One of the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner No. 1), Lin-chao Chen, jointly inherited the disputed land (hereinafter referred to as Land A) on July 23, 1946, along with Chen-shi Lin and Chin-shing Lin. His share of the inheritance was one-third of the estate. Subsequently, upon the death of Chen-shi Lin on February 13, 1963, one-third of Land A was jointly inherited by Petitioner No. 1 and Chin-Liang Lin, as an heir through per stirpes distribution. The succession of Land A through two intestate inheritances was never registered. According to inheritance law, Land A should be jointly owned by Petitioner No. 1 and Chin-Liang Lin. On March 19, 1976, Chin-Liang Lin unilaterally changed the ownership of Land A to solely list himself as owner. He then sold and transferred ownership to Long-cheng Lin, his son, on June 9, 2005, without the consent of Petitioner No. 1. Consequently, Petitioner No. 1 initiated civil action in court, arguing that the transaction between Chin-Liang Lin and Long-cheng Lin should be voided. The Supreme Court rejected his claim in Supreme Court Civil Judgment 102-Tai-Shang-2449 (2013) (hereinafter referred to as Decision No. 1). Petitioner No. 1 subsequently filed a constitutional petition asserting that Decision No. 1's reliance on the Supreme Court Civil Precedent 40-Tai-Shang-730 (1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Disputed Precedent), which states that "if the claim to recover entitlement to inherited estate becomes extinct due to the statute of limitations imposed by Article 1146, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, the real heir's original right of inheritance ceases to exist, and the putative heir acquires the entitlement" violates Articles 15, 22, and 23 of the Constitution. He further argued that the precedent should be invalidated to resolve the decade-long debates surrounding the right to recover entitlement to inherited estates and to unify the interpretation of the law.
The other petitioner(hereinafter as Petitioner No. 2), An-jieh Luo, a daughter of Wen-chin Luo, was designated by law as the heir of the first order together with Chia-shin Luo, the adopted daughter of Wen-chin Luo, and Chia-lin Chung, the surviving spouse of Wen-chin Luo. After Wen-chin Luo died on April 6, 2003, a family meeting was held and decided that all heirs in all orders, except Yen-der Luo and Chia-lin Chung, would forfeit their right of inheritance. It was further determined that Yen-der Luo and Chia-lin Chung would jointly inherit Wen-chin Luo's estate, become owners of the disputed land (hereinafter referred to as Land B), and administrate all assets and debts of Wen-chin Luo. At the time, Petitioner No. 2 was a minor, and her mother, Chia-lin Chung, acting as her legal representative, submitted the declaration for forfeiture of intestate succession rights to the court on June 2, 2003. Subsequently, Chia-lin Chung and Yen-der Luo registered themselves as joint owners of inherited Land B on July 23, 2004. On August 2, 2009, the Taiwan Taichung District Court issued Taichung District Court Civil Judgment 98-Su-7 (2009), ruling the declaration of forfeiture void due to Chia-lin Chung's action infringing on Petitioner B's interests. It affirmed Petitioner B's entitlement to Wen-chin Luo's intestate estate, and this decision became final as no appeal was filed thereafter. Petitioner No. 2 attempted to challenge Yen-der Luo's ownership registration in court on October 3, 2012, but lost the case after the Supreme Court issued its final decision in Supreme Court Civil Judgment 103-Tai-Shang-1671 (2014) (hereinafter referred to as Decision No. 2). Petitioner No. 2 then filed a constitutional petition asserting that Decision No. 2's reliance on J.Y. Interpretation Y.C.T. No. 3997, issued on June 14, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Disputed Interpretation), and the Disputed Precedent constitutes violations of Articles 1147 and 1148 of the Civil Code, as well as Supreme Court Civil Precedent 53-Tai-Shang-592 (1964), and Article 15 of the Constitution.
The previous interpretations (J.Y. Interpretation Nos. 154, 271, 374, 569, 582, and others) have affirmed that a precedent invoked as the legal basis in a finalized decision shall be deemed a decree and can be subject to constitutional review. Although the Disputed Precedent was not specifically cited in Decision No. 1, nor was the Disputed Interpretation referenced in Decision No. 2, it can be inferred from the legal arguments presented in these decisions that they were substantially considered by the Supreme Court and served as the legal basis for ruling against the claims raised by Petitioner No. 1 and Petitioner No. 2. Furthermore, Petitioner No. 1 and Petitioner No. 2 have adequately explained how the Disputed Precedent and Interpretation may infringe upon their rights to property safeguarded by the Constitution, thereby raising doubts about the constitutionality of the Interpretations. Therefore, the petitions conformed to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (1993) and were hereby granted.
Given that both of the aforementioned petitions involve the Disputed Precedent, the Court has consolidated the petitions and issued this Interpretation. The reasoning is as follows:
1. The precedent at issue violates the protection of the right to property prescribed in Article 15 and shall no longer be valid.
Article 15 of the Constitution protects people's right to property, ensuring each individual's freedom to use, profit from, and dispose of their property during its existence. It aims to prevent infringement by the government or any other third parties, thereby safeguarding people's access to life resources essential for their livelihood and personal development (see J.Y. Interpretation Nos. 596, 709, 732, and 763). An heir assumes all rights and obligations related to the decedent's estate at the time of the commencement of the succession (see Article 1148 of the Civil Code). An heir's rights, including the right to inherit, the right to recover entitlement to inherited estate, and other rights such as property return based on ownership rights to each asset of the decedent's estate, possess inherent property value and thus merit protection under Article 15 of the Constitution.
The legal system of inheritance aims to protect the rights of heirs by allowing individuals with a specified relationship to the decedent to acquire the decedent's estate following their death (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 437). Succession begins immediately upon the decedent's death. Regardless of whether the heir is aware that succession has commenced or whether the estate is in their possession or under their control, they automatically assume all rights and obligations related to the decedent's estate (see Article 1147 and Paragraph 1 of Article 1148 of the Civil Code).
However, if a person who is not a real heir or one of the legitimate heirs (hereinafter referred to as a putative heir) challenges the real heir's qualification for succession and deprives them of possession, management, and disposition of the inherited estate, the real heir inherently retains the right to claim entitlement to the estate assets as their owner. They can also take legal actions against the putative heir to reclaim these assets and remove the infringement. However, when the inherited estate involves multiple assets, the real heir would need to initiate multiple actions to reclaim each encroached asset from the putative heir. To enhance the protection of the real heir's legitimate rights more effectively, Paragraph 1 of Article 1146 of the Civil Code stipulates that "where the right to inherit has been infringed upon, the injured party or their legal representative may claim its recovery." This provision allows the real heir to collectively reclaim all encroached assets without having to individually prove their rightful ownership of each asset when their inheritance qualification is contested and the estate is encroached upon. They only need to demonstrate their status as the legitimate heir while asserting their right to reclaim the inherited estate. This right exists separately yet concurrently with the ownership rights to each individual asset (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 437).
The precedent at issue states that "the right to recover the entitlement to inherited estate encompasses both the affirmation of the qualification of an heir and the recovery of every right relevant to the inherited estate. If the claim to recover the entitlement to inherited estate becomes extinctive because the statute of limitations expires, the real heir's original right of inheritance then ceases to exist; and the putative heir, therefore, acquires the entitlement." However, according to Article 144, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, which prescribes that "after the time of the statute of limitations expires, the debtor is entitled to refuse to perform his obligation," such refusal to perform only has the effect of defense according to the Civil Code. Similarly, when the statute of limitations for the right to recover the entitlement to inherited estate prescribed in Article 1146, Paragraph 2 expires, it merely enables the obligator of the recovery to invoke such law as a defense. The right to inherit per se still exists (see the legislative purpose of Article 144 of Civil Code).
Paragraph 1 of Article 1148 of the Civil Code stipulates that "unless it is otherwise provided for in this Code, an heir assumes all the rights and obligations pertaining to the estate of the decedent at the time of the commencement of the succession." The precedent at issue here nevertheless takes a further inference that after the putative heir makes the defense to assert that the statute of limitations for the right to recover the entitlement to the inherited estate has expired, the real heir would lose all the rights relevant to the inherited estate. While the real heir loses all the rights on the inherited estate derived from the right of inheritance, including the right to return the entitlement prescribed in Article 767 of the Civil Code, the putative heir as a consequence acquires the right of inheritance.
The purpose of the right to recover the entitlement of the inherited estate is to render the real heir a special status to remove consummately and speedily the infringement on the inherited estate imposed by the putative heir. Even when the putative heir makes the defense to assert that the statute of limitations for the right to recover the entitlement to the inherited estate has expired, the real heir merely loses his special status to claim such right. It does not follow that the legal heir loses his/her status as a legitimate heir as well as the estate he/she already inherited. He/She must be entitled to demand the removal of the infringement and return the infringed assets under the relevant provisions, for instance, Article 767, of the Civil Code, so as to be in accordance with what the J.Y. Interpretation No. 437 has prescribed as "the claim to recover the entitlement to inherited estate and the claim to return of each asset of the decedent's estate are separate but co-existing rights" as well as the protection of people's right to property secured by Article 15 of the Consitution.
The part regarding the forfeiture of the right to inherit in the precedent at issue not only deprives the real heir of his right to inherit derived from his status, which has added another stipulation to forfeit the right of inheritance without explicit legal provision (see Article 1145 in the Civil Code) but also departs from various principles of inheritance law such as the principle of automatic succession and the non-transferrableness of the right to inherit. It fundamentally undermines the real heir's rights and obligations which have already been legally assumed, and further causes the loss of the property right of each inherited asset. The real heir as a result cannot make any claims such as the claim to return the asset based on the right of ownership or other rights to the inherited estate. At the same time, comparing to the 15 years of statute of limitations, the statutes of limitations of both two years and ten years in Article 1146 of the Civil Code are shorter. The precedent at issue not only allows the putative heir to invoke the statute of limitations but also makes the real heir lose all of his rights to inherit within a shorter period of time. To the same degree, it shortens the statute of limitations of the claim based on Article 767 of the Civil Code to two years or ten years and consequently yields a severe effect of dispossession, even when the tortious act takes place after ten years of the commencement of the inheritance. The consequence is too harsh for the real heir. The part of "the real heir's original right of inheritance then ceases to exist; and the putative heir, therefore, acquires the entitlement" in the disputed precedent thus violates the protection of the right to property prescribed in Article 15 and shall no longer be valid from the date of the promulgation of this Interpretation.
In order to maintain the existing legal order stemming from the long-term possession of the estate from the putative heir and to consider the legislative purpose of the imposition of the statute of limitations on the claim of recovery of the right to inherit, the statute of limitations stipulated in Article 125 of the Civil Code shall be applied, when the real heir files a claim according to Article 767 of the Civil Code based on the right of ownership to his inherited estate, be it a personal property or registered or non-registered real estate. To this extent, J.Y. Interpretation Nos. 107 and 164 shall be supplemented accordingly.
As far as the third party who make a transaction with the putative heir in a good faith is concerned, he can be protected by the law of adverse possession of personal property based on good faith stipulated in Article 801 of the Civil Code, and the law of adverse possession of registered real estate based on the trust in the prima facie registration stipulated in Article 759-1 of the Civil Code and the Land Act, as well as the effect of the debt performance stipulated in Article 310 of the Civil Code. That being the case, even if the law recognizes that the real heir's right of inheritance and the property rights of each asset of intestate would not be extinctive after the statute of the limitations imposed on the right to recover the right of inheritance expires, it would not jeopardize the transactional safety and the rights of the third party in good faith.
2. The Interpretations at issue violate the protection of the right to property prescribed in Article 15 of the Constitution and shall no longer be valid.
The disputed Interpretation states that "when the putative heir asserts a defense of the statute of limitation based on Article 1146, Paragraph 2, the relationship between him and the claimant whose right of inheritance is encroached is no different than a real heir. The property rights to the estate of the decedent shall be deemed transferred to the putative heir from the moment of the commencement of the inheritance." It deems that the status of the putative heir is no different than a real heir after he asserts the defense of the statute of limitations and thus acquires the estate which should have belonged to the real heir. To this extent, the part of the acquisition of inherited property by the putative heir in the disputed Interpretation has the same effect as the disputed precedent on the forfeit of the right of inheritance and shall be subject to constitutional review in the same manner. Since the disputed precedent has been deemed unconstitutional, the disputed Interpretation shall be also be considered unconstitutional.
The Justices of the first term were appointed by the President on July 15 of 1948 and they convened the first meeting on September 15 in the same year. The J.Y. Interpretation No. 1 was made on January 6 of 1949. At an earlier time, the Judicial Yuan had delivered Y.T. and Y.C.T. interpretations with the total amount of 4097. The interpretations made during the Period of Political Tutelage were numbered as Y.T. from No. 1 made on February 16 of 1929 to No. 2875 made on April 30 of 1945, and later numbered as Y.C.T. from No. 2876 made on May 4 of 1945 to No. 3770 made on December 24 of 1947 [Note 1]. During the period between the implementation of the Constitution on December 25 of 1947 and the inauguration of the Justices of the first term, the interpretations were made from Y.C.T. No. 3771 of December 29 of 1947 to Y.C.T. No. 4097 of June 23 of 1948. The above interpretations were made by the President of the Judicial Yuan within his power to unify statutory Interpretation and to reverse precedents, after the convention of the meeting with the President of the Supreme Court and division-chief judges therein(see Article 3 of the Judicial Yuan Organization Act revised on November 17 of 1928). On account of this historical explanation, the nature of interpretations of Y.T. and Y.C.T. was the unified interpretation of statutes and regulations according to the law at that time and was not the interpretation of the text of the Constitution. The legal basis of such power stemmed from the Rules regarding the Unified Interpretations of Laws and Regulations and the Revision of the Judicial Precedents of the Judicial Yuan of the National Government promulgated on January 4 of 1929. The procedure of the Interpretation making stipulated in Articles 4 to 6 as well as Article 8 of the aforementioned rules [Note 2]was as follows: The President of the Judicial Yuan firstly assigned the case to the President of the Supreme Court and the case was later distributed to the division-chief-judges of the civil or criminal division in the Supreme Court. After the division-chief-judges wrote their opinions, the President of the Supreme Court then submitted the opinions to the President of the Judicial Yuan for review and approval. The Interpretation was finalized by the meeting of the unified Interpretation of statutes and regulations. Although the above procedure was similar to that of the unified opinions of the Supreme Court, the competent authority to promulgate interpretations was the Judicial Yuan which is the highest judicial organ of the State, rather than the Supreme Court which is the highest court exercising its power to review and try cases.
The Judicial Yuan is vested with the power to interpret the Constitution, and to provide unified interpretations with respect to statutes and regulations (see Article 78 and Article 79, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution). The interpretations of the Judicial Yuan shall be binding upon every institution and person in the country, and each institution shall abide by the meaning of these interpretations in handling relevant matters (see J.Y.Interpretation No. 185). The power vested in the Judicial Yuan to make the interpretations of Y.T. or Y.C.T. did not stem from the Constitution; the procedure and the competent authority to make such interpretations were different from the interpretations made by the Justices. "The interpretations of the Judicial Yuan" stated in J.Y. Interpretation No. 185 shall not be construed as to include interpretations of Y.T. or Y.C.T. With respect to the procedure and authority of promulgation, the nature of the interpretations of Y.T. or Y.C.T. shall be deemed as a decree made by the Judicial Yuan as the highest judicial organ in order to unify the statutory Interpretation of relevant laws and regulations under the power rendered by the law at that time [Note 3]. Under the current constitutional system, judges can invoke such interpretations but are not bound by them; judges are allowed to express different opinions in accordance with the laws(see J.Y. Interpretation No. 216). With regard to the effect and the legal level of the interpretations of Y.T. or Y.C.T., the J.Y. Interpretation No. 108 stated in its reasoning that "the interpretations made by Judicial Yuan, unless the underlying law or regulation is revised, remain effective and shall not be compromised until itself being amended." In addition, J.Y. Interpretation No. 174 stated that "if before the amendment of an interpretation, it appears that the legal objectives of the new and old rulings are consistent, the legal explanations are the same, the subject matter of the Interpretation still exists or the content of the Interpretation can be used to supplement the new ruling, then the existing ruling will remain in effect." These two parts of the interpretations are incongruent with the aforementioned ruling in this Interpretation and shall be revised. Regarding those interpretations of Y.T.or Y.C.T. which were explicitly affirmed and supplemented by the interpretations made by the Justices (for instance Interpretation Y.T. No. 2702 was affirmed by J.Y. Interpretation No. 679; Interpretation Yuan-Chieh-Tzu No. 2986 was supplemented by J.Y. Interpretation No. 308), if the underlying law or regulation is still effective and the said interpretations made by the Justices have not been revised, to the extent of the scope of affirmation and supplement, these interpretations have the same effect as the unified Interpretation with respect to statutes and regulations provided by the Justices.
In conclusion, the part about the acquisition of inherited property by the putative heir in the disputed Interpretation is in conflict with the protection of people's property right guaranteed by Article 15 of the Constitution, and shall no longer be valid.
Besides, the assertion made by Petitioner No. 1 stating that Decision No. 1 violates Article 388 of the Code of Civil Procedure, J.Y. Interpretation Nos. 185 and 437, is challenges regarding fact-finding and application of the law of the court decision. However, under the current legal system, the court decision together with its legal doctrine cannot be the object of the constitutional Interpretation. The aforementioned constitutional challenges made by Petitioner No. 1 is discordant with Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (1993) and shall be dismissed according to Paragraph 3 of the same article. Moreover, Petitioner No. 1 asserted that when applying Article 1146 of Civil Code, Decision No. 1 invoked disputed precedent and the Supreme Court Civil Judgment 53-Tai-Shang-1928 (1964) which was inconsistent with the opinion in the Kaohsiung Administrative High Court Judgment 101-Su-114(2012). He thus filed for the unification of Interpretation of the statute. However, the aforementioned Kaohsiung Administrative High Court Decision did not invoke the disputed precedent nor Decision No. 1 invoked the above civil precedent of 1964. Furthermore, the opinion with regard to the application of Article 1146, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code in Decision No. 1 is no different than the opinion in the aforementioned Kaohsiung Administrative High Court Decision. Accordingly, the aforementioned petition for unified Interpretation made by Petitioner No. 1 is discordant with Article 7, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (1993) and shall be dismissed according to Paragraph 3 of the same article.
[Note 1]: An interpretation made by the Judicial Yuan would be called Yuan-Tzu, if it was made during the period from February of 1929 to April of 1945. It would be called Yuan-Chieh-Tzu, if it was made during the period from May of 1945 to June of 1948. But the numbers were coded consecutively from Y.T. to Y.C.T. Interpretations, meaning that Y.C.T. Interpretations did not begin with No. 1 and therefore Y.C.T. began with No. 2876 followed after Y.T. No. 2875. Although the title was changed from Y.T. to Y.C.T., the numbers were consecutively coded.
[Note 2]: Article 4 of the Rules regarding the Unified Interpretations of Laws and Regulations and the Revision of the Judicial Precedents of the Judicial Yuan of the National Government stipulated that "upon receiving the request for the unified Interpretation and regulations, the President of the Judicial Yuan firstly assigned the case to the President of the Supreme Court; the case would further be assigned, according to the nature of the case, to the chief judge in the civil division or criminal division to write the draft of the opinion. If the request is submitted to the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Court shall follow the same procedure herein." At the same time, Article 5 stipulates that "the chief judge in the Supreme Court who are assigned the task mentioned in the previous provision shall counsel with other chief judges for their opinions after finishing the draft." In addition, Article 6 stipulates that "the draft, after being noted by chief judges of each division and approval by the President of the Supreme Court, shall be submitted to the President of the Judicial Yuan for review and approval; If the President of the Judicial Yuan approved the opinion, it shall then become a proposal for the meeting of the unified interpretations and regulations" and Article 8 stipulates that "(Paragraph 1) the judgment of the meeting of the unified interpretations and regulations shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the total number of the members listed in Article 3 of the revised Judicial Yuan Organization Act. The chair has the final say when the yes and no votes are equal. (Paragraph 2) The meeting in the previous paragraph shall be chaired by the President of the Judicial Yuan pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the revised Judicial Yuan Organization Act. If the President of the Judicial Yuan is unable to attend the meeting due to any cause, the deputy president of the Judicial Yuan shall act for him; If the deputy president of the Judicial Yuan is also unable to attend the meeting due to any cause, the President of the Supreme Court shall act for him."
[Note 3]: Article 2 of the Rules regarding the Unified Interpretations of Laws and Regulations and the Revision of the Judicial Precedents of the Judicial Yuan of the National Government provides that "the request to interpret the matter of judicial administration does not apply the provisions of the rules." In addition, Article 3, Paragraph 1 stipulates that " every agency, government official and a public legal person established by the law is permitted to request for Interpretation on the laws and regulations relevant to their authority".
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*Translated by Hsiao-Wei Kuan