Case News

The TCC delivers its Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1 (2025)

    The Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) delivered its judgment on the “Case on the Constitutionality of the Amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act” (TCC Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1) on December 19, 2025.

Facts, Issues, and Background of the Case

    On December 20, 2024, the Legislative Yuan passed the amendment bill to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act upon third reading. The bill amended seven provisions in Articles 4, 30, and 95 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (CCPA). The amendments require the President to nominate TCC candidates in two months when there is a vacancy (Article 4, Paragraph 3; hereinafter “Provision I”), as well as adding additional quorum/threshold requirements for the Constitutional Court to deliberate, declare unconstitutionality ( together in Article 30 Paragraph 2; hereinafter “Provision II”), order preliminary injunction, uphold the President and Vice President’s impeachment, and dissolute unconstitutional parties (together in Article 30, Paragraph 4; hereinafter “Provision IV”). The amendment bill also added procedural rules for situations when the quorums are not met, including those due to recusals (Article 30, Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6; hereinafter “Provision III”, “Provision V”, and “Provision VI”). Lastly, the amendment also designated December 20, 2024, as its date of enforcement, while deleting the enforcement clauses for two previous amendments of the CCPA (Article 95, hereinafter “Provision VII”). 

    The Executive Yuan deemed the provisions unfeasible and requested the Legislative Yuan to reconsider. On January 10, 2025, the Legislative Yuan upheld the original bill by majority vote in a plenary session, denying the Executive Yuan’s request to reconsider. On January 13, 2025, the Legislative Yuan sent the amended provisions to the President for promulgation. The provisions were promulgated on January 23, 2025. 

    Fifty-one members of the Legislative Yuan believed that the newly amended provisions of the CCPA are unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers and the flaws in their legislative process. They filed a petition with the TCC on June 15, 2025. Because the new quorum would leave the Court unable to deliberate with only eight justices, the petitioners also filed a motion with the TCC for a preliminary injunction to suspend the implementation of the challenged provisions. On May 12, 2025, the TCC held a public hearing and summoned relevant parties and experts to provide their opinions. 

    The abovementioned events happened against the backdrop of the ongoing rotation of constitutional justices. On October 31, 2024, seven constitutional justices, including the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, ended their terms. The President of the State had previously nominated seven candidates on August 31, 2024. But the candidates were all denied by the Legislative Yuan on December 24, 2024. The second round of candidates was nominated on March 21, 2025, but the Legislative Yuan also denied them on July 25 of the same year. The circumstances left the TCC with only eight justices since September 2024. 

    Justice Tai-Lang LU authored this judgment. Justice Po-Hsiang YU filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Ming-Yan SHIEH and Justice Chung-Wu CHEN joined. Justice Tsai-Chen TSAI filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Hui-Chin YANG, Justice Tzung-Jen TSAI, and Justice Fu-Meei JU refused to attend the deliberation of this case. 

Procedure of the Case

    As this case pertained to the TCC’s deliberation quorum and decision threshold (Provision II), the Court elaborated extensively on the procedure of this case. 

    The TCC referred to the Constitution and its Additional Articles and held that the absence of provisions governing how constitutional justices exercise their powers shows that the Constitution intended the constitutional judiciary to enjoy procedural autonomy. Furthermore, the TCC emphasized that if the Court were to apply the challenged Provision II to review the provision’s own constitutionality, it would leave the Court’s opinion tangled in a logical fallacy of circular reasoning.  For this reason, the TCC applied Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the CCPA (same as Article 30 of the previous version) as the rule for quorum and threshold of this case. 

    For this case’s extreme circumstance, where three justices have continuously refused to join deliberation due to their belief that this case should apply the Provision II quorum, the TCC held that they should be discounted from the number of incumbent justices in this case. The TCC based its decision on the same legal reasoning that vacancies, recused justices, and justices not yet on duty are not included in the number of incumbent justices. The TCC stated that it made this decision as a last resort to maintain the functioning of the Court and its reviewing competence, given the uncertainty surrounding when the vacancies can be filled.  

Decision of the Court

    Aside from TCC’s opinion on this case’s procedure, the Court’s decision can be summarized into two main aspects. 

    First, the TCC found the legislative process for the challenged provisions severely flawed, violating the due process of lawmaking under the Constitution. Such flaws were as follows:

1. The amendment bill for all the challenged provisions was initially proposed by a group of legislators led by Legislator Hsiao-Ling WENG. When being discussed article-by-article during a second-reading meeting, the amendments for Provisions I to VI were adjusted entirely by a subsequent amendment motion proposed by the Taiwan People's Party caucus. Such an adjustment, along with the lack of explanation, left the public, other legislators, and relevant authorities unable to respond or reflect, thereby violating the principles of transparency and openness. 
2. An immediate halt to discussion followed the said motion. The adjusted bill was soon passed through its second and third readings. Such a process negates the requirement for discussion in the legislative process. 
3. Furthermore, the records show that there was a high disagreement on this bill between parties, thus requiring a formal plenary vote under Article 11 of the Law Governing Legislative Yuan’s Power rather than being passed through unanimous consent upon third reading. Failing to adopt such a procedure violates the principle of democracy. 
4. The TCC added that this case presented flaws far more severe than the legislative process in TCC Judgment 113-Hsien-Pan-9 (2024).

    Second, the TCC declared all the challenged provisions unconstitutional for violating the principle of separation of powers. The TCC’s decision was as follows:

1. The TCC held that Provision I, which imposes an additional obligation to the President’s constitutional-conferred nomination power for constitutional justices, violates the principle of separation of powers under the Constitution. 
2. The TCC declared Provision II unconstitutional on the grounds that it lacked subsidiary measures to prevent the Court from being paralyzed when vacancies occur. The quorum for the TCC was originally based on a proportion of the incumbent justices. As Provision II established a fixed quorum of ten justices for deliberation and a fixed threshold of nine for declaring unconstitutionality, the TCC found that it would hinder the justices from exercising their competence, thereby violating the principle of separation of powers. 
3. The TCC noted that Provision III has unreasonably allowed dismissal rulings if the number of justices taking part in the proceeding could not meet the quorum in Provision II, which negates the Constitution’s intention to protect people’s fundamental rights and the liberal democratic constitutional order through constitutional adjudication. 
4. Subsequent to the unconstitutionality of Provisions II and III, the TCC also declared Provision IV unconstitutional for applying the quorum and threshold of the two provisions to preliminary injunction orders, impeachment cases of the President and Vice President of the State, and cases regarding the dissolution of political parties. The TCC emphasized that such an application would render the Court unable to handle such cases promptly, which could lead to irreparable damages, continuous political turmoil, or increased social antagonism. 
5. The TCC declared Provisions V and VI unconstitutional for establishing a baseless quorum and threshold for the justices to exercise their competence, thereby violating the principle of separation of powers. The TCC noted that the provisions could apply only in the rare instance where there are fifteen incumbent justices (a full bench) and eight of them recuse themselves. As justices’ vacancies or taking a leave would apply the quorum of ten and threshold of nine under Provision II, the TCC pointed out the absurdity that, under Provisions V and VI, recusal of eight justices would somehow lead to a quorum of full attendance (seven) and threshold of three-quarters. The TCC considered this differential treatment unfounded and failed to offer guidance in situations where multiple reasons coexist in a justice’s nonparticipation. 
6. The TCC held that Provision VII, which deleted the commencement clauses for the two previous amendments, was nonconforming with the Central Regulation Standard Act and violated the principle of legal stability, thereby obstructing the justices’ exercise of competence. Provision VII was declared unconstitutional, thus null and void.

Notes:

1. The full texts of the TCC Judgment as well as the concurring and dissenting opinions of individual Justices are available on the TCC website in Traditional Chinese. An English summary of this Judgment will be available later on the TCC English website.
2. The TCC’s Case News is prepared by the Department of Clerks for the Constitutional Court (Judicial Yuan) for information only and does not constitute as a part of the decision. 
3.  In case of any conflict of meaning between the Traditional Chinese version and the translated English version, the Traditional Chinese version shall prevail.