Note: 

• This summary constitutes no part of the Judgment but is prepared by the Department of Clerks for the Constitutional Court only for the readers’ reference.
• Original paragraph numbers that the summarized texts correspond to are put into lenticular brackets after each paragraph. 
• In case of any conflict of meaning between the Traditional Chinese version and the translated English version, the Traditional Chinese version shall prevail.

Headnotes

    As the constitutional judiciary enjoys the procedural autonomy conferred by the Constitution, it shall not be constrained by procedural law if it impedes the exercise of its competence. The fixed-number quorum under Article 30, Paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (CCPA) shall not be applied to review its own constitutionality. Instead, Paragraph 1 of the said article shall apply in terms of quorum and decision threshold. As a last resort to maintain the functioning of the constitutional judiciary, the three Justices who have continuously refused to join deliberation were deducted from the number of incumbent Justices when calculating this case’s quorum. 

    Upon reviewing the legislative records, the challenged provisions’ (seven provisions in Article 4, 30, and 95 of the CCPA) legislative process was found severely flawed, violating the due process of lawmaking. 

    All the impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional for violating the principle of separation of powers. In its reasoning, the Constitutional Court held that the Legislative Yuan overreached in imposing additional obligations on the President’s constitutional power to nominate constitutional justices in Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the CCPA (hereinafter “Provision I”). The unreasonable fixed-number deliberation quorums and decision thresholds set by Article 30, Paragraph 2 of the CCPA (hereinafter “Provision II”), without complementary measures, were declared unconstitutional for hindering the Justices from exercising their competence. Paragraph 3 of the said article (hereinafter “Provision III”) was declared unconstitutional for unreasonably allowing dismissals on the grounds of insufficient quorum, which negates the purpose of constitutional adjudication. Paragraph 4 of the said article (hereinafter “Provision IV”) applies Paragraph 2 quorum to preliminary injunction orders, impeachment cases of the President and the Vice President, and cases regarding the dissolution of political parties, negating the Additional Article of the Constitution’s design on this matter. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said article (hereinafter “Provision V” and “Provision VI”) were also declared unconstitutional for establishing a baseless quorum for the constitutional judiciary when specific recusal numbers occur. Article 95 of the CCPA (hereinafter “Provision VII”) was declared unconstitutional for wrongfully deleting the date of enforcement for the two previous amendments, in violation of the Central Regulation Standard Act and the principle of legal stability.

Background Note

    On December 20, 2024, the Legislative Yuan passed the amendment bill to the CCPA. The bill amended seven provisions in Articles 4, 30, and 95 of the CCPA The amendments require the President to nominate TCC candidates in two months when there is a vacancy (Provision I), as well as adding additional quorum/threshold requirements for the Constitutional Court to deliberate, declare unconstitutionality (together in Provision II), order preliminary injunction, uphold the President and Vice President’s impeachment, and dissolute unconstitutional parties (together in Provision IV). The amendment bill also added procedural rules for situations in which the quorum is not met, including those resulting from recusals (Provisions III, V, and VI). Lastly, the amendment also designated December 20, 2024, as the date of enforcement, while deleting the enforcement clauses for two prior amendments to the CCPA (Provision VII). 

    The Executive Yuan deemed the provisions unfeasible and requested the Legislative Yuan to reconsider. On January 10, 2025, the Legislative Yuan upheld the original bill by majority vote in a plenary session, denying the Executive Yuan’s request to reconsider. On January 13, 2025, the Legislative Yuan sent the amended provisions to the President for promulgation. The provisions were promulgated on January 23, 2025. 

    Fifty-one members of the Legislative Yuan believed that the newly amended provisions of the CCPA are unconstitutional for the flaws in the legislative process and for violating the separation of powers. They filed a petition with the TCC on June 15, 2025. Because the new quorum would leave the Court unable to deliberate with only eight Justices, the petitioners also motioned for a preliminary injunction to suspend the implementation of the challenged provisions. On May 12, 2025, the TCC held a public hearing and summoned relevant parties and experts to provide their opinions. 

    The abovementioned events happened against the backdrop of the ongoing rotation of constitutional justices. On October 31, 2024, seven constitutional justices, including the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, ended their terms. The President of the State had previously nominated seven candidates on August 31, 2024. But the candidates were all denied by the Legislative Yuan on December 24, 2024. The second group of candidates was nominated on March 21, 2025, but were also denied on July 25 of the same year. The circumstances left the TCC with only eight Justices since September 2024. 
 

Summary of the Judgment 

Holding

1. Provision I stipulates “Where the number of Justices falls below that prescribed in Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China due to the expiry of their terms of office, resignation, removal from office, or death, the President of the State shall nominate replacements to fill the vacancies within two months." ^[1] Provision II stipulates “The number of Justices participating in the proceedings in the preceding Paragraph shall not be less than ten. When declaring an impugned law unconstitutional, the number of Justices consenting with the declaration shall not be less than nine.” Provision III stipulates “Where the number of participating Justices fails to meet the requirements of the preceding Paragraph, therefore the deliberation cannot proceed, an order dismissing the petition may be rendered by a majority of the total number of the incumbent Justices.” Provision IV stipulates “The provisions regarding quorums and thresholds in the preceding two Paragraphs shall apply when the Constitutional Court issues a ruling on preliminary injunction pursuant to Article 43, upholds impeachment pursuant to Article 75, or dissolves a political party pursuant to Article 80.” Provision V stipulates “Where the number of Justices recusing themselves pursuant to Article 12 of this Act exceeds seven, all remaining Justices shall participate in proceedings, and a judgment or order may only be rendered with the consent of three-quarters of the participating Justices; the provisions of Paragraph 2 shall not apply.” Provision VI stipulates “When the number of Justices who have not recused themselves under the preceding Paragraph is less than seven, the case shall not be heard.” Provision VII stipulates “The provisions amended as of December 20, 2024, shall come into force on the date of their promulgation.” These provisions, as promulgated on January 23, 2025, are majorly flawed in their legislative process, violating the constitutional principle of due process of lawmaking. The provisions also violate the separation of powers under the Constitution. The provisions shall cease to be effective from the announcement date of this Judgment. 
2. The previous version of Article 95 of the CCPA (before the challenged version as promulgated January 23, 2025) shall continue to be applicable. 
3. Preliminary injunction application of this case shall be rejected.

Reasoning

1.  The deliberation quorum and decision threshold for this case:

(1)  The Constitution deliberately remains silent on how constitutional justices exercise their competence: 

    The Constitution and its Additional Articles stipulate only that the Judicial Yuan shall have Justices, along with organizational matters such as the number of Justices and their competence. The exercise of the Justices’ authority is not explicitly defined. Given that the competence conferred upon the Justices must have taken into account its legal and political implications, it can be inferred that the Constitution intentionally maintains silence regarding the exercise of these powers. This is in light of the separation of powers and checks and balances, ensuring that constitutional justices remain free from partisan and political influence, as well as from improper legal constraints, so that they can uphold an independent stance and objectively interpret the Constitution based on their procedural autonomy. If the Justices were absolutely bound by law in exercising their competence, it would lead to the unreasonable outcome that such a law would be superior to other laws. It would also lead the Justices to conduct constitutionality reviews not based on the Constitution itself, but instead on the rules governing their exercise of competence. This would substantially undermine the supremacy of the Constitution, fundamentally contradicting the purpose of constitutional review.【35】

    In past practices of constitutional justice, the Legislative Yuan only begun drafting the Council of Grand Justice Act after J.Y. Interpretation No. 76. Before the promulgation of this Act, J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 77 through 79 were made. The validity of these decisions remains unaffected by statutory provisions (of the procedural law). The Justices have also declared unconstitutional certain provisions of laws governing the exercise of their authority and suspended their application (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 371). Moreover, the Justices have established mechanism not provided in such laws, such as suspended declarations of invalidity (J.Y. Interpretation Nos. 218 and 725) and preliminary injunctions (J.Y. Interpretation No. 599). This further demonstrates that the way in which Justices exercise their authority does not necessarily derive from the law.【35】

(2)  The CCPA, as the procedural framework for the exercise of the constitutional justices’ functions, should not impede them from doing so:

    The Constitution is the supreme legal norm of the State. The CCPA, which governs the process of constitutional review, must naturally be premised on safeguarding the supremacy of the Constitution. If its provision results in the Justices’ exercise of authority being blocked, obstructed, or improperly interpreting the Constitution, then it contravenes the Constitution’s intention for the Justices be empowered directly by the Constitution without requiring their exercise of authority be subject to law. In such circumstances, Justices of the Constitutional Court should not be bound by the CCPA. Otherwise, the legislature could employ unconstitutional procedural provisions to hinder the Justices’ power to interpret the Constitution, and to evade constitutional oversight over the Legislative Yuan’s legislative acts (including budget proposals). This would render the Constitution’s supremacy meaningless, effectively elevating the laws passed by the Legislative Yuan to the highest legal authority.【37】

(3)  Since Provision II is impugned, it should not simultaneously serve as the procedural rule for determining its own constitutionality— the deliberation quorum and decision threshold in this case shall be established under Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA: 

    From the logic of application of law, since Provision II in this case is the subject of constitutional review, it naturally cannot at the same time serve as the procedural rule for this case. Otherwise, Provision II would assume the dual role of both the procedural rule and the subject of review, leading to the absurdity of self-contradiction through circular reasoning. To elaborate, the procedural rule governing constitutional reviews must itself be constitutional. In this sense, the constitutionality of the applied procedural rule must be presumed when examining the constitutionality of itself. Should the review instead conclude that the provision unconstitutionally exceeds legislative discretion, this would amount to the Justices conducting constitutional review through unconstitutional procedures and then deriving a valid judgment from such invalid proceedings. Such a scenario fundamentally violates the due process of law. To avoid logical contradiction, the Justices may be compelled—or highly likely—to declare Provision II constitutional. This can be seen as prejudging the case and cannot avoid the fallacy of circular reasoning, breaching the requirement for impartiality and due process of law. Moreover, with the current bench of eight Justices, applying Provision II would render the case unreviewable, which severely impedes the Constitutional Court’s exercise of its authority. Provision II cannot serve as the procedural rule for this case. Furthermore, as Provision II does not concern the organization of the Constitutional Court, this Judgment does not have a question of illegal composition of the Court. 【39-41】

    Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA (implemented on January 4, 2022) retains the original text unchanged and remains valid since its amendment in 2019. The Constitutional Court has rendered fifty-one judgments under this provision, which establishes its constitutionality. Said provision’s framework is well-constructed and suitable to apply to this case, needing no supplementary regulations to fill in for the non-application of Provision II. For this reason, the deliberation quorum and decision threshold of this case should apply Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA. 【42-43, 45】

(4)  The three Justices who refuse to participate in deliberation shall be deducted from the number of incumbent Justices in quorum and threshold calculation: 

    The quorum and threshold under Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA are calculated by a fixed proportion based on the number of incumbent Justices. The legislative purpose of this design is to ensure deliberations and decisions not affected by the number of Justices at any given time, thereby maintaining the operation of constitutional interpretation. When Justices recuse themselves under the CCPA, they may not participate in deliberation, which is equivalent to a vacancy on the bench. That is why Article 12 of the CCPA stipulates that such Justices shall not be counted among the incumbent Justices when calculating the total required for deliberation and decision. Only in this manner can the quorum for constitutional review remain unaffected by the number of recusals. It should be specifically noted that when recusals prevent all Justices from exercising their authority, the Justices are still required to adjudicate instead of refusing on the grounds of recusal. Otherwise, this would paralyze the constitutional interpretation system, amounting to a refusal by Justices to exercise their constitutional duties, consequently undermining the constitutional order of separation of powers. Certainly, the continuous refusal of some Justices to participate in deliberations must not impede other Justices from exercising their authority. The reason countries mandate judges’ duty to participate in deliberations and decisions is to prevent refusal of adjudication. Such a principle is also applicable to the constitutional judiciary. When incumbent Justices persistently refuse to participate in deliberations, it is akin to a recusal or non-assumption of office. From the perspective of this case, such a refusal is tantamount to a vacancy on the bench and should be deducted from the current total number of Justices. 【49, 51】

    On October 31, 2024, seven Justices of the Constitutional Court ended their terms. The President twice nominated for successors, all of whom were rejected by the Legislative Yuan. As a result, this Court was left with only eight on the bench for over a year. It is difficult to predict when the vacancies can be filled. If the three Justices who continuously refuse deliberation are counted toward the current total, this Court will be unable to conduct substantive review on this case or any other petitions, as it will fail to meet the quorum of two-thirds majority of incumbent Justices (i.e., six Justices). In this state of exception and necessity, to keep the Constitutional Court functioning, the three Justices should be deducted from the current total for the reasons stated above.【52】

2.  The legislative process of Provisions I through VII was majorly flawed, violating the due process of lawmaking under the Constitution:

    When drafting laws, the Legislative Tuan must follow the requirement of due process of lawmaking, such as the principle of transparency and the need for discussion in the legislative process, as well as deciding by resolutions. If the lawmaking process is clearly and grossly flawed to the extent that no further investigation is needed to determine its unconstitutionality, the Constitutional Court may declare the law null and void.【64】

    The amendment draft to Provisions I through VII originated from a secondary amendment motion proposed by the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) caucus during the article-by-article discussion following the second reading session on December 20, 2024, in response to an amendment bill (the main motion) originally proposed by Legislator Hsiao-Ling WENG. The TPP-proposed draft passed in the second and third readings on the same day. The contents of Provisions I through VI are entirely different from WENG’s original proposal and unknown to the public before submission. The TPP caucus failed to provide the purpose of the amendment, explanations, or a rebuttal, as required under Articles 7 and 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Yuan. Other legislators could not ascertain its content or its implications, making it difficult to decide how to vote. There was also insufficient time to consult the Judicial Yuan (the competent authority), let alone enabling the public to access relevant information and discuss through media and public forums. Thus, the procedure did not comply with the principle of transparency. Particularly regarding Provisions II through VI, when the bill entered article-by-article discussion, the TPP and the Kuomintang (KMT) caucuses respectively proposed primary amendment motions and secondary amendment motions, totaling five. Each motion involved highly significant and professional issues. Among these, the TPP caucus’s secondary amendment motion to Article 30, which corresponds to Provisions II through VI, established a fixed-number threshold, differing from the proportional threshold originally proposed in Legislator WENG’s version. The content of TPP’s subsequent amendment was highly complex, making it unreasonable to expect substantive opinions within the allotted time for objections or questions. Moreover, the records show that even when objections or questions were raised, neither the proposer nor the supporters provided any explanation or rebuttal. Under these circumstances, immediately halting the discussion and proceeding to the second and third reading votes did not meet the requirement for discussion during the lawmaking process. 【74, 77-78】

    Article 11, Paragraph 3 of the Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power (hereinafter “LGLYP”) stipulates that during the third reading of a bill of act, the entire proposal shall be put to a vote. This provision embodies the intent of Article 63 of the Constitution, which provides that laws shall be passed by a resolution. As to the voting methods, Article 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Yuan specifies that votes may be taken orally, by a show of hands, by electronic voting devices, by ballot, or by roll call votes. However, there is no provision exempting bills from voting. Within the scope of parliamentary autonomy, the legislature may expedite proceedings by having the chairperson consult the plenary session on whether there is any objection against passing the bill that has already been negotiated and agreed upon, when legislators have shown no signs of objection during the lawmaking process. Upon confirmation of no objection, the chairperson may declare the bill passed. However, during the lawmaking process before the third reading of the impugned provisions, different political parties consistently voiced divergent positions, indicating that there is no room to pass the bill by unanimous consent at the third reading. In this case, the chairperson failed to put the entire bill to a vote as required by law. After the second reading of the provisions, he merely inquired if the plenum had any textual amendments, then immediately declared that the bill had passed with no textual amendments. The legislators present were deprived of a reasonable time to express their opinions, effectively substituting the chairperson’s declaration for the legislators’ voting. The legislative process was thus flawed.【79-80】

    In conclusion, the amendment bill to Provisions I through VII is highly complex, yet it was introduced only during the article-by-article discussion at the second reading and proceeded to a vote without substantive debate. Furthermore, the bill was not submitted for a vote in accordance with Article 11 of the LGLYP, making the public unable to know the positions taken by individual legislators. The flaws in this legislative process were far more severe than those in TCC Judgment 113-Hsien-Pan-9 (2024), constituting a clearly and grossly flawed defect in its legitimacy. This violates the constitutional requirement for due process of lawmaking.【82】

3.  Provisions I through VII violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers:

(1)  The principle for review:

    The constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances are fundamental. All constitutional organs are obligated to adhere to them. Since the Constitution confers the Legislative Yuan’s competence, the legislature cannot deviate from these principles. Any law passed by the legislature that involves other constitutional organs’ competence, substantially impedes the operation of such organs, or imposes extra-constitutional obligations on them shall be deemed as overreach. Pursuant to Article 171, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, such a law shall be null and void. 【85】

(2)  Provision I:

    The President of the State is a constitutional organ. The President’s status and competences are reserved for the Constitution to stipulate. Unless stipulated expressly or with clear authorization by the Constitution, the Legislative Yuan cannot impose additional obligations on to the President, nor shall it impose additional restrictions on the President’s constitutional tasks. Any contradiction to such a principle—requiring or prohibiting the President to perform certain acts by a legislative act—will be an overreach of the legislature’s constitutional competence and a violation of the principle of separation of powers. Provision I, imposing constitutionally unprescribed obligations on the President, exceeds the constitutional competence of the Legislative Yuan and violates the principle of separation of powers.【87, 89】

(3)  Provision II:

    Justices of the Constitutional Court are a constitutional organ established to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution. Their function of upholding the constitutional order must operate without interruption and should not be disrupted by personnel changes or other factors. The appointment of Justices under Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution (AAoC) is based on the principle of separation of powers. However, the President and the Legislative Yuan, being political branches, may fail to promptly appoint successors to vacant Justices due to political disagreement or other factors. The Constitution cannot be oblivious to such a possibility: on one hand, constraining the political branches to abide by the Constitution through final rulings of the Justices; on the other hand, allowing the political branches to paralyze the constitutional functions of the Justices by obstructing the selection of their successors. Thus, when the Legislative Yuan enacts laws concerning the competences of the Justices, failure to provide adequate complementary measures against situations where there is a reduction in the number of Justices—thereby impeding the exercise of their authority—violates the principle of separation of powers. Given the Justices’ term limits stipulated in the AAoC, such complementary measures are particularly essential. Following Article 5, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the AAoC, out of the total fifteen Justices, an average of seven to eight Justices will complete their terms every four years. Legislators serve four-year terms, meaning they can exercise approval authority over approximately half (seven or eight) of the total Justices during their term. Consequently, if the President fails to make nominations in a timely manner, or if legislators reject all nominees or approve only a minimal number, the number of Justices may drop to around half the total or even fewer. Historically, our country has opted for the legal design that a fixed proportion of the incumbent Justices shall serve as the threshold for deliberation and decision. Therefore, even in the said exceptional circumstances, the normal functioning of constitutional interpretation can be maintained without being affected by the number of Justices at any specific point in time.【47, 96, 97, 98】

    However, Provision II alters the established pattern by setting a fixed (number) quorum requiring no fewer than ten Justices to participate in deliberations. Although this quorum exceeds half of the statutory total number of Justices, it fails to consider whether the number of incumbent Justices has reached this quorum. Consequently, whether the Justices can deliberate is deeply affected by the President’s nominating power or the Legislative Yuan’s approval power. For instance, on October 31, 2024, the terms of seven Justices expired. Despite the President twice nominating Justices, all of the nominees were denied by the Legislative Yuan. Hence, from November 1, 2024, until the announcement of this Judgment, the number of Justices stood at only eight. If the quorum prescribed in Provision II is applied, no constitutional judgments can be made; cases can only be suspended or dismissed, substantially paralyzing the competence of the Justices.【98】

    In conclusion, the First Sentence of Provision II alters the existing rule that sets a fixed proportion of the incumbent Justices as the quorum for deliberation, replacing it with a fixed minimum (number) of ten Justices. Without complementary measures, this makes the Justice’s function more susceptible to suspension risks arising from political shifts or the legislature’s consent to personnel appointments. This provision violates the Constitution’s intent to uphold the normal functioning of the Justice’s competence, substantially impeding their authority, and contravening the principle of separation of powers. The Second Sentence of Provision II, which is predicated upon the said unconstitutional quorum, is likewise unconstitutional.【98, 99】

(4)  Provision III:

    The provisions on case admissibility in the CCPA are designed to screen out clearly unfounded or unlawfully lodged cases, thereby preventing the waste of constitutional adjudication’s limited resources. The strictness or leniency of admissibility requirements determines whether proceedings can commence and a subsequent decision can be rendered. It balances the petitioner’s right to institute legal proceedings, the respondent’s potential disadvantages, and the public interest in the constitutional litigation system’s functioning. Therefore, appropriate criteria for case admissibility must be established based on the nature of the litigation and the specific circumstances of the case, rather than being determined solely by the actual number of Justices participating. The impugned Provision III unreasonably links the number of deliberating Justices to the dismissal of cases, which is nothing short of deciding whether a case qualifies for and necessitates constitutional protection on the turnout of Justices. It is inconsistent with the Constitution’s intent to establish a system of Justices to uphold constitutional order and protect the fundamental rights of the people.【101】

    Particularly for petitions admitted before the implementation of Provisions II and III, when the number of participating Justices falls short of the deliberation quorum stipulated in Provision II, the Justices can only choose to dismiss the case or suspend the proceedings. Whichever option is chosen will constitute a paralysis of the constitutional interpretation system. 【101】

    The combined application of Provisions II and III effectively allows legislators to undermine the system of constitutional interpretation by manipulating deliberation quorums—in tandem with the exercise of approval power over Justice nominees—thereby severely impeding the Justice’s ability to make constitutional interpretations. This flagrantly violates the principle of separation of powers. In addition, since the application of Provision III presupposes the existence of Provision II, it becomes unconstitutional as a consequence of the unconstitutionality of Provision II.【101】 

(5)  Provision IV:

    Provision IV applies the deliberation quorum and decision threshold under Provisions II and III to rulings on preliminary injunctions, impeachment cases, and cases involving the dissolution of political parties. The unconstitutionality of Provisions II and III still stands; therefore, their application under Provision IV is likewise unconstitutional. 【103】

    Motions for preliminary injunction may be rendered impossible to deliberate or adjudicate due to the said quorum and threshold, thereby failing to offer urgent and necessary measures. This could result in substantial and irreparable harm, undermining the practical effectiveness of constitutional interpretations and indirectly obstructing the efficacy of constitutional decisions. As cases concerning the impeachment of the President and Vice President of the State, or the dissolution of political parties, often involve significant political confrontations, failure to address them promptly often leads to prolonged political turmoil and social division. Such applications (of the said quorum and threshold) may highly lead to the Constitutional Court being unable to hear cases due to a lack of quorum, thereby violating the AAoC’s intent to refer the aforementioned cases for constitutional adjudication. This constitutes an obstruction to the Justice’s constitutional competence through a legislature-passed law, contravening the constitutional principle of separation of powers.【103】

(6)  Provisions V and VI:

    Provisions V and VI complement each other; thus, they shall be reviewed together. First, the First Clause of Provision V wrongfully cites Article 12 of the CCPA as a recusal rule, whereas that article actually governs the calculation of the total amount of incumbent Justices. Second, interpreting the First Clause of Provision V with Provision VI could deduce that the criteria under the said clause apply only to the sole scenario in which the number of Justices is fifteen, with eight recusing and seven not recusing—which is extremely limited. However, comparing the said clause with the First Sentence of Provision II reveals that if, due to factual reasons such as unfilled vacancies or leave of absence, deliberation cannot be held with the full bench present, the quorum of ten under Provision II shall apply. Yet, under Provisions V and VI, if eight Justices recuse themselves, only the remaining seven Justices is needed to hold deliberation. The differing quorum (and subsequent threshold for declaring unconstitutionality) based on varying reasons for Justices’ non-participation lacks legal justification. Moreover, there is no stipulation as to which quorum should apply when the number of Justices not participating in deliberations includes those recused or absent for other reasons. There could even be unreasonable situations where a small number of recusals would render deliberation impossible, whilst a larger number of recusals could still meet the required quorum for deliberation. To conclude, Provisions V and VI are clear examples of the legislature using laws to interfere with the Justice’s exercise of competence, thereby violating the principle of separation of powers.【105-110】

(7)  Provision VII:

    Provision VII deletes the original texts specifying the enforcement dates of the provisions amended as of January 4, 2018, and June 21, 2023. Consequently, the two prior amendments of the CCPA lack provisions indicating their effective dates. This omission fails to meet the requirement for implementing regulations under the Central Regulation Standard Act. Not only is it impossible to verify whether the Constitutional Court’s review complied with the then-applicable CCPA, but it is also difficult to clearly determine which version of the CCPA should serve as the basis for review in unresolved cases where the petitioner filed before the implementation of Provision VII, or cases filed afterwards. Such circumstances fail to meet the requirement of legal stability, severely impede the exercise of the Justices’ competence, and clearly violate the principle of separation of powers. Provision VII should be null and void. Moreover, since Provision VII sets forth the enforcement dates for Provisions I through VI, the latter’s unconstitutionality should naturally also render Provision VII unconstitutional.【114】

4.  The version of Article 95 of the CCPA before Provision VII (promulgated January 23, 2025) shall continue to be applicable: 
    As Provision VII violates the Constitution, the version of Article 95 of the CCPA prior to Provision VII shall remain unaffected by the amendment and shall continue to be applicable.【116】

5. Since this case has been decided, there is no need for a preliminary injunction. The petitioner’s application for one shall be rejected accordingly. 【117】

Notes:

1. The official English translation of Provisions I through VII has yet to be published. The translated provisions here are provided by the translator of this case summary and will be updated once the official texts are published.