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  • Interpretation
  • No.244
  • Date
  • 1989/07/26
  • Issue
    • Is the Supreme Administrative Court precedent constitutional in holding that opinions of the law delivered by a court are not material objects admissible as evidence to support an action for retrial under Article 492, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure before it was amended on February 1, 1968?
  • Holding
    •        The Supreme Administrative Court*s holding in its Precedent T.T. 36 (Supreme Administrative Court, 1966) that opinions of the law are not material objects admissible as evidence to support an action for retrial under Article 492, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure before it was amended on February 1, 1968, is not in conflict with the Constitution. Apropos, it must be pointed out that upon amendments made on February 1, 1968, and December 12, 1975, respectively, to the Code of Civil Procedure and the Administrative Proceedings Act, “clearly erroneous in the application of law in an irrevocable judgment” is made admissible as one of the reasons by which actions for retrial may be brought.
  • Reasoning
    •        An action for retrial is a proceeding whereby an objection is filed to an irrevocable final judgment, and it is necessary that reasonable restriction be placed on such action for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the order of law. The Supreme Administrative Court held in its Precedent T.T. 36 (Supreme Administrative Court, 1966): "J.Y. Interpretation No. 110 delivered upon resolution of the Grand Justices Council Adjudication Act and Interpretation Yuan-Tze 2704 of the Judicial Yuan mean essentially that if the land condemner fails to pay just compensation and other compensatory fees within the specified time limit the original approval granted to the condemnation shall be construed to have become no longer effective, rather than intended to render the original condemnation unlawful. Such opinion of the law cannot be deemed to be a material object admissible as evidence under Article 492, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor is it comparable with an irrevocable adjudication or administrative act referred to in Subparagraph 9 of the same article and paragraph or an irrevocable judgment, settlement, or mediation referred to in Subparagraph 10 thereof. Now that the plaintiff in retrial, in instituting this proceeding of retrial, has no legal cause of action for the retrial, and furthermore, because this action is instituted after a lapse of over one year since the original judgment was served, there is no ground for him to argue that the peremptory period for instituting an action for retrial begins to run from the time the facts occur or are known to him. His institution of this action for retrial in such circumstances is thus legally non-permissible." The main purpose of the decision is to make it clear that an opinion of the law is different from a material object to be used as evidence, which gives information by the physical existence or condition of the object, and is not admissible as a discovered but unconsidered piece of evidence to support an action for retrial. As the decision does not debar the institution of a proceeding of retrial on legal cause of action for retrial, it is therefore not in conflict with the Constitution. Apropos, it must be pointed out that upon amendments made on February 1, 1968, and December 12, 1975, respectively, to the Code of Civil Procedure and the Administrative Proceedings Act, “clearly erroneous in the application of law” in an irrevocable judgment is made admissible as one of the reasons by which actions for retrial may be brought. 
      
    • *Translated by Raymond T. Chu.
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