Article 4 of the Administrative Proceedings Act providing that: “a judgment of the Administrative Court, insofar as the matter adjudged is concerned, shall have a binding effect upon all related government agencies,” is a statute designed to guarantee the people the constitutional right to demand through legal procedure final disposition by the court of their disputes over jural relations. Thus, where the judgment entered by the Administrative Court setting aside an administrative decision or action is one pointing out that the facts of the case are unclear and requiring the defendant government agency to take alternative action upon investigation into the facts and evidence, such agency must conduct an investigation into the facts and evidence either in pursuance of the substance of the judgment or ex officio. If, based upon the facts found in consequence of such further investigation, the previous action is deemed to be free of error in law, the opinions given in support of the previous action may be sustained. If, however, the judgment entered by the Supreme Administrative Court setting aside an administrative decision or action is one that points out an error in law in such administrative action, the judgment must be taken as binding upon its supervisory government agency. The Supreme Administrative Court Precedent P.T. 35 (1971), holding that “if it is specifically pointed out in the reasoning of our judgment to nullify an administrative decision or action and that the defendant government agency must review the case, such administrative agency may of course conduct an investigation ex officio into the facts and evidence and make a decision based upon its review, and the result of such investigation, even if of the same opinion as the decision previously nullified, is not against the law,” is contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution in protecting the people’s right to sue, to the extent that it is inconsistent with the essence of our opinion given above, and must therefore be rendered invalid.