as follows:
Considering that criminal laws involve restrictions or deprivations of people’s lives, personal freedoms, and property rights, the exercise of the state’s penal power must strictly adhere to the principle of legality in criminal law as mandated by the Constitution. Punishment for conduct is limited to what is explicitly stipulated by the law at the time of conduct, and the legal elements of the crime must be understandable and foreseeable to the general public (refer to J.Y. Interpretation No. 602 of this Court). When courts interpret and apply criminal laws, they must not expand or add to the legal elements of a crime beyond what is prescribed by law, which would thereby broaden the scope of punishable conduct. This principle especially applies to criminal precedents reviewed as ordinances for constitutional review prior to the amendment of the Court Organization Act on January 4, 2019, which took effect on July 4 of the same year. Failure to adhere to this would contravene the principle of legality in criminal law as enshrined in the Constitution.
Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the 2003 and 2009 Narcotics Acts applicable at the time of the petitioners’ conduct respectively stipulated: “(Paragraph 1)... Those who traffic first-class drugs shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment... (Paragraph 2)... Those who traffic second-class drugs shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than seven years... (Paragraph 3)... Those who traffic third-class drugs shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five years... (Paragraph 4)... Those who traffic fourth-class drugs shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years but not more than ten years...” (This provision was subsequently amended on February 4, 2015, and January 15, 2020, only to increase the severity of the punishments without modifying the constituent elements of the crime).
The terminology used in criminal law provisions should be interpreted in a manner that can be understood and foreseen by those who are subject to the regulation, thereby satisfying the vagueness doctrine in criminal law interpretation. This ensures the avoidance of arbitrary enforcement against individuals, aligning with the constitutional purpose of protecting citizens’ fundamental rights. The term “trafficking” in the elements of the aforementioned provisions, according to its definition in current dictionaries, can either mean selling items or purchasing items for resale. Regardless, the core meaning of trafficking lies in selling and does not solely refer to the act of purchasing items.
Further considering the structure of Article 4 of the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as the Narcotics Act), Paragraphs 1 to 4 of this article place the act of trafficking drugs alongside the acts of manufacturing and transporting drugs, prescribing the same statutory penalties for these three types of criminal behaviors. From this, it can be inferred that the severity of “trafficking” drugs, as mentioned in this article, should be on par with that of manufacturing and transporting drugs. The act of manufacturing drugs involves producing drugs from nothing, which can then harm others; transporting drugs involves moving drugs from one place to another, causing their distribution and subsequent harm. Based on the same legal principle, the crime of drug trafficking should penalize the act of “selling” drugs, which causes drug-related harm. Interpreting trafficking in this manner ensures its severity is comparable to the harm caused by manufacturing and transporting drugs.
Next, from the perspective of the overall framework of the Narcotics Act, Article 5 and Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 14 of this Act respectively prescribe the crimes of “possession of narcotics with intent to traffic” and “possession of opium seeds, coca seeds, or cannabis seeds with intent to traffic.” If the term “trafficking” in these two provisions is understood to solely mean purchasing, it would result in the unreasonable interpretation of merely intending to purchase narcotics as constituting the crime of possessing prohibited narcotics. Based on the principle of consistent interpretation of the same terms scattered across different provisions of the same Act, the term “trafficking” in Article 4 of the Narcotics Act should not solely refer to the act of purchasing.
Furthermore, Paragraph 6 of Article 4 and Article 5 of this Act respectively prescribes the crimes of “attempted drug trafficking” and “possession of narcotics with intent to traffic”; whereas the “simple possession” of narcotics is regulated by the “crime of possession of narcotics” in Article 11 of this Act. This means that the legislature, after considering the different forms of drug-related criminal behavior, the importance of the legal good to be protected, the potential for prevention of harm, and the necessity of post-offense rehabilitation of the perpetrator, constructed a framework in Paragraphs 1 to 4 and Paragraph 6 of Article 4, Article 5, and Article 11 of this Act that distinguishes four layers of drug-related criminal behavior: “completed drug trafficking”, “attempted drug trafficking”, “possession of narcotics with intent to traffic”, and “simple possession of narcotics”. The penalties are defined based on the degree of responsibility the perpetrator should bear for these crimes. Thus, according to the framework established by these provisions, the term “completed drug trafficking” as specified in Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the Narcotics Act should be interpreted to mean that the act of selling or transferring narcotics has been completed, and does not include the mere “purchase” of narcotics.
In addition, from the perspective of historical interpretation, since the predecessor of the current Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act, namely the Suppression of Narcotics during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion Act promulgated on June 3, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 1955 Narcotics Act), the behaviors of trafficking and possessing narcotics have been categorized into four distinct crimes: “trafficking narcotics (or opium)”, “attempted trafficking of narcotics (or opium)”, “possession of narcotics (or opium) with intent to traffic”, and “simple possession of narcotics (or opium)”, with corresponding statutory penalties prescribed in descending order of severity (refer to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 10 of the 1955 Narcotics Act). Although this Act was subsequently amended and renamed as the Suppression of Narcotics Act on July 27, 1992, and later as the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act with a comprehensive revision of 36 articles on May 20, 1998, along with several other detailed amendments, the distinction between the crimes of trafficking and possessing narcotics established by the 1955 Narcotics Act has remained unchanged. This indicates that since 1955, the legislature has consistenly intended to make a nuanced distinction between the crimes of trafficking and possessing narcotics, without any intention to classify the mere “purchase” of narcotics as “completed drug trafficking”.
Accordingly, it is evident that, based on textual canons, systemic interpretation, and the original intent of the legislature, the crime of completed drug trafficking as stipulated in Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the Narcotics Act is limited to the completed act of “selling or transferring”. Any expansion or addition of content not specified in the legal provisions, thereby broadening the scope of punishable conduct, would violate the principle of legality in criminal law as enshrined in the Constitution.
Disputed Precedent One states: “The crime of opium trafficking under the Tobacco Prohibition Act does not require the act of selling after purchase as a constituent element. As long as opium is purchased for profit or sold, the crime is completed and cannot be considered merely an attempt.” Disputed Precedent Two also states: “The act of trafficking does not require the act of selling after purchase. As long as prohibited drugs are purchased or sold for profit, the crime is completed and constitutes a completed crime...” Both precedents hold that the act of trafficking is established as long as there is a purchase for profit.
However, as previously mentioned, the crime of completed drug trafficking stipulated in Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the Narcotics Act is limited to the completed act of “selling or transferring”. The parts of Disputed Precedents One and Two that consider the mere act of purchasing narcotics for profit as constituting the crime of completed drug trafficking are inconsistent with this meaning of “trafficking” and violate the principle of legality in criminal law as enshrined in the Constitution. These parts contradict Articles 8 and 15 of the Constitution, which protect personal freedom, the right to life, and property rights.
Petitioners may seek remedies for the causes of action based on this interpretation through legal procedures, as specified herein.
*Translated by Patrick Chung-Chia Huang