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  • Interpretation
  • No.784【Cases on the Right to Bring Administrative Appeal and Litigation by Students of All Education Levels】
  • Date
  • 2019/10/25
  • Issue
    • Shall J.Y. Interpretation No. 382 concerning the right to bring administrative appeal and litigation by students of all education levels be partly overturned?
  • Holding
    • Based on Article 16 of the Constitution protecting the right to judicial remedy, students of all education levels are entitled to bring administrative appeal and litigation pursuant to the law corresponding to the nature of the relevant administrative measures, as long as they believe that their rights are infringed upon by schools’ educational or management measures, or other public authority measures. Whether such measure is an expulsion or an action with similar effect does not matter. There is no need to place special restrictions on the student’s right to judicial remedy. The holding of J.Y. Interpretation No. 382 should be overturned accordingly.
      
  • Reasoning
    •         Petitioner Doe Chang (hereinafter as “Petitioner I”) was a minor and then a student of Taichung Municipal Chang Yi Senior High School. Petitioner I was firstly disciplined with a minor demerit for holding a cigarette in the mouth during November 2016; after that he/she was again disciplined with a major demerit for riding a motorcycle without a license in December of the same year (hereinafter as “the Original Measures”). Petitioner I appealed the Original Measures in accordance with relevant procedures. The court decisions, namely the Taichung High Administrative Court Orders 106-Su-Tzu-219 and 220 (2015), the Supreme Administrative Court Orders 106-Tsai-Tzu-2146 (2017) and 107-Tsai-Tzu-141(2018) (together hereinafter as “the Final Orders No. 1”), all rendered that the Original Measures did not have a significant impact on the student's constitutional right to education or other fundamental rights and thereupon dismissed the cases according to J.Y. Interpretation No. 382 (hereinafter as “the Interpretation at issue” ). Petitioner I alleged that the Interpretation at issue applied in the Final Orders No. 1 was in violation of Articles 7 and 16 of the Constitution and infringed upon his/her right to judicial remedy and other fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. Hence, Petitioner I brought the case to this court for an interpretation as well as a supplementary interpretation.
      
    •         Petitioner Ju-Chun Fu (hereinafter as “Petitioner II”) was then a -student of Hsinchu Municipal Peiying Junior High School. In January 2014, Petitioner II took a sick leave and missed a day of the third periodic assessment of the 2013 fall semester. She took a make-up exam afterwards. According to Article 15, Subparagraph 2 of the Measures Governing Hsinchu Municipal Peiying Junior High School Student Performance Assessment, as amended and released on August 14, 2012 (hereinafter “the Performance Assessment Measures,”) “[w]hen taking a periodic assessment, a student who has been permitted to be absent for official leave, sickness, or personal cause may take a make-up exam….The score of the make-up exam is calculated in accordance with the following rules: 2. [f]or a student who is absent for personal cause or sickness, the score...should be reduced by 30% on the part exceeding 60 points.” Petitioner II appealed after receiving the assessment result (hereinafter “the Assessment-at-issue”), contending that the deduction of the score had no specific legal authorization and therefore should be invalid. The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed by the Taipei High Administrative Court Order 103-Su-Tzu-1101 (2014) and the Supreme Administrative Court Order 103-Tsai-Tzu-1748 (2014) (hereinafter “the Final Order No. 2”), rendering that the Assessment-at-issue was not an administrative disposition according to J.Y. Interpretation No. 382. Petitioner II further initiated a retrial, which was denied on the merits by the Supreme Administrative Court Order 104-Tsai-Tzu-487 (2015) (hereinafter “the Final Order No. 3”) and dismissed on the ground that the retrial did not meet the legal requirements by the Supreme Administrative Court Order 104-Tsai-Tzu-934 (2015). Petitioner II thereby petitioned this Court for an interpretation and supplementary interpretation, arguing that J.Y. Interpretation No. 382 and Article 15, Subparagraph 2 of the Performance Assessment Measures, both of which were applied in Final Order Nos. 2 and 3, violated Articles 16, 21, 22, and 23 of the Constitution and infringed upon her right to judicial remedy and other fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.
      
    •         When a party raised an issue regarding this Court’s Interpretation applied in a final judgment and petitioned for a supplementary Interpretation, if we consider that there are indeed lack of clarity in language, unsoundness in reasoning, or other legitimate reasons, the petition should be admissible (see J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 503, 741, 742, 757 and 774). Given that Final Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 3 all applied J.Y. Interpretation No. 382 as the basis to dismiss Petitioner I and II’s appeals for remedy, this Court considers the petitions to be of legitimate grounds and grants for interpretation. Since the aforementioned two petitions share common constitutional issues, we thus consolidate them to adjudicate in this Interpretation. The reasoning is as follows:
      
    •         Article 16 of the Constitution protects the right to judicial remedy, which means that individuals have the right to seek remedies from courts when their rights or legal interests are infringed upon. Based on the constitutional principle that where there is a right, there is a remedy, when a person’s right or legal interest has been infringed upon, the state should guarantee such person an opportunity to bring a lawsuit to the court, to request a fair trial in accordance with due process of law, and to obtain timely and effective remedies. Restricting the right to judicial remedy simply based upon a person’s status is constitutionally impermissible.
      
    •         1. The Interpretation at issue should be overturned
      
    •         Students of all education levels should be allowed to bring administrative appeal and litigation to seek remedies, as long as their rights—namely the right to learn and the right to education accorded by virtue of their student status as well as the right to bodily autonomy, the right to the personality, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to property, or other constitutional or legally-protected rights enjoyed by every individual—are improperly or illegally infringed upon by school’s educational or management measures, or other public authority measures. Such right to judicial remedy should be guaranteed regardless of an individual’s status as a student.
      
    •         The Interpretation at issue held that the Constitution protects the people’s right to education. An expulsion or similar action taken by a school against one of its students will change that student’s status and hinder his/her opportunity to receive an education. In light of its significant impact on the disciplined student’s right to education, that student is entitled to bring an administrative appeal and later an administrative litigation pursuant to relevant laws when he/she has exhausted all remedies available within his/her school. The right to seek judicial remedy cannot be restricted because of the person’s student status. Nevertheless, when a disciplinary action (such as recording a demerit or a reprimand) is necessary for the maintenance of the school order or realization of educational purposes and does not infringe upon the student’s right to education, the affected student should only be allowed to appeal within the school and not be allowed to bring administrative appeal and litigation. This is a special restriction placed on a person’s right to bring administrative appeal and litigation because of his/her student status.
      
    •         The disciplined actions addressed in the Interpretation at issue include administrative dispositions and other public authority measures. Even if the public authority measure taken by a school against its students does not violate their right to education, such measure may infringe upon other rights enjoyed by the students. Based on Article 16 of the Constitution protecting the right to judicial remedy, students of all education levels are entitled to bring administrative appeal and litigation pursuant to the law corresponding to the nature of the relevant administrative measures, as long as they believe that their rights are infringed upon by the school’s educational or management measures, or other public authority measures. Whether such measure is an expulsion or an action with similar effect does not matter. There is no need to place special restrictions on the student’s right to remedy. The holding of the Interpretation at issue should be overturned accordingly
      
    •         Whether a school’s educational or management measure or other public authority measure against its students for educational purposes or the maintenance of the school order (such as learning performance evaluations, other management, reward or penalty measures) violates the students’ right, it should be evaluated in accordance with the Administrative Litigation Act or other relevant laws on a case-by-case basis. A holistic examination on the purpose, the nature, and the degree of intervention of the school’s measure is especially warranted. If the intervention is apparently a minor one, it does not infringe upon the students’ right. Additionally, even if the students’ right is indeed infringed upon and they are entitled to bring administrative appeal and litigation for remedy, teachers and schools still enjoys professional discretion for their educational or management measures. The reviewing courts and other administrative appeal agencies should have a higher degree of deference to such discretion.
      
    •         2. Issues on which petitions for constitutional interpretation are dismissed 
      
    •         Petitioner II contended Article 15, Subparagraph 2 of the Performance Assessment Measures to be unconstitutional. However, the petitioner did not specify why the said Measures is in contravention of the Constitution. As such, this part of the petition does not conform to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, and shall be dismissed in accordance with Paragraph 3 of the same Article. 
      
    • ______________________
      
    • *Translated by Chao-Tien Chang
      
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