Note: 

• This summary constitutes no part of the Judgment but is prepared by the Department of Clerks for the Constitutional Court only for the readers’ reference.
• Original paragraph numbers that the summarized texts correspond to are put into lenticular brackets after each paragraph. 
• In case of any conflict of meaning between the Traditional Chinese version and the translated English version, the Traditional Chinese version shall prevail.

Headnotes

    Article 416, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter the “disputed provision”), which governs standing to file a quasi-interlocutory appeal against judicial detention orders, is constitutional provided it is interpreted as permitting defense counsel to file such appeals on the defendant’s behalf in the absence of the defendant’s express objection. 

Background Note

    The disputed provision stipulates: “A subject of a disposition, who objects to the following disposition made by a presiding judge, commissioned judge, assigned judge, (…), may petition the concerned court to withdraw or change the disposition. (…) 1.A disposition regarding detention, (….)” Such a petition for change or withdrawal is called “quasi-interlocutory appeal” in academic terms, because rules for interlocutory appeal apply mutatis mutandis to its legal effects, periods, and rulings under Article 416, Paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CoCP). Compared to typical interlocutory appeals against court-ordered dispositions, quasi-interlocutory appeals are filed against judge-ordered dispositions. A question arose as to whether the defendant’s counsel has standing to file a quasi-interlocutory appeal against the defendant’s detention disposition, as the defense counsel is not literally the “subject of disposition” in Article 416, Paragraph 1 of the CoCP. 

    The petitioner of this case was charged with violating the Firearms, Ammunition, and Knives Control Act and was subject to a detention disposition ordered by his case’s commissioned judge from the Pingtung District Court. The petitioner’s counsel filed a quasi-interlocutory appeal, but a panel of the district court ultimately dismissed it. The panel held that, under the disputed provision, the standing to file a quasi-interlocutory appeal is limited to the “subject of disposition,” i.e., the defendant, thus excluding the defendant’s counsel. The petitioner challenged the provision’s constitutionality and filed a constitutional complaint against the panel’s ruling, arguing that the provision violated his rights to individual liberty and to institute legal proceedings. The petitioner cited TCC Judgment 111-Hsien-Pan-3 (2022) as a reference, which held that the defendant’s counsel may apply Article 346 of the CoCP mutatis mutandis and file interlocutory appeals against court-ordered detention dispositions.

    Judgment 115-Hsien-Pan 1 (2026) was rendered on January 2, 2026 by a bench of five Justices. The TCC cited the decision in Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1 (2025) and excluded the three Justices who refused to participate. 

Summary of the Judgment 

Holding

1. Article 419 of the CoCP, which stipulates “Except otherwise stipulated in this Chapter, interlocutory appeals shall apply mutatis mutandis Chapter I of Part III regarding Appeals,” remains applicable to the disputed provision. Subsequently, provisions governing the standing to appeal provided in Article 346 still apply mutatis mutandis to standing in motion to withdraw or change detention dispositions provided in the disputed provision. The disputed provision does not violate the rights to individual liberty and to institute legal proceedings under Articles 8 and 16 of the Constitution, provided it is interpreted as permitting a defense counsel to file quasi-interlocutory appeals against judicial detention orders (issued by a presiding judge, commissioned judge, or assigned judge) on the defendant’s behalf in the absence of the defendant’s express objection. 
2. Pingtung District Court Criminal Order 112-Sheng-19 (2023) was unconstitutional. It is to be quashed, with matters remanded to the Pingtung District Court. 

Reasoning

1. The deliberation quorum and decision threshold of this Judgment:

    Persons exercising judicial adjudication power have the duty to sit and decide through deliberation even when the matters before them concern the legitimate composition of the court itself or the jurisdiction of the case. Since the Constitution grants constitutional justices the exclusive authority for constitutional interpretation, they naturally have a duty to participate in deliberation and adjudication of such cases, except where there are legal grounds for recusal or leave of absence. Failure to do so constitutes a refusal of their duty to sit in constitutional adjudications, which is against the intention of the Constitution. Therefore, since the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (CCPA) did not provide how the number of “incumbent justices” should be calculated when a constitutional justice refuses to participate in deliberations and adjudications, this Court shall supplement such provisions based on its procedural autonomy to meet the constitutional requirement of ensuring the uninterrupted exercise of the Justices’ authority.【8】

    A Justice’s refusal to participate in deliberation has the same practical effect as a recusal by law, as both result in the Justice taking no part in deliberation or decision and may affect the Court’s ability to reach a quorum. Such a situation is also substantively comparable to recusal on the Justice’s own account. By analogy to Article 12 of the CCPA, such Justices may reasonably be deducted from the calculation of the number of incumbent Justices, so as to avoid disrupting the Constitutional Court’s exercise of its constitutional functions.【9】

    There were three Justices who refused to participate in the deliberation of this case, which would prevent the Court from meeting quorum if counted in the number of incumbent Justices. This not only affects the Justices’ function of interpreting the Constitution, but also risks impeding the petitioner’s constitutional right of instituting legal proceedings, which is by no means permitted under the Constitution. Following this Court’s decision in Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1 (2025), the three Justices who have consistently refused to participate in the deliberation on this case shall be excluded from the number of incumbent Justices.【10】

2.    In terms of the constitutional review of the disputed provision:

    The CoCP distinguishes interlocutory appeals against detention dispositions based on whether they are issued in the name of the court or by individual judges (presiding, commissioned, or assigned). However, as detention is a compulsory measure that restrict most severely a person’s liberty, a defendant has to rely on his or her defense counsel providing effective and timely assistance in order to exercise the right to defense once detained. From the defendant’s perspective, this distinction is therefore insignificant. It is unreasonable to bar a defense counsel from appealing against detention dispositions issued by individual judges in the interest of the defendant, whilst allowing counsel to appeal against those issued in the name of the court. Moreover, the disputed provision appears in Part IV “Interlocutory Appeal,” one of the procedures setting aside court orders in a broad sense and therefore termed academically as quasi-interlocutory appeal. Under Paragraph 4 of the same article, the regulations concerning the legal effect, period, and results of interlocutory appeals shall apply mutatis mutandis to quasi-interlocutory appeals, making them substantively indistinguishable in their function as legal remedies. Since defense counsels are allowed to file an interlocutory appeal against the court’s detention order for the defendant’s interest in the absence of the defendant’s express objection, they should likewise be permitted to challenge detention orders issued by individual judges. The term “interlocutory appeal” as used in Article 419 of the CoCP should be interpreted as including motions to withdraw or change (dispositions) under Article 416. Therefore, provisions governing the standing to appeal provided in Article 346 (in Part III, Chapter I) should apply mutatis mutandis to standing in motion to withdraw or change detention dispositions provided in the disputed provision. In other words, a defense counsel may, in the defendant’s interest, petition the court to withdraw or change the detention order issued by the presiding judge, commissioned judge, or assigned judge, unless the defendant expressly objects. Within this scope, the disputed provision does not violate the rights to individual liberty and to institute legal proceedings under Articles 8 and 16 of the Constitution. 【20】

3.    In terms of the constitutional complaint:

    The final court ruling of the petitioner’s original court case barred the petitioner’s defense counsel from petitioning for withdrawal or modification of the detention disposition issued by the case’s judge (presiding, commissioned, or assigned) on the defendant’s behalf. The ruling has unconstitutionally violated people’s rights to individual liberty and to institute legal proceedings under Articles 8 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioner’s constitutional complaint is meritorious. The said court ruling shall be quashed following the First Sentence of Article 62, Paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (2022). The petitioner’s case shall be remanded to the Pingtung District Court.【22】