I. Summary of the Parties’ Statements
1. Outline of the Facts of the Case
Petitioner, National Taiwan University (hereinafter “NTU”), with respect to the case concerning Assistant Professor Li ○○ of the Department of Horticulture and Landscape Architecture (hereinafter the “Department of Horticulture”), College of Bioresources and Agriculture (hereinafter the “College of Agriculture”), at NTU, decided not to renew his appointment commencing from the 2014 academic year on the ground that he had not been promoted in rank upon the completion of eight years of service at NTU. After the Central Teacher Grievance Review Committee of the Ministry of Education determined (hereafter “Central Review Committee” ), upon a re-appeal procedure, that the re-appeal was well-founded and that a lawful disposition should be made anew, the matter was reviewed by the faculty evaluation committee of the Department of Horticulture and the College of Agriculture. Ultimately, at the 10th meeting of the University Faculty Evaluation Committee, held on July 27, 2015, a decision was adopted determining not to renew the appointment commencing from the 2014 academic year (hereinafter the “disputed non-renewal decision”), and NTU notified Li ○○ thereof by official letter Shiao-ren-1040058471A, dated August 5, 2015. Li ○○ then filed an appeal with the Committee of Teacher Grievances of NTU (hereinafter the “University Committee of Teacher Grievances”). On November 19, 2015, the University Committee of Teacher Grievances issued Review Decision Jiao-shen-ping-5 (104), finding the appeal well-founded, setting aside the disputed non-renewal decision, and ordering the petitioner to make a lawful decision anew. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a re-appeal. By the letter dated March 21, 2016 (Tai-Jiao-Fa-San-1050016557), the Ministry of Education transmitted to NTU the re-appeal review decision of the Central Review Committee, dated March 14 of the same year (hereinafter the “disputed re-appeal decision”), which determined that the petitioner’s re-appeal was without merit and dismissed it.
Subsequently, the petitioner instituted an action for revocation against the Ministry of Education as the defendant before the Taipei High Administrative Court. By Ruling 105-Su-710 (2016), the court dismissed the petitioner’s action on the ground that the disputed re-appeal decision rendered by the Central Review Committee under the Ministry of Education was “no different from an appeal decision rendered by a superior authority over an ordinary administrative agency; therefore, the plaintiff was obligated to submit to the supervision of the competent authority, and there was no room to permit the institution of administrative litigation against a re-appeal decision.” The petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal. By Ruling 106-Chai-1527 (2017) rendered by the Supreme Administrative Court (hereinafter the “final ruling”), the court, relying on the resolution adopted at the Second Joint Meeting of Presiding Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court in June 2017 (hereinafter the “disputed resolution”), dismissed the interlocutory appeal as without merit, thereby rendering the ruling final.
2. Summary of the Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner’s arguments may be summarized as follows: A university’s decisions concerning the appointment and dismissal of faculty members constitute a core matter of university autonomy and are protected by academic freedom under Article 11 of the Constitution. With respect to such matters of autonomy, a university occupies the status of a rights holder. When the Ministry of Education exercises supervisory authority over matters of university autonomy (for example, by rendering a re-appeal decision that does not uphold a university’s measure of non-renewal of a teacher’s appointment), if such exercise infringes university autonomy, the university itself enjoys the right to seek remedies to eliminate the infringement. However, the disputed resolution relied upon by the final ruling states that the Teachers’ Act, promulgated on August 9, 1995 (hereinafter the “1995 Teachers’ Act”), provides under Articles 29, 31, and 33 a special administrative remedy allowing teachers to file appeal, re-appeal, and, in sequence, administrative litigation with respect to measures concerning them personally, for the purpose of correcting unlawful or improper conduct by competent educational administrative authorities or schools that do harms to teachers’ rights and interests. Where a university renders a decision not to renew the appointment of a faculty member and the teacher, being dissatisfied, files an appeal and a re-appeal, the object of such procedures is the non-renewal measure, and the university is the entity that rendered that measure. Absent specific legal provisions to the contrary, the university may not, following the result of a re-appeal, again institute administrative litigation in sequence, because only in this way can the legislative purpose of establishing the special administrative remedy system be fulfilled. The disputed resolution further reasons that Article 33 of the Teachers’ Act provides only that “teachers” may, depending on the nature of the re-appeal decision, institute administrative litigation in sequence, which is manifestly different from the latter sentence of Article 31, paragraph 2 of the same Act, which specifically provides that “schools” may also file a re-appeal against an appeal decision. Moreover, an overview of the legislative history of Article 33 of the Teachers’ Act shows that the legislators by their discretion intentionally did not include schools to institute administrative litigation against re-appeal decisions, rather than having made a legislative omission. Accordingly, a university may not institute administrative litigation in sequence against a re-appeal decision that does not uphold its decision not to renew a teacher’s appointment. On this basis, the disputed resolution denies universities the right to seek relief by instituting administrative litigation in sequence against re-appeal decisions that are unfavorable to their enjoyment of university autonomy, thereby contravening the intent of Article 11 of the Constitution, which safeguards university autonomy, and Article 16, which safeguards the right to judicial remedy.
II. Reasons for Admission
The petitioner’s representative was originally Tei-wei Kuo, and was changed to Chung-ming Kuan in January 2019. The newly appointed representative, Chung-ming Kuan, has submitted a written statement declaring the assumption of the litigation. Upon review, there is no impropriety, and such assumption shall therefore be approved.
Pursuant to Article 90, paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, cases that were pending but not yet concluded prior to the amended Act taking effect shall, unless otherwise provided by the Act, be governed by the provisions after its amendment and implementation. However, whether a case is admissible shall be determined in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act as in force prior to the amendment (hereinafter the “former Act”). Article 90, paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act so expressly provides. Further, under Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 of the former Act, a petition for constitutional interpretation by the people may be filed only where a constitutionally protected right has been unlawfully infringed, litigation has been instituted in accordance with statutory procedures, and there exists a doubt as to the constitutionality of the law or order applied in the final and binding judgment. Upon examination, the present petition was pending as of November 13, 2017; therefore, its admissibility shall be determined in accordance with the requirements set forth in Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 of the former Act. Having reviewed the petition, the Court finds that it satisfies the requirements prescribed by the aforementioned provision of the former Act, and accordingly, the petition is admitted.
III. Legal Opinions Forming the Disposition
1. Review Principle
Article 16 of the Constitution safeguards the people’s right to judicial remedy, meaning that when a person’s rights or legal interests are infringed, that person has the right to seek relief from the courts. Based on the constitutional principle that where there is a right, there must be a remedy, when a person’s rights or legal interests are infringed, that person must be afforded the opportunity to institute litigation before a court and to request a fair trial in accordance with due process of law, so as to obtain timely and effective relief (see Judicial Yuan Interpretations Nos. 736 and 785). This constitutes the core content of the protection of the right to judicial remedy (see Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 742). Furthermore, Article 11 of the Constitution, which provides for the freedom of teaching, establishes an institutional guarantee of academic freedom. University autonomy also falls within the scope of protection of this provision. Universities enjoy autonomy with respect to matters concerning research, teaching, and learning. They include internal organization, faculty appointment, and qualification evaluation (see Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 380). Moreover, pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution, universities are subject to state supervision in accordance with law. When the competent education authority exercises its administrative supervisory power in accordance with law and such exercise infringes upon university autonomy, universities—by virtue of their status as rights holders enjoying constitutionally protected autonomy under law (see Article 1 of the University Act)—should, in line with the aforementioned principle that where there is a right, there must be a remedy, be permitted to institute litigation in order to seek judicial relief.
2. The Court’s Determination
Since a university’s autonomy in employing faculty members is protected by university autonomy, each university may enter into an appointment contract with a specific teacher who meets the qualifications for appointment, thereby establishing a relationship of rights and obligations between the two parties, and may decide, upon the expiration of the term of appointment, whether to renew and continue the appointment. However, in order to safeguard university teachers’ employment rights and livelihood and to enhance their professional status, the State has expressly regulated, in the Act Governing the Appointment of Educators and the Teachers’ Act, matters concerning the rights and obligations between universities and their faculty members, as well as the requirements and procedures for dismissal, non-renewal, suspension of appointment, and related matters, and has exercised supervision by requiring approval from the competent authority (see Article 31 of the Act Governing the Appointment of Educators; Article 14 of the Teachers’ Act as amended and promulgated on January 8, 2014 [hereinafter the “2014 Teachers’ Act”]; Articles 14 through 16, Article 18, and Article 22 of the Teachers’ Act as amended and promulgated on June 5, 2019 [hereinafter the “current Teachers’ Act”]). With respect to whether a university renews a teacher’s appointment upon the expiration of the term of appointment, Article 19 of the University Act provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the Teachers’ Act, … a university may, based on the needs of academic research and development, separately prescribe provisions regarding … non-renewal of teachers, … and incorporate such provisions into the appointment contract.” Further, pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 1, subparagraph 14, and paragraph 2 of the 2014 Teachers’ Act (Article 16 of the current Teachers’ Act), a university’s decision on whether or not to renew a teacher’s appointment must be deliberated by the school’s faculty evaluation committee to determine whether grounds for non-renewal do exist, and must be submitted to the competent education administrative authority for approval before the non-renewal takes effect. The content of these regulations concerns whether, upon the expiration of the appointment term, a new appointment relationship will no longer be formed between a university and a teacher, and should constitute part of the appointment contract between the university and the teacher concerned. Accordingly, when a university, pursuant to an appointment contract containing such regulatory content, decides not to renew a teacher’s appointment, the legal effect is merely that the teacher will not be reappointed at the originally employing university. In nature, this is simply an expression of intent based on the appointment contract. Although it has a significant impact on the teacher’s employment rights and interests, it is nonetheless distinct from a university’s determination of teacher qualifications, which involves the delegated exercise of public authority and thus constitutes an administrative disposition (see Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 462).
Pursuant to Article 29, paragraph 1 and Article 31, paragraph 2 of the Teachers’ Act promulgated on August 9, 1995 (which correspond to Article 42, paragraph 1 and Article 44, paragraph 2 of the current Teachers’ Act, with only minor textual adjustments and identical regulatory contents), it is expressly provided that: “Where a teacher considers that a measure taken by the competent education administrative authority or a school concerning the teacher personally is unlawful or improper and thereby harms the teacher’s rights or interests, the teacher may file a grievance with the teacher grievance review committees at the various levels,” and that “where a teacher is dissatisfied with a grievance decision, the teacher may file a re-appeal grievance; the same shall apply where a school or the competent education administrative authority is dissatisfied with a grievance decision.” However, as previously explained, a university’s right to institute litigation to seek judicial relief when its autonomy is infringed falls within the scope of protection of the right to judicial remedy under Article 16 of the Constitution. Moreover, although the Teachers’ Act, for the purpose of safeguarding teachers’ employment rights and interests, establishes a special dispute resolution mechanism of appeal and re-appeal, it does not expressly restrict a university’s right, where it considers that its autonomy has been infringed by supervisory measures taken by the competent education authority, to institute corresponding administrative litigation in accordance with law. If, as stated in the disputed resolution, “by reference to Article 33 of the Teachers’ Act, which provides only that ‘teachers’ may, depending on the nature of the re-appeal decision, institute administrative litigation in sequence, … the legislature, as a matter of legislative discretion, intentionally did not include schools within the scope of entities entitled to institute administrative litigation against re-appeal decisions …,” then the aforementioned provisions of the Teachers’ Act would hardly be free from constitutional doubt. In fact, the question of whether a public university may institute administrative litigation against a re-appeal decision rendered by the central competent authority should still depend on whether the measures taken by the public university with respect to its faculty members are adopted solely in its capacity as a party to an appointment contract, without involving the delegated exercise of public authority, as well as on a careful examination of the nature of the appeal and re-appeal mechanisms prescribed by the Teachers’ Act, so as to interpret the relevant regulatory provisions accordingly.
The Committee of Teacher Grievances as referred to in the Teachers’ Act above (hereinafter the “Teacher Grievance Committee”), whether established pursuant to the current Teachers’ Act or the Teachers’ Act promulgated in 1995, is composed of scholars and representatives of local teacher organizations, and teachers who do not concurrently hold administrative positions shall constitute no less than two-thirds of the total number of the committee members. Once its review decision becomes final, it has binding effect on the relevant authorities and schools with respect to the matter at issue, and the competent authority shall supervise its proper implementation in accordance with law (see Article 29, paragraph 2 and Article 32 of the 1995 Teachers’ Act; Article 43, paragraph 1 and Article 45, paragraph 1 of the current Teachers’ Act). Furthermore, the grievance procedure prescribed by the Teachers’ Act is a two-tier process that includes appeal and re-appeal. For universities other than military academies and police academies, an appeal is filed by a teacher with the school-level Teacher Grievance Committee established at each university. Its composition and operation are determined by each university. The appeal decision shall be rendered in the form of a review decision issued in the name of the university, and shall become final if neither the complainant (the teacher) nor the university that adopted the original measure files an appeal within 30 days after service of the review decision. A re-appeal, by contrast, is filed with the central Teacher Review Committee established under the central competent authority, namely the Ministry of Education, and the corresponding review decision is issued in the name of the central competent authority (see Article 22 of the University Act; Article 30, subparagraph 1 of the 1995 Teachers’ Act; Article 42, paragraph 3 and Article 44, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 of the current Teachers’ Act; Articles 11, 29, paragraph 1, and 30, paragraph 3 of the Regulations Governing the Organization and Review Procedures of the Committee of Teacher Grievances as amended and promulgated on August 19, 2005; and Articles 12, 35, paragraph 1, and 36, paragraph 3 of the same Regulations as currently in force, as amended and promulgated on June 28, 2020).
In other words, the Committee of Teacher Grievances is composed primarily of teachers who do not concurrently hold administrative positions, and, for the purpose of resolving disputes between teachers and their employing universities, provides professional opinions grounded in educational practice. Regardless of whether the measures taken by a public university with respect to its faculty members—whether based on the delegated exercise of public authority or on appointment contracts—are of an administrative disposition nature or of a non-administrative disposition nature, public university teachers may file appeals with the school-level Teacher Grievance Committee, thereby first submitting the disputes to an internal university mechanism for resolution. This arrangement serves not only to safeguard the academic professional autonomy of university teachers, but also reflects the concept that although university teachers are employed by their universities, they do not stand in the position of objects of university autonomy. Where a dispute between a teacher and a public university concerning a school measure cannot be resolved through internal university mechanisms, the re-appeal system expressly provided by the Teachers’ Act permits both disputing parties (namely, the teacher and the public university) to file a re-appeal. Such re-appeal is adjudicated by the central Teacher Review Committee established under the central competent authority, based on the supervisory authority that the central competent authority exercises over universities pursuant to the University Act and the Teachers’ Act, through a re-appeal decision of an administrative disposition nature. In cases where a public university’s measures toward its faculty members are not based on the delegated exercise of public authority and give rise to disputes under the appointment contract, if the appeal decision does not uphold the university’s measures and the public university therefore files a re-appeal, and if the university remains dissatisfied with the re-appeal decision, then, by virtue of the fact that it stands as a rights holder of academic freedom alongside the teacher and enjoys university autonomy, where the re-appeal decision rendered in the name of the central competent authority infringes upon the public university’s autonomy, the university may institute administrative litigation in sequence against such re-appeal decision.
The disputed resolution states that “where a university renders a decision not to renew the appointment of a faculty member and the teacher, being dissatisfied, files an appeal and a re-appeal, the object of such procedures is the non-renewal measure, and the university is the entity that rendered that measure. Absent specific legal provisions to the contrary, the university may not, following the result of a re-appeal, again institute administrative litigation in sequence, because only in this way can the legislative intent of establishing the special administrative remedy system be fulfilled.” However, as explained above, a public university’s measure of non-renewal with respect to its faculty members is, in nature, a contractual expression of intent made by the public university solely in its capacity as a party to the appointment contract. A public university is legally entitled to file a re-appeal against a appeal decision that does not uphold its non-renewal measure because the re-appeal mechanism constitutes a special dispute resolution under which, only when internal university autonomy mechanisms are unable to resolve internal disputes, the central competent authority adjudicates the dispute between the two parties. Accordingly, where a re-appeal decision rendered to resolve a dispute concerning a non-renewal measure is considered by a public university to infringe upon its autonomy in appointing faculty members, the university may institute administrative litigation in sequence against the re-appeal decision of the central competent authority that does not uphold its non-renewal measure.
In sum, the disputed resolution holding that a public university may not institute administrative litigation in sequence against a re-appeal decision that does not uphold its measure of non-renewal of a teacher’s appointment contravenes the intent of Article 11 of the Constitution safeguarding academic freedom and Article 16 safeguarding the right to judicial remedy, and shall no longer be applied as of the date of promulgation of this Judgment.