Article 3, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 3 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of China stipulates: “The Executive Yuan shall be accountable to the Legislative Yuan in accordance with the following provisions; … (3) With the signatures of more than one-third of the total members, the Legislative Yuan may propose a no-confidence motion against the Premier of the Executive Yuan. After 72 hours since the no-confidence motion is made, an open-ballot vote shall be cast within 48 hours. …” The purpose of this provision is to require the open ballot vote to be completed within the provided time limit so as to avoid the delay and suspension that affects political stability. But the provision does not require that a no-confidence motion must be proposed during an ordinary session. Article 69 of the Constitution stipulates: “In any of the following circumstances, the Legislative Yuan may hold an extraordinary session: 1. At the request of the President; 2. At the request of no less than one-fourth of its Members.” It only stipulates the procedure of convening an extraordinary session and does not limit the subject matters that can be reviewed therein. Therefore, the Constitution does not prohibit the Legislative Yuan from reviewing a no-confidence motion in an extraordinary session. Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Legislative Yuan Organization Act provides: “An extraordinary session shall be proceeded in accordance with Article 69 of the Constitution, and only the specific matters that the extraordinary session is convened for can be decided.” The part that is not consistent with the meaning and purpose of the aforementioned Constitution provision shall no longer be applicable. When a no-confidence motion is proposed during recess, the Legislative Yuan shall immediately convene an extraordinary session to review the motion

       Article 3, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 3 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of China stipulates: “The Executive Yuan shall be accountable to the Legislative Yuan in accordance with the following provisions; … (3) With the signatures of more than one-third of the total members, the Legislative Yuan may propose a no-confidence motion against the Premier of the Executive Yuan. After 72 hours since the no-confidence motion is made, an open-ballot vote shall be cast within 48 hours. …[the former part, hereinafter the Disputed Constitutional Provision] Should more than one-half of the total Legislative Yuan members approve the motion, the Premier of the Executive Yuan shall resign within ten days, and may simultaneously petition the President to dissolve the Legislative Yuan; in the event that the no-confidence motion fails to carry, no re-submission of a no-confidence motion against the same Premier of the Executive Yuan may be permitted within one year. [the later part]” The mechanism of a no-confidence motion is established for ensuring party discipline, resolving political stalemate, and realizing political accountability, and also has the positive effect of stabilizing politics (see the Illustration of Constitution Amendment Proposal No. 1 at the Second Session of the Third National Assembly in May, 1997). To avoid a delay and suspension that affects political stability, the Disputed Constitutional Provision provides that after 72 hours since the no-confidence motion is proposed, an open-ballot vote shall be cast within 48 hours. But it does not require that a no-confidence motion must be proposed in an ordinary session. In addition, Article 69 of the Constitution stipulates: “In any of the following circumstances, the Legislative Yuan may hold an extraordinary session: 1. At the request of the President; 2. At the request of no less than one-fourth of its Members.” It only stipulates the procedure of convening an extraordinary session and does not limit the subject matters that can be reviewed therein. In light of the constitutional requirement of a speedy disposition of a no-confidence motion, it is not disallowed by the Constitution for the legislative Yuan to review a no-confidence motion in an extraordinary session. However, Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Legislative Yuan Organization Act provides: “An extraordinary session shall be proceeded in accordance with Article 69 of the Constitution, and only the specific matters that the extraordinary session is convened for can be decided.” On the part that does not permit the review of a no-confidence motion in an extraordinary session convened due to other specific matters, it is not consistent with the meaning and purpose of the aforementioned Constitution provision and shall no longer be applicable. Since the Disputed Constitutional Provision does not restrict the timing of proposing a no-confidence motion, when a no-confidence motion is proposed during recess, the Legislative Yuan shall immediately convene an extraordinary session to review the motion.

       Article 37 of the Legislative Yuan Power Exercise Act is a provision concerning the procedure of the introduction and review of a no-confidence motion. Although this matter falls within legislative self-governance, it is worth noting that, as a matter of course, the provision shall comply with the requirement that the Disputed Constitutional Provision imposes: After 72 hours since a no-confidence motion is proposed, the process of an open-ballot vote shall be completed within 48 hours.

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＊ Translated by Chung-Lin CHEN.