I. Facts and the Petitioner’s Arguments
1. First Petitioner
The first group of petitioners, initiated by Meishieh Chu and thirty three others, were originally members of the Fourth Division of the China Airlines Co., Ltd. Company Union (hereinafter “China Airlines Company Union”). Pursuant to Article 11 of the Labor Union Act, they jointly initiated the establishment of a Maintenance Factory Union. Upon completing the preparatory procedures, they applied on September 3, 2014 to the then-Taoyuan County Government for registration of the China Airlines Maintenance Factory Company Union. On September 25, 2015, and the Taoyuan County Government approved the registration (hereinafter “the first approval disposition for the first group of petitioners”), issuing both the union registration certificate and the certificate of the union chairman. The China Airlines Company Union, dissatisfied with this decision, filed an administrative appeal in the capacity of an interested party. On May 10, 2016, the Ministry of Labor rendered an appeal decision, revoking the first approval disposition for the first group of petitioners and ordering the Taoyuan City Government to issue a new lawful disposition. In compliance with the appeal decision, the Taoyuan City Government reexamined the case and, on September 30, 2016, once again approved the registration of the union (hereinafter “the second approval disposition for the first group of petitioners”), and issued a new registration certificate. Still dissatisfied, the China Airlines Company Union again filed an administrative appeal as an interested party. On February 2, 2017, the Ministry of Labor rendered another appeal decision, once again revoking the second approval disposition for the first group of petitioners and instructing the Taoyuan City Government to issue a new lawful disposition. The first group of petitioners, disagreeing with this decision, filed an administrative lawsuit. The Taipei High Administrative Court Judgment 106-Su-435 (2017) dismissed the case. The petitioners then appealed, but the Supreme Administrative Court Judgments 109-Shang-584 (2020) (hereinafter “Final Judgment I”), dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
The first group of petitioners petitioned for constitutional review of both statutory provisions and judicial decisions, contending in summary as follows:(1) Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Rules of the Labor Union Act (hereinafter “Contested Provision I”) and Paragraph 2 of the same article (hereinafter “Contested Provision II”) require that, in order for a factory to establish an company union, the workplace must meet three conditions: “independent personnel,” “independent budgeting and accounting,” and “eligibility for factory, company, business, or commercial registration in accordance with law.” These requirements are not merely technical or procedural details but add substantive restrictions not found in the Labor Union Act itself, thereby violating the principle of statutory reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution.(2) Whether a factory meets the conditions for establishing a company union is entirely within the control of the employer, who can manipulate organizational structure, personnel arrangements, and budgeting processes to prevent any given factory from meeting the statutory requirements. As a result, the system under the Labor Union Act that permits the establishment of factory-level company unions becomes illusory. Accordingly, Contested Provisions I and II violate the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution and infringe upon the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution, Article 22(1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 8(1)(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).(3) Since Final Judgment I applied Contested Provisions I and II, which are unconstitutional, it should be vacated and remanded to the Supreme Administrative Court.
2. Second Petitioner
On January 12, 2015, the second group of petitioners applied to the Taichung City Government for registration of a company union. On August 12, 2016, the Taichung City Government approved the registration (hereinafter “the first approval disposition for the second group of petitioners”) and issued both the union registration certificate and the certificate of the union chairman. Dissatisfied, the Taichung City AIDC Company union (hereinafter “AIDC Company union”) filed an administrative appeal. On February 2, 2017, the Ministry of Labor rendered an appeal decision, revoking the first approval disposition for the second group of petitioners and ordering the Taichung City Government to issue a new lawful disposition.In compliance with the appeal decision, the Taichung City Government reexamined the case and, on March 31, 2017, issued a new disposition (hereinafter “the second approval disposition for the second group of petitioners”), again approving the registration of the union and issuing a registration certificate. The AIDC Company union, still dissatisfied, filed another administrative appeal. On October 12, 2017, the Ministry of Labor rendered an appeal decision, revoking the second approval disposition for the second group of petitioners and ordering the Taichung City Government to issue a new lawful disposition.UponAfter reexamination, the Taichung City Government, on November 17, 2017, issued a third approval disposition (hereinafter “the third approval disposition for the second group of petitioners”), approving the registration of the union and issuing a registration certificate. Dissatisfied once again, the AIDC company union filed another administrative appeal. On August 3, 2018, the Ministry of Labor rendered an appeal decision, revoking the third approval disposition and ordering the Taichung City Government to issue a new lawful disposition.The second group of petitioners, disagreeing with this decision, filed an administrative lawsuit. The Taipei High Administrative Court Judgment 107-Su-1165 (2018), dismissed the case. The petitioners appealed, and the Supreme Administrative Court Judgment 108-Pan-498 (2019), vacated the judgment and remanded the case. Upon retrial, the Taipei High Administrative Court Judgment in 108-Su-Geng-Yi-89 (2019), again dismissed the case. The petitioners appealed again, but the Supreme Administrative Court Judgments 110-Shang-321 (2021) (hereinafter “Final Judgment II”), dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
The second group of petitioners petitioned for constitutional review of both statutory provisions and judicial decisions, contending in summary as follows:(1) Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Labor Union Act provides: “The types of labor unions are as follows: (1) company unions, which are organized by workers employed at the same factory, the same business entity, enterprises with controlling or subordinate relationships under the Company Act, or financial holding companies and their subsidiaries under the Financial Holding Company Act.” However, the Act provides no definition of the term “factory.” The Enforcement Rules of the Labor Union Act were promulgated pursuant to the general authorization clause in Article 48 of the Labor Union Act and may only stipulate technical and procedural details. By requiring “independent personnel,” “independent budgeting and accounting,” and other independence criteria as prerequisites for establishing a factory-level company union, Contested Provisions I and II effectively restrict the statutory meaning of “factory,” thereby violating the principle of statutory reservation.(2) Whether a factory meets the requirements for establishing a company union is entirely subject to manipulation by the employer, who may control organizational structure, personnel arrangements, and budgetary processes to prevent any given factory from qualifying for establishment under the Act. Accordingly, Contested Provisions I and II contravene the spirit of union freedom and union autonomy, infringing upon the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution, Article 22(1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 8(1)(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).(3) Since Final Judgment II applied Contested Provisions I and II, which are unconstitutional, it should be vacated and remanded to the Supreme Administrative Court.
II. Review of Admissibility and Proceedings
1. Review of Admissibility
(1) Grounds for Admissibility
According to law, where a party has exhausted all levels of judicial remedies in accordance with statutory procedures and considers that the legal provisions applied in a final and binding judgment adverse to them, or the judgment itself, conflict with the Constitution, the party may, within six months from the service of such judgment, petition the Constitutional Court for a judgment declaring unconstitutionality. Furthermore, such petitions by individuals shall be admissible if the case involves issues of constitutional significance or if acceptance is necessary to safeguard the fundamental rights of the petitioners. These requirements are explicitly stipulated in Articles 59 and Article 61, Paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (hereinafter “the CCPA”).
In the present case, the first group of petitioners received Final Judgment I on January 25, 2022, and filed the present petition on April 28, 2022. The second group of petitioners received Final Judgment II on April 29, 2022, and filed the present petition on October 3, 2022. Both groups of petitioners were parties to Final Judgments I and II, respectively, and therefore have a direct legal interest in whether these judgments should be vacated to ensure the realization of constitutionally protected fundamental rights. Since the petitioners seek a declaration of unconstitutionality and the annulment of the judgments in order to safeguard their freedom of association, they possess standing to petition for constitutional review of both the contested legal provisions and the judgments. Accordingly, the petitions for constitutional review of legal provisions and judgments filed by the petitioners meet the admissibility requirements set forth in the CCPA and, given their constitutional significance, are hereby admitted for review.
(2) Consolidated Hearing
Although the above petitions were filed separately, since they challenge the same legal provisions, they are hereby consolidated for joint review and adjudication in accordance with the proviso of Article 24, Paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (CCPA).
2. Oral Proceedings
On February 21, 2023, this Court held oral proceedings. In addition to notifying the petitioners and the Ministry of Labor as the relevant government agency, the National Human Rights Commission of the Control Yuan, experts and scholars, as well as China Airlines Co., Ltd. as an interested party, also appeared before the Court to present their opinions. The main arguments presented by the petitioners and the Ministry of Labor during the oral proceedings are summarized as follows:
(1) The first group of petitioners essentially argucontended that:
A. Contested Provisions I and II, in defining the term “factory,” infringe upon the workers’ freedom to organize labor unions as guaranteed by the freedom of association under Article 14 of the Constitution.
B. Although Article 48 of the Labor Union Act authorizes the Ministry of Labor to promulgate enforcement rules, Contested Provisions I and II do not concern merely technical or procedural details. Instead, by imposing additional restrictions not found in the Act itself, they violate the principle of statutory reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution.
C. The three requirements set forth in Contested Provisions I and II for determining whether a factory may establish a company union—namely, independent personnel, independent budgeting, and independent accounting—are entirely subject to the employer’s control, allowing employers to easily prevent workplaces from meeting the statutory requirements. This violates the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution.
(2) The second group of petitioners essentially contended that:
A. The three requirements set forth in Contested Provisions I and II for determining whether a factory may establish an company union are entirely subject to the control of the employer. By substantially restricting the establishment of unions, these provisions contravene the protection of the freedom of association guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
B. The enforcement rules may regulate only technical and procedural matters supplementary to the parent statute. However, Contested Provisions I and II impose restrictive definitions on the term “factory” as used in Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Labor Union Act, thereby exceeding the scope of authorization conferred by the parent statute and violating the principle of statutory reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution.
(3) The Ministry of Labor, as the relevant government agency, essentially argucontended that:
A. The petitioners no longer possess the substantive existence of a labor union. Their filing of the present petition in the name of the union renders them without proper standing. Furthermore, as their claims concern merely disputes over the correctness of judicial fact-finding and application of law, the petition should not be admissible.
B. The freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution with respect to workers specifically protects the individual worker’s right to organize. This right is distinct in nature from the general freedom of association and therefore should not be subsumed under the latter concept.
C. Contested Provisions I and II constitute regulations of a technical and procedural nature. They do not impose additional restrictions beyond those provided by law and thus do not violate the principle of statutory reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution.
D. By requiring that a factory-level company union serve as the minimum unit of a company union, and that such unions possess a certain degree of independence and scale, Contested Provisions I and II establish necessary regulations to safeguard the workers’ exercise of the three labor rights. These provisions are consistent with the legislative purposes of the Labor Union Act, namely, to promote labor solidarity, enhance workers’ status, and improve workers’ livelihoods. They represent the most appropriate means of achieving these goals, effectively contribute to labor-management harmony, and comply with the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution.
(4) The remaining arguments and statements of the petitioners and the relevant government agency are set forth in detail in their written submissions for oral proceedings and in the transcript of the oral proceedings.
Having considered the petitions of the petitioners, the written opinions of the relevant government agency, the opinions of the expert, and the arguments presented in the oral proceedings, this Court renders the following judgment with reasons stated as follows.
III. Legal Reasoning BehindForming the Holding
1. Fundamental Rights under the Constitution and Standards of Review
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees the people the freedom of association. This freedom is intended to safeguard the fundamental right of individuals to form common wills through associations, to pursue shared ideals for specific purposes, to organize groups based on collective intent, and to participate in their activities to achieve common goals. Freedom of association not only protects the people’s liberty to freely choose the purposes of associations and to establish such associations, but also guarantees that associations formed by individuals are free from unlawful restrictions regarding their formation, existence, naming, and activities related to association (see J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 479, 644, and 733). Article 153, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution further provides that, to improve the livelihood of workers and enhance their skills, the State shall enact laws and implement policies to protect labor. Workers engaged in various occupations, in order to improve working conditions and enhance their social and economic status, may organize labor unions to exercise rights such as collective bargaining and industrial actions. These are fundamental labor rights widely recognized in modern constitutional states and fall within the meaning of the above constitutional provisions (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 373). Such rights are also affirmed in several international covenants (see ICCPR Article 22(1), ICESCR Article 8(1), and ILO Convention No. 87, Article 2, on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize). The formation of labor unions by workers, and the exercise of workers’ right to solidarity, collective bargaining, and industrial action, are closely intertwined. These rights constitute part of the State’s obligations to protect workers and are a specific manifestation of the freedom of association under Article 14 of the Constitution. Accordingly, workers’ freedom of association, expressed through the formation of unions and the pursuit of their collective will, falls within the protective scope of Article 14.
The implementation of workers’ freedom of association involves a balancing of labor and employer interests. Its concrete content must be shaped by legislation, requiring the State to establish systems governing labor unions through statutory regulations—such as procedures for union registration, conditions and effects of collective bargaining and strikes, and protections against interference in union activities or employer misconduct. Only through such legislation can the constitutional purpose of safeguarding workers’ freedom of association be realized. The formation of specific union systems concerns major issues such as labor-management relations and public interests. Under the principles of the rule of law and the principle of democracy, these matters must be addressed by legislative power and administrative powers through statutory enactments, or by clear statutory authorization serving as the basis for competent authorities to promulgate regulations (see J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 443, 568, and 614). Where statutory authorization is granted for supplementary regulations, such authorization must comply with the principle of clarity and specificity. Whether a matter must be directly regulated by law or may be delegated to regulations depends on the subject, content, and the importance of the protected interests, as well as the degree of restriction imposed. Only matters that are merely technical or procedural in the execution of law may be regulated by administrative orders (see J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 443, 522, 765, and Constitutional Court Judgment No. 19, 2022). Accordingly, when relevant authorities formulate policies and define the concrete content of workers’ freedom of association, or impose restrictions on union systems affecting workers’ choice of union partners or their ability to form unions, such actions must comply with the principle of statutory reservation and the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution, so as to ensure the realization of workers’ freedom of association guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. The definition and requirements for the establishment of factory-level company unions set forth in Contested Provisions I and II constitute an interference with workers’ freedom of association to form labor unions
The formation of specific union systems by the State must be based on multiple social factors and developmental conditions, including contemporary economic development, the public’s understanding and acceptance of the union system, workers’ willingness to participate in union activities, and their expectations regarding such activities. The legislature, in this regard, is required to balance workers’ freedom of association with employers’ freedom of business and property rights, thereby achieving industrial democracy and order through compromise between labor and management cooperation and collective bargaining. The design of regulations governing the requirements for establishing labor unions constitutes an important part of the State’s labor protection policy. The strictness or leniency of such requirements not only affects the number of unions that may be established, but also determines whether workers may freely organize unions and exercise their rights under labor laws regarding dispute resolution mechanisms, the conclusion of collective agreements, negotiation and industrial actions, as well as the protections against unfair labor practices under the current legal system. These are matters of significant importance concerning restrictions on workers’ freedom of association. The Constitution does not mandate that the protection of workers’ freedom of association be limited solely to factory-level company unions as the smallest unit of solidarity, nor does it require that the protection of union formation and activities be confined to specific content. Accordingly, with respect to the organizational requirements for unions, the procedures for their establishment and registration, and the approval process, the legislature enjoys a certain margin of discretion when enacting laws at the statutory level. Nevertheless, when the requirements for union organization and establishment create obstacles to workers’ freedom to form unions and thereby constitute an interference with workers’ freedom of association, such requirements must be based on statutory provisions or on clear statutory authorization for the promulgation of regulations, in order to comply with the principle of statutory reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution. Moreover, they must also conform to the principle of proportionality.
3. Violation of the Principle of Statutory Reservation by Contested Provisions I and II
Chapter 2 of the Labor Union Act regulates the organization of labor unions, which may take the form of company unions, industrial unions, or occupational unions. Among them, company unions, as stipulated in Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Act, may be organized by workers employed at the same factory, the same business entity, enterprises with controlling or subordinate relationships under the Company Act, or financial holding companies and their subsidiaries under the Financial Holding Company Act. Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Act provides that only one company union may be organized within each enterprise. Under the current law, company unions enjoy specific statutory rights, such as the authority to consent to certain matters on behalf of workers (e.g., extension of working hours under Article 32, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act) and the entitlement of union officials to paid leave for union affairs (see Article 36 of the Labor Union Act). These are concrete institutional arrangements established through legislative processes.
The provision allowing workers employed in the same factory to establish factory-level company unions embodies the substantive content through which workers’ freedom of association is realized. Under the existing union system, the concept of “the same factory” defines the organizational unit within which workers may form a factory-level company union. Its meaning and scope directly determine whether workers may establish such unions, and therefore concern an essential aspect of workers’ freedom of association. Regulations on such essential matters are found only in Contested Provisions I and II. Contested Provision I of the Enforcement Rules of the Labor Union Act provides: "The term ‘factory’ as referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Act means a workplace that has independent personnel, budgeting, and accounting, and is eligible to apply for factory registration, company registration, business registration, or commercial registration in accordance with law.” Contested Provision II further provides:“The requirement of having independent personnel, budgeting, and accounting as prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall meet the following conditions: (1) possessing the authority to hire or dismiss employees of the workplace; (2) preparing and executing budgets; and (3) establishing a separate accounting unit and keeping accounts to calculate profits and losses.” Accordingly, under Contested Provisions I and II, workers may establish a factory-level company union only if their common workplace satisfies these definitions and requirements.
As stated above, the definition and requirements set forth in Contested Provisions I and II concern essential matters of workers’ freedom of association. However, the concept of “the same factory” in Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Labor Union Act is left undefined. From the legislative purpose set forth in Article 1 and from the systematic context of the Act, no concrete guidance or operative criteria can be discerned, nor any policy directions or conceptual framework for competent authorities to follow in defining “factory.” Moreover, the Act does not provide clear and specific authorization for the competent authority to define “the same factory” as a workplace with independent personnel (with the authority to hire and dismiss employees), independent budgeting (preparing and executing budgets), independent accounting (establishing a separate accounting unit and keeping accounts of profits and losses), and eligibility for factory, company, business, or commercial registration. Nor does the Act authorize the competent authority to further require, under Contested Provision II, that independence in personnel, budgeting, and accounting be met through these specified criteria. As a result, under Contested Provisions I and II, it is impossible for workers at a common workplace that lacks independence in personnel, budgeting, and accounting, or is ineligible for registration under factory, company, business, or commercial laws, to are excluded from the possibility of establishing a factory-level company union. Since these regulations concern essential matters of workers’ freedom of association, they must be based on statutory provisions or clear statutory authorization. By regulating such essential matters without clear statutory authorization, the competent authority has restricted workers’ freedom of association through Contested Provisions I and II, thereby contravening the principle of statutory reservation.
4. Contested Provisions I and II are not in conflict with the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution
Contested Provisions I and II directly concern the requirements for workers to organize factory-level company unions. Their regulatory content constitutes restrictions on workers’ freedom of association and must therefore comply with the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution. Since the organizational model of company unions involves balancing the interests of labor, employers, and the public, the legislature enjoys a wide margin of discretion. Accordingly, review under the principle of proportionality requires that the regulatory purpose be legitimate and that the means adopted bear a reasonable relation to that purpose.
With respect to the legitimacy of purpose, Contested Provision I was enacted in 2011 to accompany amendments to the Labor Union Act, designating “factory” as the minimum unit for organizing company unions in order to prevent fragmentation and excessive proliferation of unions, which would weaken their collective strength. To give effect to Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the Labor Union Act, Contested Provision I requires that workplaces eligible to organize company unions must possess “independent personnel, budgeting, and accounting” and be eligible for “factory, company, business, or commercial registration.” Subsequently, because disputes arose over whether a workplace met the requirement of independence in personnel, budgeting, and accounting, Contested Provision II was added in 2014, referencing the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ 1966 interpretive letter on independent accounting, to clearly define such independence. The purpose of these provisions is to provide labor authorities with clear criteria when handling registration of factory-level company unions, to ensure that eligible workplaces possess managerial functions enabling unions to negotiate on equal footing with employers, conclude collective agreements, and thereby enhance workers’ labor rights. Although Contested Provisions I and II contravene the principle of statutory reservation, their regulatory purposes are nonetheless legitimate.
With respect to the reasonable relation between means and purpose, given Articles 6 and 9 of the Labor Union Act, Contested Provision I limits workers’ ability to organize factory-level company unions to workplaces that are eligible for legal registration (factory, company, business, or commercial) and that possess a certain degree of independence. Contested Provision II further sets out specific criteria for independence to guide competent authorities in reviewing such applications. Substantively, Contested Provision I employs workplace characteristics as the standard for determining eligibility to organize a union, ensuring that the rights of collective bargaining and industrial actions can be effectively exercised once a union is established. Contested Provision II specifies the criteria for independence, thereby providing uniform standards for competent authorities in individual cases. Taken together with the provisions of the Labor Union Act, these contested rules aim to prevent the excessive proliferation of small-scale company unions within a single enterprise, which would result in unions lacking sufficient membership strength, being unable to effectively engage in collective bargaining, or producing too many entities with statutory privileges such as the authority to consent on behalf of workers or entitlement to paid union leave. Without reasonable restrictions, such outcomes could harm rather than protect workers’ interests. The means adopted in Contested Provisions I and II are thus reasonably related to their purpose of providing consistent standards for labor authorities in reviewing applications for union registration. Accordingly, Contested Provisions I and II are not in conflict with the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution.
5. Final Judgments I and II are hereby vacated and remanded to the Supreme Administrative Court
According to law, where a party has exhausted all levels of judicial remedies in accordance with statutory procedures and considers that the legal provisions applied in a final and binding judgment adverse to them, or the judgment itself, conflict with the Constitution, the party may petition the Constitutional Court for a judgment declaring unconstitutionality. Where the Constitutional Court finds such a petition well-founded, it shall declare the final judgment unconstitutional, vacate it, and remand the case to the competent court. If the Court finds the legal provisions applied in such judgment unconstitutional, it shall also issue a declaration of unconstitutionality of the provisions (see Articles 59(1) and 62(1) of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act). Accordingly, in cases such as the present petitions, if the Constitutional Court declares that the content of a final and binding judgment conflicts with the Constitution, the judgment shall be vacated and remanded to the competent court. Furthermore, if the Court declares unconstitutional the provisions applied in the final and binding judgment, in order to safeguard the petitioners’ right to have their cases retried under constitutional provisions free of unconstitutionality, the Court must also vacate the judgment and remand it to the competent court, thereby ensuring that the competent court adjudicates by applying provisions consistent with constitutional principles. In the present case, this Court finds that Contested Provisions I and II, without clear statutory authorization, regulate essential matters of workers’ freedom of association that must be stipulated by law or by regulations based on clear statutory authorization, thereby contravening the principle of statutory reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution. The petitions filed by the first and second groups of petitioners are therefore well-founded. As the final and binding Judgments I and Judgement II applied Contested Provisions I and II, which are unconstitutional, both judgments are vacated pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act and remanded to the Supreme Administrative Court.
IV. Conclusion
1. Contested Provisions I and II contravene the principle of statutory reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution and shall cease to be effective no later than two years from the date of this Judgment’s pronouncement.
2. Contested Provisions I and II are not in conflict with the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution.
3. Final Judgments I and II, having applied Contested Provisions I and II that are unconstitutional, are hereby vacated and remanded to the Supreme Administrative Court.
V. Additional Explanations
With respect to the requirements for the establishment of labor unions, while the legislature indeed enjoys a certain margin of discretion, Contested Provisions I and II are not in conflict with the principle of proportionality. Nevertheless, in enacting relevant detailed regulations, the legislature must take into account the constitutional purpose of safeguarding workers’ freedom of association. Accordingly, legislative provisions adopted within the scope of such discretion must remain within reasonable bounds and avoid imposing excessive restrictions on union formation requirements under the pretext of protecting workers’ collective interests. In particular, regarding the regulatory design of requirements such as the organizational scope, type, and scale of labor unions, the relevant authorities, when revising Contested Provisions I and II, should review and improve them comprehensively so as to conform to the constitutional guarantee of workers’ freedom of association. Such revisions should aim to enhance workers’ willingness to organize and participate in unions, strengthen the functions and autonomy of unions, and promote the sound development of union organizations. These supplementary clarifications are hereby provided by this Court.