Go to Content Area :::

Constitutional Court R.O.C. (Taiwan) Logo

Home Sitemap 中文版
   

Decisions

Home > Decisions > Docket Search > Before 2022
:::
:::
  • Interpretation
  • No.240
  • Date
  • 1989/05/12
  • Issue
    • Is Article 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitutional in providing that, in calculating the statutory period, the time needed for traveling to the court by a party residing outside the venue of the court, said time shall be deducted from such period unless the party has an agent ad litem inside the venue of the court?
  • Holding
    •        The Code of Civil Procedure provides in Article 162, Paragraph 1, that "where a party resides outside the venue of the court, the time for his journey to the court shall be deducted from the statutory period when calculating such period provided, however, that this does not apply where the party has an agent ad litem residing inside the venue of the court capable of carrying out all the litigation acts required to be done within such period." The proviso is intended to make the statutory period practically the same length for all parties to carry out the litigation acts so that there will be no adverse effect on the exercise of the people*s right of instituting legal proceedings. It is thus not in conflict with Articles 16 and 23 of the Constitution.
  • Reasoning
    •        The right of instituting legal proceedings of the people as provided in Article 16 of the Constitution is the people*s right to the benefit of justice. In other words, people have the right to bring suit to seek remedy when they suffer injury to their right, and the court, on the other hand, has the duty to try under law. Under Article 23 of the Constitution, however, this right is subject to restrictions by law as may be necessary for the purpose of preventing infringement upon the freedom of others, averting an imminent crisis, maintaining social order, or furthering public interest. Thus, the restriction imposed by Article 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the period for appeal is meant to define the rights and duties of the parties where the period for appeal has expired and no legal appeal has been brought. Similarly, the Act provides in Article 162, Paragraph 1, that "where a party resides outside the venue of the court, the time for his journey to the court shall be deducted from the statutory period when calculating such period provided, however, that this does not apply where the party has an agent ad litem residing inside the venue of the court, capable of carrying out all the litigation acts required to be done within such period." The law is so made as to take into consideration the factor that, although the party is residing outside the venue of the court, he has appointed an agent ad litem residing inside the venue of the court with special authorization given under the proviso to Paragraph 1 of Article 70 of the Act to file an appeal on his behalf, who is empowered to use his discretion to decide upon receiving the court decision whether or not to file an appeal for the party within the statutory peremptory period. Thus, the time needed for the party to travel to the place of the court must not be deducted from the statutory period. The purpose of the law is to make the statutory period practically the same length for all parties to carry out the litigation acts, notwithstanding the difference in the distances and traffic conditions for the parties to make the journey to the court and whether or not they have any other person to carry out litigation acts for them at the place of the court. We hold that the law is essential to the furtherance of the public interest and will cause no adverse effect on the exercise of the people*s right of instituting legal proceedings. It is thus not in conflict with Articles 16 and 23 of the Constitution.  
      
    • *Translated by Raymond T. Chu
Back Top