When reviewing bills of act, the Legislative Yuan shall proceed with the review in accordance with the self-enacted rules of assembly whilst remaining within the scope of the Constitution. The issue of whether the review of the bills of act that are submitted by the Legislative Yuan to the President for promulgation follows the review procedures shall not be subject to scrutiny by the authority responsible for interpretation of the Constitution unless it is in clear contravention to the Constitution since it is an internal matter which falls within the scope set by the Legislative Yuan by virtue of the principle of parliamentary autonomy. Therefore, where the President, pursuant to Article 72 of the Constitution, promulgates laws submitted by the Legislative Yuan, despite deviation from the rules of the Legislative Yuan, if it already exists in formality, it shall be effective in accordance with Article 13 of the Standard Act for the Law and Rules. Where the procedures for enactment of the laws can be determined to be in contravention to the Constitution without investigation into the facts, i.e., where there are palpable material defects which are against the fundamental rules of enactment of laws, the authority responsible for constitutional interpretation may still declare it void. Where there is a dispute as to whether the defect is sufficient to affect the enactment of the laws to a grave extent and investigation is required, i.e., where it is not evident and, according to the current regime, the investigation of the facts thereof by the authority responsible for constitutional interpretation is subject to constraints, then the dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the autonomy rule of the Legislative Yuan. With respect to Article 9 of the Amendment to the Constitution which authorizes the establishment of the organizations of the National Security Council, National Security Bureau and Bureau of Personnel Administration of the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan has submitted it to the President for promulgation on December 30, 1993. Although the protocols to the laws passed have not yet been affirmed, they do not involve the fundamental rules of enactment of laws under the Constitution. In addition, whether the protocols have been resolved is controversial and cannot be confirmed without investigation. In accordance with the aforesaid principles, it shall be determined by the Legislative Yuan and shall be remedied within an appropriate period. If the resolution is at variance with the promulgated laws, then it shall be resubmitted to the President for promulgation pursuant to Article 72 of the Constitution.

       In accordance with the general rules of constitutionally democratic countries, the legislative authority of a country rests with the state council. The procedures through which the legislative authority is exercised by the state council can be prescribed in accordance with the self-stipulated rules of assembly so long as they are within the realm of the Constitution. The implementation of the rules of assembly is an internal matter for the state council. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, the executive, the judiciary or other state authorities should give respect thereto and this is what is jurisprudentially called self-regulation or parliamentary autonomy of the state council. The rules of assembly of the state council of each country, except for the codified rules, include a variety of uncodified rules. Therefore, when applying the rules, room for flexibility is necessary depending on the resolutions. The senator who makes the assertion or the party to which he/she belongs shall be politically responsible therefor. Accordingly, the applicability of the assembly rules of the state council differs from the strict execution in compliance with laws in regard to ordinary authorities and the extent to which they are subject to supervision and review.     

       Article 62 of the Constitution clearly specifies that the Legislative Yuan is the country*s highest legislature and is comprised of legislators elected by the people and who act on behalf of the people in the exercise of legislative rights. Although the procedure for the exercise of the aforesaid authorities is not clearly stipulated in the Constitution, the review of bills of act shall follow the rules of assembly which comprise the rules of organization of the Legislative Yuan, the rules of assembly and the customs and practices of assembly. This is not at variance with the self-regulation rights enjoyed by the state council of the constitutionally democratic countries in general. Whether the Legislative Yuan is in compliance with the procedure stipulated in its rules of assembly in its review of bills of act is an internal matter, unless it is in violation of the Constitution, and it shall fall into the scope of the parliamentary autonomy instead of the subject to be reviewed by the authority responsible for the constitutional interpretation which can be seen from the precedents in many countries’ practices. The judgment of the United States Federal Supreme Court in 1890 states that bills of act which have been signed by the leaders of both houses and which have been submitted to the President for approval and delivered to the State Secretary shall be considered passed in the state council without having to refer to the meeting minutes or the relevant documents of the two houses. This is based on the principle of separation of powers in that each department is equal and there is mutual respect amongst the departments. As such, the review power of the judiciary authorities with respect to these matters shall be subject to constraints (See Field v. Clark, 143 US 649). A judgment of the Japan Supreme Court in 1962 states that since the Amendment to the Police Act has been resolved by both houses and has been promulgated in accordance with the legal procedures, the court shall respect the self-regulating nature of the two houses and shall not adjudicate the facts pertaining to the stipulation of the rules of assembly which are referred to in the notion of appeal in determining the validity or invalidity thereof (Judgment of the Japan Supreme Court, March 7, 1962). The judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1977 also states that unless the rules of assembly are in violation of the Constitution, matters relating to the progress of the meeting and the discipline thereof shall fall within the domain of the self-regulation of the state council. If during the review process there is participation by members from different parties and there is no fundamental dispute at the time of the voting, and, at the time of the voting, irrespective of the number of persons in attendance, if no more than five members raise any objections thus confirming that there is no support for a resolution, then the effect of the resolution would not be affected (BveerfGe 44, 308ff). Although the particulars of the practical affairs of the state council contained in the above rulings differ depending on the systems of each country and are difficult to harmonize, the credence in respect to the parliamentary autonomy of the state council is the same. Therefore, the President, pursuant to Article 72 of the Constitution, shall decide that laws which have been submitted by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated thereby, despite deviation from the rules of assembly, exist in terms of formality, and shall be effective in accordance with Article 13 of the Standard Act for the Law and Rules.     

       Laws shall be considered void by reason of contradiction with the Constitution. This is not confined to contradiction in substance with the Constitution. In other words, where material defects can be found in the legislative process which can be deemed in contradiction with the Constitution without investigation into the facts thereof (for example, failure to comply with the resolution procedures contained in Article 63 of the Constitution), the authority responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution may declare it void. However if there is a dispute as to whether the defect is sufficient to affect the enactment of law to a great extent and investigation is required, then the facts are not yet clear. Pursuant to Article 13, Paragraph 2, of the Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure, when interpreting the Constitution, the Grand Justices may apply mutatis mutantis the rules for verbal debate stipulated for the constitutional court. This refers to debate on legal issues and is different from the verbal debate involved in declaring matters which are in contradiction with the Constitution by the political party and which may require investigation for evidence thereof. This cannot be subject to the review and scrutiny by the authority responsible for constitutional interpretation. Moreover, if, for purposes of investigating facts, legislators of different stances are subpoenaed to appear in court for exposition, then undoubtedly this is a transfer of dispute over political issues to the judicial authority and is in contravention to the purpose of Article 73 of the Constitution. This shall be determined by the Legislative Yuan in accordance with the autonomy rules of the state council. With respect to Article 9 of the Amendment to the Constitution which authorizes the establishment of the three organizations of the National Security Council, National Security Bureau and Bureau of Personnel Administration of the Executive Yuan, the Constitution thereof shall be stipulated by the law. After the Executive Yuan submits the draft bills to the organization of each authority, the Legislative Yuan completes its review before the time period prescribed in Paragraph 3 of the same Article and, in the case of said law, the President promulgated it on December 30, 1993, in accordance with the submittal of (82) Yuan-Tai-Yi-Tze 4018, 4019 and 4020 of the Legislative Yuan. Although the protocols to the laws passed have not yet been affirmed, if they are not items for discussion for the meeting itinerary and do not involve the fundamental rules of enactment of laws under the Constitution, they do not constitute material defects which are sufficient to affect the enactment of the laws. In addition, there was a dispute as to whether the defect was extensive in its scale and the chaotic situation of the meeting at that time in the Legislative Yuan resulted in the protocols not being confirmed. As such, it is not self-evident whether the passage of each law proposal has been resolved in substance, let alone is it evident to the public. In accordance with the aforesaid elucidation, the Legislative Yuan shall remedy the situation within an appropriate period. If the resolution is at variance with the promulgated laws, then it shall be resubmitted to the President for promulgation pursuant to Article 72 of the Constitution. Its effective date shall be determined in accordance with Articles 12 and 13 of the Standard Act for the Law and Rules. 

*Translated by David T. Liou.