I. Facts of the Case and Purpose of the Petition
1.Petitioner No. 1
Petitioner No. 1, while adjudicating the divorce cases described in the Issues section, considered that the proviso to Article 1052, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code (hereinafter “the contested provision”), which prohibits an at-fault spouse from petitioning for judicial divorce, infringes upon the freedom of marriage guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution. Petitioner No. 1 further contended that the contested provision fails to employ the least restrictive means, thereby giving rise to constitutional concerns as to whether it violates the principle of proportionality stricto sensu under Article 23 of the Constitution. Given that the requirements for judicial divorce have been reexamined in light of J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 748 and 791, further constitutional review is warranted. The question of whether the contested provision is unconstitutional directly affects the outcome of Petitioner No. 1’s cases—specifically, whether the plaintiff’s petition for divorce should be dismissed. As this issue constitutes a preliminary constitutional question with a direct bearing on the judgment, Petitioner No. 1 suspended the trial proceedings and petitioned this Court for constitutional review.
2. Petitioner No. 2
Petitioner No. 2 married his spouse in 1967 (the 56th year of the Republic of China) and thereafter had one son and one daughter. Beginning in 1991, frequent quarrels arose between them. In 2000, they signed a divorce agreement but did not complete the registration. Starting in 2006, Petitioner No. 2 resided in Hong Kong, while his spouse remained in Taiwan. In 2018, Petitioner No. 2 petitioned for judicial divorce under Article 1052, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. The Taiwan Taipei District Court, in Civil Judgment 2018-Hun-353, dismissed the petition. Petitioner No. 2 was dissatisfied and appealed, but in 2019 the Taiwan High Court, in Civil Judgment 2019-Chia-Shang-202, found that he had admitted to engaging in a relationship with another person in 2009, committing adultery, and establishing another family, which had led to the couple’s long-term separation. From an objective standpoint, an emotional foundation was already lacking and the marital relationship had already broken down. However, as the cause of the breakdown was attributable to Petitioner No. 2, his petition for divorce was deemed groundless and was not granted.
Petitioner No. 2 was dissatisfied and further appealed, but the Supreme Court, in Civil Ruling 2020-Tai-Shang-958, dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. Consequently, the aforementioned Taiwan High Court Civil Judgment became final and binding (hereinafter referred to as “Final Judgment I”).
Petitioner No. 2 argued that the contested provision, as applied in Final Judgment I, contravenes the essence of the freedom of marriage and runs counter to the legislative intent of the 2002 amendment to Article 1052 of the Civil Code, which introduced the doctrine of marriage in breakdown. He further asserted that the provision infringes upon the people’s freedom of marriage guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution and may violate the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (1993) (hereinafter “the 1993 Act”), Petitioner No. 2 petitioned this Court for constitutional review.
3. Petitioner No. 3
Petitioner No. 3 married his spouse in 1989 (the 78th year of the Republic of China) and had three sons. In 2018, he petitioned for judicial divorce under Article 1052, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, alleging that significant causes existed which made it difficult to maintain the marriage. The Taiwan Kaohsiung Juvenile and Family Court, in Civil Judgment 2019-Hun-76, dismissed the petition. Petitioner No. 3 was dissatisfied and appealed, but in 2019 the Taiwan High Court Kaohsiung Branch, in Civil Judgment 2019-Chia-Shang-44, held that although the marriage had broken down since 2016, the breakdown was attributable to Petitioner No. 3, who engaged in an improper relationship with a female friend, left home without consent, and passively faced marital problems. Such conduct further deepened the marital breakdown. Accordingly, Petitioner No. 3 was found to bear primary responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage, and his petition for divorce was deemed groundless and was not granted.
Petitioner No. 3 was dissatisfied and further appealed, but the Supreme Court, in Civil Ruling 2020-Tai-Shang-1881, dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. Consequently, the aforementioned Taiwan High Court Kaohsiung Branch Civil Judgment became final and binding (hereinafter referred to as “Final Judgment II”).
Petitioner No. 3 argued that the right to individual autonomy guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution encompasses the right to divorce. The contested provision, by prohibiting an at-fault spouse from petitioning for divorce, unlawfully infringes upon the petitioner’s autonomy in divorce guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution and contravenes the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution. Pursuant to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (1993), Petitioner No. 3 petitioned this Court for constitutional interpretation, requesting a declaration that the contested provision is unconstitutional and that its application be immediately discontinued.
II. Basis for Admissibility and Review Procedure
1. Basis for Admissibility
(1) Petitioner No. 1
In order for Petitioner No. 1 to review the divorce cases Taiwan Kaohsiung Juvenile and Family Court Civil Judgments 2019-Hun-305 and 2020-Hun-231, the contested provision constituted the applicable law. Petitioner No. 1 suspended the trial proceedings and set forth specific reasons for his firm belief that the contested provision was unconstitutional. The petition therefore satisfied the requirements for a judicial petition for constitutional interpretation as established in J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 371, 572, and 590. The Council of Grand Justices admitted the petition in November 2021.
Moreover, since the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (hereinafter “the 2022 Act”) was amended and took effect on January 4, 2022, courts adjudicating cases may, pursuant to Article 55 of the 2022 Act, petition this Court for a judgment declaring a law unconstitutional if the applicable statutory provision is reasonably believed to conflict with the Constitution and directly affects the outcome of the case. While reviewing the divorce and counterclaim-for-divorce cases Taiwan Kaohsiung Juvenile and Family Court Civil Judgments 2020-Hun-519, 2021-Hun-216, 2021-Hun-341, 2021-Hun-389, 2022-Hun-47, 2022-Hun-53, and 2023-Hun-12, Petitioner No. 1 filed petitions after the enforcement of the 2022 Act. These petitions satisfied the aforementioned statutory requirements and were therefore admitted by this Court.
(2) Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3
Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, relying on Final Judgments I and II, argued that the contested provision raised doubts as to its constitutionality. Their petitions satisfied the requirements for petitions for constitutional interpretation filed by individuals under Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (1993), and were admitted by the Council of Grand Justices in November 2021.
(3) Consolidated Review of Cases
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (2022), this Court continued its review of whether the contested provision conflicted with the Constitution by applying the 2022 Act to the aforementioned petitions. As the aforementioned petitions concerned the same statutory provision, the Court consolidated them for joint review and rendered a single judgment in accordance with the proviso to Article 24, Paragraph 1 of the 2022 Act
2.Oral Argument Procedure
This Court held oral argument on November 15, 2022, regarding the above petitions. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 and the relevant authority (the Ministry of Justice) were duly notified, and experts and scholars were invited to present their opinions. The main points of the oral arguments presented by the petitioners and the relevant authority are summarized as follows:
(1) Petitioner No. 1 essentially stated: a. Judicial divorce forms part of the freedom of marriage, which is protected under Article 22 of the Constitution. b. The legislative purpose of the contested provision is to uphold fairness, morality, and reasonableness in marriage. However, the means adopted by the contested provision do not serve to achieve its stated purpose of protecting marital freedom. In divorce proceedings, the parties often attack each other in court, thereby aggravating the breakdown of the marriage beyond repair. Moreover, such divorce proceedings frequently require determinations on the custody of minor children, leading to bargaining conditions such as “I will not agree to divorce unless I obtain custody of the children,” thereby using minor children as bargaining chips—an outcome manifestly detrimental to the best interests of minor children. c. The contested provision does not employ the least restrictive means to achieve its purpose, as the respondent spouse may still claim divorce damages, maintenance, distribution of the remainder of marital property, or allocation of pension rights upon divorce under the Civil Code. d. Forcing the continuation of marital relationships that have become difficult to sustain in reality merely punishes the spouse bearing greater fault, depriving him or her of any lawful means to establish a new exclusive and intimate relationship or to pursue their own personal development. The same consequence may likewise apply to the spouse bearing lesser fault.
(2) Petitioner No. 2 essentially stated: a. The decision whether to divorce, or whether to jointly form and maintain a marital relationship with one’s spouse, is an exercise of individual autonomy that is inseparable from personal dignity. The right to freedom of divorce should therefore be regarded as an aspect of the freedom of marriage and should be protected under Article 22 of the Constitution. b. In a marriage that has already broken down—where affection has been lost and the prospect of restoring shared life is no longer possible—maintaining such a marital relationship would only breed hostility and resentment, thereby failing to fulfill the purposes of marriage. Although the conduct of the at-fault spouse cannot be condoned, the continuation of marriage should not serve as a means of punishment. Instead, emphasis should be placed on the post-divorce consequences, ensuring the protection of the innocent spouse in order to realize the essential purpose of marriage. c. As for the at-fault spouse, less restrictive alternatives are available—such as addressing the issue through divorce proceedings or claims for damages under the Civil Code—rather than directly depriving the spouse of the right to petition for divorce. Determining which party bears fault, and to what degree, should be relevant only to whether and to what extent a claim for damages may be made, not to whether a petition for divorce may be filed.
(3) Petitioner No. 3 essentially stated: a. If an individual cannot autonomously decide whether to leave a marriage, this will affect his or her ability to remarry and to choose whom to marry. Therefore, the freedom of marriage necessarily encompasses the freedom to divorce. b. In addition to restricting the freedom of marriage, the contested provision also limits the constitutional right to family. c. The contested provision is frequently intertwined with cases involving the determination of custody. To prove that the causes of marital breakdown are attributable to the other party, or that the other party bears greater fault, both spouses often resort to every possible means to collect unfavorable evidence against one another. This compels minor children to continually endure the unresolved conflicts between their parents before, during, and after litigation, which is clearly inconsistent with the principle of the best interests of the child and infringes upon the right to a harmonious family life. d. There exist multiple alternative measures to replace the contested provision, which could be addressed through the consequences of divorce rather than through the grounds for divorce. For instance, Article 1030-1, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Civil Code grant the court discretion to adjust the distribution of the remainder of property between spouses. e. The contested provision forces marriages that are on the verge of collapse—or already broken—to continue in a prolonged and dysfunctional state, thereby causing serious physical and psychological harm to both spouses, their children, and their families. This contravenes the constitutional guarantee of the people’ right to health.
(4) The Ministry of Justice, as the relevant authority, essentially stated: a. With reference to foreign divorce regimes: (ⅰ) Germany – Recognizes only one ground for divorce, namely the breakdown of marriage, and establishes both a separation system and hardship clauses. (ⅱ) Switzerland – Judicial divorce requires that the spouses have been separated for two years before filing a petition. However, if there are significant causes making it impossible to maintain the marriage, the innocent spouse may petition for divorce before the two-year period expires. (ⅲ) Japan – Since the Grand Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in 1987 (Showa 62), judicial practice has conditionally allowed at-fault spouses to petition for divorce. (ⅳ) South Korea – Divorce by judgment requires specific statutory grounds while also recognizing general grounds such as “other significant causes making it difficult to continue the marriage.” Overall, comparative foreign legislation demonstrates that the freedom of divorce is subject to limitations, and that the systems adopted vary across jurisdictions. b. The freedom of marriage does not entail an unrestricted freedom to dissolve marriage. This is evident from J.Y. Interpretation No. 791, in which the freedom of marriage was not explicitly defined to encompass “judicial divorce.”c. Marriage is afforded constitutional institutional protection. The legislative purpose of the contested provision lies in maintaining fairness and safeguarding the institution of marriage as matters of public interest, and the provision contributes to achieving those purposes. d. Divorce-related claims such as damages, maintenance, and property distribution are legal consequences of divorce rather than prerequisites for it. They do not serve as instruments to realize the public interests underlying the institutional protection of marriage. If the contested provision were removed, it would impose an excessive burden on public interests and on the innocent spouse. Therefore, it cannot readily be concluded that the contested provision fails to adopt the least restrictive means. e. According to divorce statistics from 2021, there were 47,888 divorces nationwide, of which 85.76 percent were consensual divorces, and only 5.82 percent were judicial divorces. Moreover, according to statistics from the Judicial Yuan the proportion of judicial divorces adjudicated under Article 1052, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code was even lower (4.25 percent). Hence, careful consideration should be given to whether amending the contested provision might adversely affect consensual divorces and thereby harm the interests of the innocent spouse.
(5) The remaining arguments and statements made by the petitioners and the relevant authority are set forth in detail in their written submissions of oral arguments.
III. Legal Opinions Forming the Basis of the Holding
1. Constitutional Rights Forming the Basis of Review
Marriage is a union entered into by two spouses for the purpose of managing a shared life, through which their personalities may be realized and developed. It is characterized by intimacy and exclusivity and serves to provide mutual spiritual, emotional, and material support between the spouses. As the foundation of family and society, the marital relationship is protected under the freedom of marriage guaranteed by Article 22 of the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee of the freedom of marriage is closely connected to the freedoms of personality and human dignity. It encompasses the individual’s autonomous decision whether to marry, whom to marry, whether to divorce by mutual consent, and the right to jointly form and manage the marital relationship with one’s spouse, including matters such as intimacy, financial arrangements, and lifestyle choices. (See J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 552, 554, and 791; Taiwan Constitutional Court Judgment 111-Hsien-Pan-20).
The marital relationship encompasses its formation, maintenance, and termination. The dissolution of marriage is likewise an integral component of the marital institution. The freedom of marriage guaranteed by the Constitution covers not only the freedom to marry and to maintain a marital relationship, but also the freedom to dissolve a marriage, that is, the freedom of divorce, including whether and when to terminate (or withdraw from) the marital relationship. Although the realization of the freedom of divorce generally depends on the mutual consent of both spouses, the absence of such consent does not negate the constitutional protection of one party’s freedom to divorce. Moreover, the protection of the freedom of marriage is not confined to the defensive function of an individual’s fundamental right; it also requires the State to properly design and regulate the marital institution. Because marriage profoundly affects the lives and rights of both spouses, their children, and their relations with others, the State bears a duty of protection and must establish appropriate legal norms governing judicial divorce and the rights and obligations arising therefrom. Therefore, while the full realization of an individual’s freedom to divorce may depend on the other spouse’s consent, where such consent is withheld, the State must, through institutional design or legal regulation, ensure that individuals have the opportunity to petition for judicial divorce. As the institutional design and statutory regulation of judicial divorce pertain to the constitutional guarantee of the fundamental right to marriage, they are necessarily subject to constitutional review.
After entering into marriage, if an individual wishes to dissolve the marital relationship but the spouses cannot agree to terminate the marriage, that individual has the right to petition the court for judicial divorce in accordance with law. This right forms part of the freedom of marriage. Accordingly, the contested provision, which restricts an at-fault spouse from petitioning for judicial divorce after marriage, constitutes an interference with the freedom of marriage for individuals seeking to dissolve the marital relationship. Such interference must comply with the requirements of Article 22 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of marriage. Furthermore, both the freedom to maintain a marriage and the freedom to dissolve a marriage fall within the scope of the freedom of marriage guaranteed by Article 22 of the Constitution. When the spouses disagree on whether to maintain or to dissolve the marriage, a conflict of fundamental rights may arise. In other words, protecting one spouse’s right to petition for judicial divorce necessarily affects the other spouse’s freedom to maintain the marriage. These two aspects must be properly balanced in order to give full effect to the intent of Article 22 of the Constitutionguaranteeing the freedom of marriage.
2. In Principle, the Contested Provision Is Not Inconsistent with the Intent of Article 22 of the Constitution Guaranteeing the Freedom of Marriage
The substantive content of the contested provision is that, in addition to the specific statutory grounds for judicial divorce enumerated in Article 1052, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, and the abstract ground for judicial divorce under the first clause of Paragraph 2—namely, significant causes rendering it difficult to maintain the marriage—where such significant causes are attributable to one spouse, that sole responsible spouse is precluded from petitioning for judicial divorce. By contrast, where both spouses are responsible for the significant causes that make it difficult to maintain the marriage, regardless of the degree of fault, such situations do not fall within the scope of application of the contested provision.
As for the legislative purpose of the contested provision, Paragraph 2 of Article 1052 of the Civil Code was added on June 3, 1985. The legislative reasons for the amendment stated:“Under the former law, the grounds for judicial divorce were limited to ten enumerated grounds under this Article, which was overly strict. In modern foreign legislation, general clauses are often adopted to meet practical needs. Therefore, the first part of Paragraph 2 was added to provide greater flexibility. Furthermore, where significant causes constituting grounds for divorce are attributable to one spouse, only the other spouse should be entitled to petition for divorce in order to ensure fairness. Accordingly, the proviso was established.” In addition, the legislative deliberations in the Legislative Yuan document that the Ministry of Justice explained:“The reason for the proviso is that grounds for divorce should be subject to certain moral constraints, such that the party responsible for the breakdown of the marriage may not petition for divorce, and only the other party may do so, in order to avoid unfair and unreasonable results.”(See the Legislative Yuan Gazette, Vol. 73, No. 38, Committee Record, p. 133.) It is therefore evident that the legislative intent and purpose of the contested provision were, within the existing framework of marriage and judicial divorce, to strengthen the innocent spouse’s autonomous decision-making power as to whether to maintain or dissolve the marriage by excluding the sole at-fault spouse from petitioning for judicial divorce. The provision also aimed to prevent arbitrary petitions for judicial divorce that might disrupt marital order, thereby safeguarding the legal order of marriage and the people’s sense of justice. Where children are involved and the interests of minor children are to be taken into consideration, it further has the function of fulfilling family and social responsibilities by upholding marriages. The legislative purpose is thus legitimate.
With respect to the institutional design of judicial divorce, comparative foreign legislation shows that some jurisdictions adopt a plurality of grounds combining fault-based and breakdown-based causes, as well as specific and general ones (a pluralistic approach) (see, e.g., Article 770 of the Japanese Civil Code). Others adopt a single ground for divorce based solely on marital breakdown (a monistic approach) (see, e.g., Article 1564 of the German Civil Code). In such monistic systems, the degree of fault attributable to each spouse is not the primary criterion for determining whether the marriage may be dissolved. Rather, the inquiry focuses on the essence and purpose of marriage, namely, whether the marital relationship has broken down and whether the spouses can continue to live together—as the sole ground for divorce. The current Civil Code adopts a pluralistic approach by providing multiple grounds for judicial divorce. Within this framework, the contested provision, by restricting the at-fault spouse from unilaterally dissolving the marriage through judicial divorce, serves to strengthen the innocent spouse’s autonomy in deciding whether to maintain or dissolve the marriage. In terms of protecting the innocent spouse’s freedom of marriage, safeguarding the legal order of marriage, and upholding the people’s sense of justice, the method of restriction imposed by the contested provision is not entirely ineffective in achieving its legislative purposes. Accordingly, where the statutory provisions providing multiple grounds for judicial divorce do not result in manifestly excessive hardship in individual cases, the legislature may be afforded a margin of discretion in institutional design. Moreover, both the maintenance and dissolution of marriage after its formation fall within the constitutional protection of the freedom of marriage and individual autonomy. When the spouses disagree on whether to maintain or dissolve the marriage, a conflict inevitably arises as to which interest the State should prioritize. The contested provision, in order to preserve the legal order of marriage and the people’s sense of justice, gives priority to protecting the innocent spouse’s right to maintain the marriage when significant causes exist that render the marriage difficult to sustain, and restricts the sole at-fault spouse from petitioning the court for judicial divorce. In principle, this is not inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of marriage.
3. The Contested Provision Is Manifestly Excessive in Exceptional Cases Where It Applies to a Sole At-Fault Spouse Petitioning for Judicial Divorce
Since the system of judicial divorce serves as a means of realizing the constitutional freedom of marriage, when significant causes arise that make it difficult to maintain the marriage, either spouse may petition the court to dissolve the marriage. Although such petitions may be subject to statutory restrictions, whether those restrictions are excessively harsh remains a matter for constitutional review. Accordingly, where the contested provision restricts an at-fault spouse from petitioning for judicial divorce in cases where that spouse alone is responsible, it must still be examined for consistency with Article 22 of the Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of marriage, so as to prevent manifestly excessive hardship in individual cases.
The foundation of marital relationship lies in the spouses’ voluntary mutual affection and support. The core of marital relationship is to maintain and manage a shared life, characterized by mutual spiritual and material assistance and interdependence, thereby enabling both spouses to realize and develop their personalities. The marriage that the legislature seeks to preserve must be a harmonious one, as reflected in the first clause of Article 1052, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. Marriage is deeply personal. Circumstances in which a marriage becomes difficult to maintain often arise from the long-term accumulation and interaction of multiple factors—such as finances, emotions, personalities, and living habits—hence the saying, “three feet of ice do not form in a single day.” The causes of marital breakdown usually develop gradually over time and may involve varying degrees of fault on the part of both spouses. Regardless of the complexity of such causes, under the current system of judicial divorce, when a marital relationship has irretrievably broken down and one or both spouses no longer wish to continue the marriage, the contested provision’s prohibition on a sole at-fault spouse petitioning for judicial divorce often preserves only the outward form of the marriage, devoid of its substantive essence of mutual affection and support. This may also hinder the healthy physical and psychological development of minor children who remain in such circumstances for extended periods. By categorically denying a sole at-fault spouse the opportunity to petition for judicial divorce—without regard to whether a considerable period has passed since the occurrence of significant causes making the marriage difficult to maintain, or whether such causes have persisted for a considerable time—the contested provision effectively compels the spouse to remain in a hollow marital relationship already marked by severe breakdown, estrangement, or conflict. This amounts to a complete deprivation of the opportunity for divorce and may result in manifestly excessive hardship in individual cases. In such manifestly excessive situations, it is necessary to balance the restriction on the at-fault spouse’s right to petition for judicial divorce against the innocent spouse’s freedom to maintain the marriage protected under the Constitution. Within this scope of manifestly excessive hardship, the restriction for the at-fault spouse to petition for judicial divorce imposed by the contested provision cannot be deemed consistent with the Article 22 of the Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of marriage. The relevant authorities shall, within two years from the date of this Judgment, amend the provisions governing judicial divorce in accordance with the intent of this Judgment. If such amendments are not completed within that period, courts shall adjudicate relevant cases in accordance with the intent of this Judgment. As for the determination of what constitutes a “considerable period”—whether referring to the time elapsed since the occurrence of significant causes making the marriage difficult to maintain, or the duration of their persistence—this remains within the legislature’s margin of discretion and lies beyond the scope of this Court’s review. This is hereby so indicated.
IV. Additional Remarks
Since the contested provision concerns the institutional design of judicial divorce and the legal framework governing the grounds for divorce, the relevant authorities, when amending the law, must re-examine and improve the current system of judicial divorce and properly redesign its legal framework in response to social changes and the evolving nature of modern marital relationships. For instance, comparative foreign legislation shows that more flexible grounds for divorce have often been adopted to accommodate social transformation. One possible reform is to consider whether the Civil Code provisions on judicial divorce should introduce a separation system, explicitly providing that a considerable period of separation without cohabitation may constitute a ground for judicial divorce. To prevent adverse consequences that may arise from such relaxed grounds, foreign legislative examples may also be drawn upon to introduce hardship clauses—for example, where, for the benefit of minor children of the marriage, it is necessary to maintain the marriage due to special circumstances, or where, for the spouse opposing divorce, dissolution would cause extreme hardship due to special circumstances, the marriage, even if broken down, shall not be dissolved (see Article 1568 of the German Civil Code). These mechanisms help mitigate extreme hardship caused by divorce. Furthermore, to safeguard the post-divorce living security of the innocent or disadvantaged spouse and minor children, comprehensive supportive should be implemented. For example, beyond the current Article 1030-1, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, consideration should be given to expressly revising statutory provisions, reasonably raising the proportion of residual property allocated to the other spouse, requiring the at-fault spouse to pay higher maintenance, bear a greater share of child support, or assume increased liability for damages or other negative effects arising from divorce. These additional burdens imposed on the at-fault spouse in the course of judicial divorce proceedings would ensure that the rights and interests of the innocent or disadvantaged spouse and minor children receive timely and effective legal protection and remedies, as well as fair substantive compensation, thereby fulfilling the expectations of maintaining legal order and the people’s sense of justice. These remarks are hereby made.